3 From Berne to Frankfurt to Jena: Failed Projects and Fresh Starts
第3章 “從伯爾尼到法蘭克福再到耶拿時期：失敗的計劃和新的開始”(2)
Hegel gladly accepted the position and left Berne as soon as he could.
? ? 黑格爾樂意接受這個職位并盡快離開了伯爾尼。
Christianity, Modernity, and Hegel’s Bernese Kantianism
基督教、現代性和黑格爾伯爾尼時期的康德主義
Although Hegel himself was crushingly disappointed with his activities in Berne, his time there was not completely wasted. Notwithstanding that he was failing in terms of his own aspirations, in terms of where he was eventually headed he had been laying some crucial groundwork. He had begun an intense study of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling - although with some chagrin he admitted to Schelling that “you cannot expect observations from me on your writing. In this matter I am but an apprentice”^^ - which was to pay off a few years later. In his few writings in Berne, he at first continued the line of thought that he had begun in his “Tubingen Essay,” continuing to employ the distinction between objective and subjective religion, all the while spicing it up with some of his new readings and new reflections. The fragments of his work from this period show that his Enlightenment background (as tempered by his admiration for Rousseau) continued to play a role in this thought. For example, on the one hand, he claimed that any division of society into “estates” {Stdnde) is a danger to freedom, since it fragments the whole — a theme that had also been voiced in an essay written during his period at the Stuttgart Gymnasium^ in which he drew on his youthful readings of Johann Herder and the “popular philosopher” Christian Garve to explicate the difference between ancient and modern literature.He also began to echo Edward Gibbon in his discussions of how the introduction of Christianity had undermined the Roman empire; Gibbon’s irony coupled with his passionate attachment to his subject obviously made a big impression on Hegel - indeed, he was to adopt some of Gibbon’s manner in his own masterpiece, the Phenomenology of Spirit. On the other hand, he praised the individuality of Socrates and compared Jesus unfavorably to Socrates; Socrates, he says, “left behind no Masonic signs, no mandate to proclaim his name.? ... He did not, in order to bring people to perfect goodness, outline some detour by way of him . . . dispensing with mediators, he led the individual only into himself.”^"* He revived the idea found in the “Tubingen Essay” of transforming an “objective” religion into a “subjective” religion, except that now he ascribed this task to the state, noting that somehow the state must do this while preserving freedom for the individual conscience.(Exactly how the state was to do this, he did not say.)
? ? 雖然黑格爾本人對他在伯爾尼的活動極度失望，但他在那里的時間沒有被完全浪費。盡管他未能根據自己的志向做事，但他在自己致力于從事的事業方面，還是打下了某種至關重要的基礎。他已經著手對康德、費希特和謝林進行廣泛的研究——盡管他有些愧謙地向謝林承認“你不能期待我對你的著作作出評論。在這件事上我只是個學徒”——這個學徒必將在幾年后取得成功。在他伯爾尼時期少量作品中，他起初繼續秉持他在“圖賓根論文”中開出的思路、繼續使用主觀宗教與客觀宗教這一區分，始終以他的某些新解讀和新反思來為這一區分加工潤色。他這個階段札記表明他的啟蒙運動背景（作為他對盧梭的欽佩所調和的東西）繼續在上述思考中發揮重要作用。舉例來說，一方面，他聲稱任何把社會分成“等級”（Stdnde）的做法都是對自由的威脅，因為這樣的做法打破了整體——一個同樣早在他斯圖加特高級中學階段撰寫的文章中就已被提出的論題，在那篇文章中，他把他青年時期對約翰·赫爾德和“通俗哲學家”克里斯蒂安·加爾弗的解讀，用來解釋古代文學與現代文學的區別。他同樣也著手在探討基督教的傳入怎么削弱了羅馬帝國時重復愛德華·吉本的觀點；吉本的諷刺連同他對他的問題表現出的熱情明顯地給黑格爾留下了深刻的印象——更確切地說，他必將在他自己的杰作《精神現象學》中采用吉本的某些方式。另一方面，他贊揚蘇格拉底的個性且不贊成把耶穌與蘇格拉底相比；蘇格拉底，他說，“沒有留下共濟會標志，沒有命令人們去為他歌功頌德……他沒有，為了把人們引向至善，從而通過他自己來勾勒出標種迂回曲折的道路……在摒棄了調解者后，他只是使他自己具有個性?！彼厥澳且娪凇皥D賓根論文”把“客觀的”宗教變成“主觀的”宗教這一想法，只是眼下他把這個任務歸于國家，他強調指出不管怎么樣，國家在保護個人良知的自由時必須這樣做。（國家恰恰怎么必將這樣做，他沒有說出具體理由。）
In making these kinds of claims, however, he once again found himself in a bind of his own making: On the one hand, he wanted to call for some way of overcoming the fragmentation of modern life and establishing some form of community without at the same time violating individual liberty of conscience; on the other, he wanted to praise the reliance on individual insight and understanding taught by Socrates without letting such self-reliant individuals go on to fragment themselves from the social whole and from each other. In his Berne fragments, just as in his “Tubingen Essay,” he still had found no concrete way to bring these kinds of conflicting claims together, to unite his ideas of a unified, unfragmented “beautiful” social whole with the idea of the preservation of the rights and practices of the individual conscience. He seemed to realize that his prescriptions ended up being only moralistic calls for “something better” without any real possibility of their being realized. And as a Wiirttemberger, he of course certainly knew the pitfalls of having a “state” simply mandate a particular religion; Duke Carl Eugen would have gladly mandated Catholicism for his subjects, if only he could have gotten away with it.
? ? 然而，在提出這些種類的主張時，他再度發覺解鈴還須系鈴人：一方面，他想倡導一種用以克服現代生活的斷裂和建立一種形式社區的方法而同時又不侵犯個人的良知自由；另一方面，他想贊揚依賴由蘇格拉底教導的個體洞察力和理解力而同時又不讓這種依靠自己的個體繼續割斷他們自己與社會整體的聯系和他們彼此間的聯系。在他的伯爾尼時期札記中，正像在他的“圖賓根論文”中一樣，他仍然沒有發現任何具體的方法可使這些種類的自相矛盾的主張融為一體，可使他關于一個統一的非碎片化的“優美的”社會整體這類想法與保護個體良知的權利和實點這一想法結合起來。他看來好像意識到他的一系列濟世良方最終僅僅道德主義式地倡導“樹立一種更好的東西”而根本不可能真正地使它們得以實現。而且作為一個符騰堡人，他當然肯定曉得讓“國家”簡單地授權一種特殊的宗教是非常危險的；卡爾·歐根公爵大概很樂意把臣民委托給天主教，但愿他可以僥幸成功。
Most significant for Hegel’s development during his Bernese period was his growing concern with what it would mean, as he had put it to Schelling, to “complete” the Kantian philosophy. Indeed, his fragments and his more developed pieces from that time bear witness to his early forays into Fichte’s writings and, more importantly, to the growing influence of Kant on his thought. In Berne, his more explicitly Rousseauian commitments began to fade as the more overtly Kantian elements came more and more to the fore, and Aristotle’s notion that the good man finds happiness in what virtue requires started to become linked with Hegel’s increasingly Kantian stance in ethics. By the very end of his stay in Berne, Hegel was beginning to redescribe everything in terms of the basic notions of Kantian ethical theory. Although there were strains of Fichte in some of the fragments from that period - his friend Schelling was clearly going in the direction of Fichtean thought at this time, and Hegel was not immune to it — it was Kantian language that began to overtake Hegel’s earlier ways of formulating things. For example, in one of the fragments from the Berne period, we find Hegel claiming, like a good Kantian, that “the effect of religion is to strengthen, by means of the idea of God as moral lawgiver, ethical life’s motives and to enhance the satisfaction we derive from performing what our practical reason demands, specifically with regard to the ultimate end that reason posits: The highest good.”^*^
? ? 對于黑格爾在伯爾尼時期思想發展最有意義的是他逐漸關注“完成”康德哲學通常意味著什么，像他那時已向謝林提出的一樣。更確切地說，他那時的札記和他較為詳細地闡發的段落證明他早年涉獵了費希特的作品，更重要的是，證明他的思想日益受到康德的影響。在伯爾尼時期，他的更加明晰的盧梭主義的承諾逐漸消失，其時康德哲學的要素越來越居于顯要的地位。亞里士多德關于君子能夠找到美德所要求的快樂這一見解同樣也開始變得與黑格爾倫理學上日益趨向康德哲學立場相聯系。到快要離開伯爾尼時，黑格爾在著手根據康德倫理學理論的基本概念來重新描述每個倫理問題。雖然那個階段的一些札記帶有費希特思想的色彩——他的友人謝林當時顯然在沿著費希特思想方向繼續前進，黑格爾不能不受費希特思想的影響——但正是康德的用語逐漸替代黑格爾早期詳細論述事物的方法。舉例來說，在伯爾尼時期一段札記中，我們發覺黑格爾主張，像一個虔誠的康德哲學信徒一樣，“宗教的影響必定靠上帝作為道德立法者或倫理生活動機這一概念而變強，并必定提高我們從實現我們的實踐理性要求的東西中所獲得的滿意度、特別是提高我們從在理性設定的終極目的方面所獲得的滿意度：最高的善。”
Hegel also began to enlist Kant in his battle against Tubingen orthodoxy. In a letter, he dismissively asked Schelling, “How are things otherwise in Tubingen? ... In truth, nowhere is the old system so faithfully propagated as there.”” Taking the Tubingen theologians as his target, he even went so far in his Berne period as to write an entire “Life of Jesus” (unpublished in his lifetime) in which Jesus’ life and teachings were redescribed so as to fit more or less the ideas articulated by Kant in his Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason Alone. In the “Life of Jesus,” Jesus emerged not as the natural/supernatural deliverer of a divine revelation (as Hegel’s theology professor at Tubingen, Gottlob Storr, had tried to demonstrate) but instead as one of the foremost exponents of Kant’s “religion of morality.”
? ? 黑格爾同樣還在著手與圖賓根正統觀念的戰斗中支持康德哲學。在一封信中，他輕蔑地追問謝林，“有些事情怎么在圖賓根就變了樣？說實話，在那里舊體系晨兒也找不到忠實的擁躉。”由于把圖賓根神學家們當作他的靶子看待，他甚至在伯爾尼時期思想上走得如此之遠，以至于他寫出了一部完整的《耶穌傳》（該傳在他生前未發表）。在《耶穌傳》中耶穌的生活和學說被作了重新描述，以便或多或少與康德在《單純理性限度內的宗教》中系統闡述的觀點相適應。在《耶穌傳》中，耶穌不復以神啟示的自然或超自然的拯救者面目出現（像黑格爾的圖賓根神學教授戈特洛布·施托爾嘗試去證明的一樣），反而是以康德的“道德宗教”中最重要的闡釋者之一面目出現。
Hegel did not, however, make himself over into a fully orthodox Kantian. For him the question continued to be: If Christianity is to be made into a “people’s religion” (a “subjective” religion), and if that is to be identified with a quasi-Kantian understanding of the “kingdom of God and the “invisible church” — that is, if it is to be fully reinter- preted in light of the code words used by Schelling, Hegel, and Holderlin at the Seminary in Tubingen - then it must be given a purely moral interpretation that is also compatible with Hegel’s, Holderlin’s, and Schelling’s admiration for the idealized ancient Greeks as models for what a renewed social order would look like. Thus, Hegel attempted to fuse Kant’s idea of a “religion of morality” with his own critique of the fragmentation of modern life inspired by his youthful readings of Garve, Herder, and Rousseau, and out of this he hoped to produce a “popular philosophy” that would bring about, as he had put it to Schelling, the “revolution in Germany” that would follow from the “application” of Kant’s philosophy.-^*
? ? 可是黑格爾并沒有使自己變成一個完全正統的康德哲學信徒。對于他來說問題仍然是：如果基督教必將被弄成“人民宗教”（“主觀”宗教），如果這必將被認為等同于對“上帝王國”和“看不見的教堂”的標準康德式解讀——也即如果它必將被按照謝林、黑格爾、荷爾德林在圖賓根神學院時期所使用的暗語進行全面重新闡釋——那么它就必須被賦予一種純道德上的闡釋而且這種闡釋也要與下列的東西相一致：黑格爾、荷爾德林、謝林所欽佩的作為榜樣的理想化的古希臘人，一種脫胎換骨的社會秩序通常看起來所像的東西。因此，黑格爾嘗試著把康德的“道德宗教”概念與他自己因受他年輕時解讀加爾弗、赫爾德和盧梭作品的啟發而對現代生活碎片化的批判融為一體，由于這樣，他希望創造一種“通俗哲學”，“通俗哲學”將導致，像他向謝林論述的，一場將緊隨康德哲學的“應用”而來的“德國革命”。
Indeed, at this point, Hegel was still quite explicit about his desire to be such a “popular” philosopher, noting to Schelling that the special features of Kantian and Fichtean ideas were not things he thought needed to be worked out in such a “popular presentation”; it was important for intellectuals to understand the fine points of the postKantian movement, but it was not important to make them part of the “popular philosophy”: “An esoteric philosophy will, to be sure, always remain, and the idea of God as the absolute ‘F will be part of it. . . .? The philosophers are proving the dignity of man. The people will learn to feel it.”*’ In seeing his future in this way, Hegel was also quite obviously planning to carve out new ground for himself: The “popular philosophers” had until then mostly contented themselves with reproducing, reworking, and applying British (and particularly Scottish) ideas; Hegel, on the other hand, was looking to make himself into a “popular philosopher” who was going to apply Kantian ideas in light of the British ideas he had picked up along the way."^"
? ? 更確切地說，在這一點上，黑格爾仍然十分明顯地渴望做這樣一名“通俗”哲學家，并向謝林強調指出康德哲學思想和費希特哲學思想的特征不是某種在他看來需要被以這樣一種“通俗表象”來理解的東西；黑格爾這一看法對于知識界解讀后康德哲學運動的細微觀點是非常重要的，但是使細微的觀點構成“通俗哲學”一部分就不那么重要了：“無疑問，一種秘傳的哲學終究總是保持不變的，而且作為絕對‘自我’的上帝這一概念將構成這種秘傳哲學的一部分……有些哲學家在證明人類的尊嚴。人們應該學會感覺到人類的尊嚴?！痹谝赃@種方式展望未來時，黑格爾同樣也非常明確地去籌劃為他自已開辟出一片新的天地：“通俗哲學家”目標到那時為止還主要是滿足于再造、重寫和應用大不列顛的（特別是蘇格蘭的）思想；另一方面，黑格爾期待使他自己變成一名“通俗哲學家”，這名“通俗哲學家”將要根據被他半路學得的大不列顛思想來運用康德哲學思想。
Indeed, the “completion” of Kantian philosophy at this point meant for Hegel only the application of Kantian philosophy in a “popular” way, the construction of a more or less Kantian conception of what would be a genuinely practical stimulus to action. In commenting on his study of the philosophical movement from Kant to Schelling (and on his relative ignorance of the ways in which post-Kantians like Karl Leonhard Reinhold were developing the critical philosophy), he remarked that the more recent attempts to get to the bottom of Kant’s theory (Reinhold’s and Fichte’s) were, for him, only “speculations, rather than being of great applicability to universally usable concepts, [which] seem of more direct significance mainly to theoretical reason alone.”"^’ Hegel’s ideas on “subjective” religion and a “people’s religion” were all constructed in light of what he thought at the time was necessary to transform Kantianism into something more practical, more applicable, something that could be expressed in the kind of essay written by a Popularphilosoph. However, despite Hegel’s quantitative productivity during this period (judging from the amount of manuscript material he produced), he never thought any of it worth publishing, and he never wrote to anyone (not to Schelling, not to Hdlderlin) to ask for help or advice about getting his works into print. (The exception is the pamphlet by J.-J. Cart.) Hegel was clearly dissatisfied with what he had produced. Despite the task he had set for himself of becoming a “popular philosopher,” a man of letters, despite the fact that he had produced quite a bit of work along those lines during this time, and despite the likelihood that publication would have advanced his self-chosen career as a man of letters, he simply put those manuscripts in the drawer.
? ? 更確切地說，康德哲學的“完成”在這方面意味著對于黑格爾來說僅僅以“通俗的”方式運用康德哲學，意味著建構一個或多或少康德哲學關于應該成為對行為的真正實際激勵東西的構想。在解釋他對從康德到謝林的哲學運動的研究（和他相對忽視了像卡爾·萊昂哈德·賴因霍爾德一樣的后康德哲學家借以闡發批判哲學方法）的時候，他評論說近來有些學者試圖對康德理論（賴因霍爾德理論和費希特理論）進行刨根問底，這種嘗試對于他來說僅僅是“沉思而非對普遍可用概念的了不起的應用，[這些沉思]看來好像主要對單純的理論理性具有更直接的意義。”黑格爾關于“主觀”宗教和“人民宗教”概念的建構，完全依據的是他當時認為把康德哲學變成更實用更可應用的東西所必需的東西，它就是某種可能被通俗哲學家揣寫的這樣論文表達的東西。不過，盡管黑格爾在這個時期極其多產（根據他所撰寫的手稿數量判斷），他始終認為其中沒有任何東西值得發表，他也從未給任何人寫信（沒有給謝林寫信沒有給荷爾德林寫信）請求幫助或出主意使他的作品得以發表。（關于J·卡特的這本小冊子是個例外。）黑格爾顯然對他所撰寫的東西感到不滿意。盡管他為自己提出了做“通俗哲學家”做文人這一任務，盡管事實上他在這個時期按照這些思路做了大量工作，盡管出版這些東西理應可能促使他主動選擇做作家，他干脆還是把這批手稿束之高閣。
While at Berne, Hegel also wrote an ambitious book-length manuscript, which he clearly expanded and altered after having arrived in Frankfurt, and even worked on somewhat after arriving in Jena at the turn of the century; he never found it satisfactory, however, and it was only published long after his death, under the title “The Positivity of the Christian Religion.” In it, Hegel tried to synthesize the basic influences on his thought at the time. For example, he brought Gibbon’s account of the decline of the Roman empire and the role Christianity played in it to bear on Kant’s reconstruction of Christian religion as the “religion of morality,” as religion “within the limits of reason alone,” and tried to show how these two accounts could be reconciled in an examination of the nature of the “positivity” of the Christian religion.? Hegel used the term “positivity” in a sense derived from jurisprudence: “Positive” law is that law which is in force in a particular legal and political community. In Hegel’s own time, “positive” law had come to be contrasted with what was then called “natural law.” “Natural law” had a much wider meaning than it does nowadays; it was the doctrine of the normative foundations of law in general, not just the normative foundations of law as lying in the “natural” order. For Hegel, positive religion - which is analogous to what he had been calling in his earlier efforts “objective religion” - is any religion and its associated doctrines whose normative force depends on their being the established religion of a people. Christianity was a positive religion in this sense, since both Catholics and Protestants had clear ideas about what counted as doctrine, who could take the Eucharist, who could not, and so on. Positivity, thus, in law and in religion, is that which relies only on the dictates of authority instead of on those dictates that come from “thinking for oneself’ (which, according to Kant, is the very definition of Enlightenment itself). Any positive religion, so it seems, must therefore be at odds with the demands of reason, of “thinking for oneself” Reviving some arguments from his manuscript “The Life of Jesus,” Hegel argued that Jesus never intended to institute a positive religion, at least in the sense of a religion that was to claim humanity’s allegiance by reference only to Jesus’ own authority. Instead, Jesus set out to create a religion of morality that would restore freedom to a world that had lost it, in which people would embrace virtue because they would impose it on themselves.
? ? 在伯爾尼的時候，黑格爾還寫有一部雄心勃勃的長篇手稿，這部手稿顯然被他到達法蘭克福后作了擴充和改動，甚至被他在世紀之交到達耶拿后還在以某種方式撰寫；然而，他始終認為這部手稿不盡如人意，它只是在他去世后很長時間才被人以《基督教的實定性》為題發表。在這部手稿中，黑格爾力圖綜合一下當時對他的思考產生基本影響的東西。舉例來說，他把吉本關于羅馬帝國衰微和基督教在羅馬帝國扮演角色的釋述，與康德把基督教重建成為“道德宗教”重建成“單純理性限度內的”宗教聯系起來，并努力表明上述兩種描述怎么可以被在對基督教“實定性”本質的考察過程中達成一致。黑格爾借用了從一種源于法學意義上說“實定性”這一術語：“實定”法就是一種在特殊法定共同體和政治共同體中實施的法律。在黑格爾自己的時代，“實定”法逐漸與后來被稱作“自然法”的東西形成對比?！白匀环ā陛^之今天的用法具有寬泛得多的意義；它一般是表示法律的規范基礎的學說，不止表示那倚重“自然”秩序的法律規范的基礎。對于黑格爾來說，實定宗教——作為類似于被他在早期成果中始終稱作的“客觀宗教”的實定宗教——代表任何宗教及其相關學說，它的規范力量取歐于與宗教相關學說被確立為人民宗教?；浇叹褪菑纳鲜鲆饬x上說的實定宗教，因為天主教教徒和新教教徒對什么被算作教義、誰可以獲得圣餐、誰不可以獲得圣餐等等都有著明確的看法。法律和宗教中實定性因此代表僅僅依賴于權威的需求的實定性，而不依賴來自于“獨立思考”的命令（這按照康德的說法是對啟蒙運動本身特有的界定）。因此可以說，任何實定性宗教都必然是與理性的要求或“獨立思考”的要求相抵觸的。由于他的《耶穌傳》手稿復又引起了一些爭論，黑格爾堅稱耶穌從來無意去建立一種實定性宗教，至少從一種宗教意義上說耶穌從來無意去創立實定的宗教，這種宗教旨在主張人類的忠誠僅僅涉及耶穌自己的權威。恰恰相反，耶穌著手創立道德的宗教，道德宗教應該使喪失自由的世界恢復自由，在復得自由的世界，人們之所以總是張開雙臂擁抱美德是因為他們應該把美德強加于他們自己。
The themes of freedom and the self-imposition of the law - both of them involving striking bits of Kantian language - reoccur throughout the essay.'*^ In his ethical theory, Kant had argued that the only thing that was unconditionally good in itself was a good will, which, in Kant’s well-known characterization, would if even “by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing . . . still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has full value in itself”"*^ Whereas the other great influence on Hegel, Aristotle, had argued that the only thing that was unconditionally good, that was a final end of an agent’s deliberations that is, that which rational human agents ultimately cared about it for its own sake - was Eudaimonia, happiness in terms of flourishing, prospering, and getting along well in a virtuous life, Kant argued that this unconditional good and final end had to be the free will itself Since no agent could be indifferent to freedom as a final end, as a requirement of practical reason no agent could therefore be indifferent to what was a priori required for the agent’s freedom. Kant argued that the a priori requirements of full freedom demanded that the agent determine his will according to principles that he had fully and freely adopted for himself, that is, that he act only on those principles that he has autonomously imposed on himself; and to make such self-impositions, the agent is required to determine his will only according to principles that abstract away from all contingencies that might determine his will (such as any contingent desires or needs he might just happen to have) and determine his will instead according to principles that answer to that element within him that is authoritative for him.
? ? 自由與法律自我強加——二者明顯牽涉少許康德哲學用語——這兩個話題復又成為貫穿于《基督教的實定性》這本論著中的一根紅線，在他的倫理學理論中，康德早已堅稱那本質上作為無條件的善的唯一東西就是善良意志。善良意志，借用康德有名的描繪，應該縱使“善良通過極大努力仍然一事無成……仍然會像寶石出于它自己的緣故作為一種本質上具有充分價值的東西一樣閃閃發光”，盡管另一個對黑格爾產生過很大影響的人物亞里士多德論證道，唯一作為無條件善的東西，作為行動者深思熟慮的終極目的的東西——也即理性的行動者出于善自己的緣故最終關注的東西——一是Exdaizonzid，不斷增加的、源源不斷的和在德行生活中和共處的快樂。但是康德卻堅稱這無條件的善和終極目的必然是自由意志本身。因為凡是行動者都不可能對自由作為終極目的漠不關心，都不可能對自由作為實踐理性的要求漠不關心，所以凡是行動者都不可能對什么是行動者自由先天要求的東西漠不關心。康德論證道，充分自由的先天要求要求行動者應該依據某些原理來確定他的意志，這些原理早已被行動者為了他自已而充分地自由地采納，也就是說，要求行動者僅僅按照某些被他自發地強加于他自己的原理安身立命；為作出這樣的自我強加，行動者常常被要求僅僅按照從所有可能確定他意志的偶然性事物（諸如任何可能恰恰被他碰巧具有的偶然欲望或需求）中抽象出來的原理來確定他的意志，而不是根據對作為他權威的他心中要素作出回答的原理來確定他的意志。
Since Kant holds that that which is authoritative for us is “selfdetermining reason” - reason that accepts no standards other than those which it can vindicate for itself, that survive the kind of self-critique that reason continually practices on itself - the only principles that can count as self-imposed are those that would hold for any rational being.? The principle of principles, therefore, for practical reason is the categorical (unconditional) imperative, that the agent determine his will according to principles that he could at the same time and always determine as “universal law,” as the kinds of principles which any other rational agent would also elect to determine his will.'*^ Of course, what is striking about Kant’s doctrine — and would have been particularly striking to Hegel at this stage in his life — is that Kant might have seemed, at least at first glance, to have resolved the problems Hegel had bumped up against in the “Tubingen Essay,” namely, how to reconcile a demand for full unconditional freedom and individual liberty of conscience with the demands of a community having a unified moral voice.? At this point in his development, Hegel took Kant to have shown how each individual, relying only on his own reason, would in his own conscience reach the same conclusions as all other rational individuals, and how thus a Kantian moral community would not morally be at odds with itself. A fully Kantian moral community would thus be an “invisible church,” constituting itself as a “philosophical sect” in which each individual member, in Hegel’s words, “adopts no duties except the ones imposed on himself”'*''
? ? 因為康德主張作為對我們來說權威的東西是“能自主的理性”——理性只接受某些能夠被它自為地證明是正確的標準而且這些標準使某種繼續被理性利用它自身實踐著的自我批判得以存在——只有那些能夠被算作自我強加的原理才是應該為任何理性之人所堅持的原理。所以、實踐理性原理之原理是絕對的（無條件的）命令，絕對命令意味著行動者應該確定他的意志，行動者這樣做時依據的原理同時且總是可以被他確定為“普遍規律”，確定為這樣的一種也應該被任何其他理性行動者選作確定他的意志的原理。誠然，康德學說給人留下深刻印象的東西——大概給處于人生這個階段的黑格爾留下了特別深刻影響的東西——就是康德可能看來好像解決了那些被黑格爾在“圖賓根論文”中竭力解決的問題，可能至少乍看起來解決了那些問題，也即怎樣使要求完全無條件的自由與個人良知的自由和要求共同體具有統一的道德愿望一致起來。在他闡發的這個方面，黑格爾把康德看作已經闡明每個個體，僅僅依賴于他自己理性的個體，怎樣應該出于他自己的良知得出和所有其他理性個體相同的結論，一個康德式的道德共同體因此如何不應該在道德上和它自己相抵觸。一個徹底地康德式的道德共同體因而應該成為“看不見的教堂”，“看不見的教堂”把自己建成“哲學學派”，在“哲學學派”中，用黑格爾的話說，除非有些人把責任強加給每個作為個體的成員，否則每個作為個體的成員都“享有放任自流的態度”。
In the “Positivity” essay as in the “Life of Jesus,” Hegel took Jesus to have been preaching a doctrine that fit those Kantian prescriptions.? However, he also took the corruption of the Jewish people (a theme that he seems to have taken from Chapter 15 of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall oj the Roman Empire) to have made it impossible for them to have received such a message.'*’ The Jews, on Hegel’s understanding at this time, had transformed their religion into one of base servility to law and made it thereby into a religion from which all elements of personal freedom had been extirpated. Because Jesus’ own disciples were corrupted by the Jewish adherence to the divine law, even they found it impossible to accept Jesus’ teachings for what they were — teachings that called on them to attain “truth and freedom by their own exer- tions” and thereby to lead a life of virtue"^** - and they therefore ended up proclaiming that they accepted Jesus’ teachings not by virtue of their insight into their truth but by virtue of Jesus’ own personal authority, by virtue of his having said them. The contrast with the followers of Socrates, who had been taught to think for themselves, could not be greater: as Hegel put it, the “followers of Jesus . . . had no political interest like that which a citizen of a free republic takes in his native land; their whole interest was confined to the person of Jesus,” whereas the followers of Socrates “loved Socrates because of his virtue and philosophy, not virtue and philosophy because of him.
? ? 在《基督教的實定性》這篇論著中像在《耶穌傳》中一樣，黑格爾認為耶穌始終在宣講適合康德哲學那些律令的學說。然而他同樣也認為猶太人腐化墮落（一個看來好像已經被他從吉本《羅馬帝國衰亡史》第15章中選取的主題）已經使他們不可能得到這樣一個信息。猶太人，根據黑格爾當時的理解，把他們的宗教基本上變成法律的奴顏婢膝的宗教，由此使他們的宗教成為一種徹底摧毀所有個人自由要素的宗教。因為耶穌自己的門徒被猶太人信奉神律弄得有傷風化，甚至他們也發覺不可能接受耶穌關于他們所是的東西的教導——耶穌教導號召他們“憑借他們自己的努力來獲得真理和自由”并由此過著德行生活——他們因此最終宣稱他們接受耶穌的教導，這樣做借助的不是他們對他們的真相洞若觀火而借助的是耶穌自己的個人權威，借助的是他已經對他們說的東西。與蘇格拉底的追隨者被教會獨立思考相比的差別不可能大到哪里去：像黑格爾指出的，“耶穌的追隨者……對政治毫無興趣，正像自由共和國公民對故土毫無興趣一樣；他們的全部興趣只限于耶穌其人”，盡管蘇格拉底追隨者“因蘇格拉底的美德和哲學而熱愛蘇格拉底而非因蘇格拉底而熱愛美德和哲學”。
The contrast Hegel draws is thus between Jesus, who is portrayed as a ethical-religious Kantian hero, who only wanted people to be free and to develop their own powers to impose the moral law on themselves (and thereby to become virtuous in a Kantian sense), and the founders of Christianity (the disciples, the early church fathers), who are portrayed as corrupting Jesus’ teachings and setting up Christianity as a positive religion, one whose teachings are based on authority rather than on free reason. Jesus’ own teachings are not “positive,” they are not meant to substitute a new authoritarian system for the old authoritarian system. Nonetheless, to get his teachings heard, Jesus had to confer some authority upon his own person, for, given the corrupted conditions of the time, “to propose to appeal to reason alone would have meant the same thing as preaching to fish.”^” And thus the movement was set in motion toward “positivity.”
? ? 黑格爾作出的因此是耶穌（耶穌常常被描繪成宗教倫理上康德哲學式的英雄，耶穌只想要人們擁有自由和只想要使他們自己能夠把道德律強加給他們自身，由此只想要使他們成為康德意義上具有德性的人）與基督教創始人（耶穌門徒或早期教父）之間的對比，基督教創始人被描繪成他們敗壞了耶穌教義和把基督教建成實定性的宗教，實定性宗教教義奠基于權威而非奠基于自由的理性。耶穌自己的那些教義不是“實定性的”，它們并不被說成用新的權威體系取代舊的權威體系。尚不止于此，為讓他的教義有人聽信，耶穌不得不賦予他自己這個人某些權威。原因在于，考慮到那個時代有傷風化狀況，“單純提出訴諸理性大概意味著等同向魚宣講教義”。故而這個運動被使得走向“實定性”。
Hegel, interestingly, does not speak of the early Christians as betraying Jesus’ teachings; instead he attributes the corruption to the context in which those teachings appeared. The Greek and Roman republics were free in the sense that “Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down by themselves”; each citizen found the free republic itself to be “the final end of his world,” and their religions supported this freedom.^' With the collapse of Greek and Roman freedom, Greek and Roman religion also disintegrated, and what had previously been a motivating force for the better in citizens’ lives vanished. The loss of such a good left people with nothing to inspire them except the cold ideals of protecting property and the fear of death. In this context, Christianity, which promised eternal life to those who slavishly followed its dictates, stepped into the void left by the disappearance of the Greek and Roman divinities.
? ? 黑格爾，很有趣地，并沒有提及早期基督教教徒違背耶穌的教義；相反他把腐化墮落歸咎于那些教義見之于的語境。希臘共和國和羅馬共和國從“希臘人和羅馬人遵守由他們自已親手制定的法律”意義上說是自由的；每個公民都發覺自由共和國本身是“他的世界的終極目的”，他們的宗教支持這種自由?！半S著希臘人自由和羅馬人自由的坍塌，希臘人和羅馬人宗教也隨之土崩瓦解，早先已成為一種追求更好的市民生活的動力不復存在了。這樣一個好東西的喪失絲毫沒有起到激勵他們的作用，留給他們的只是保護財產的冰冷的理想和對死亡的恐懼。在這種語境上，基督教，承諾使那些相目服從它命令的人們變得永垂不朽的基督教，消除了因希臘人和羅馬人神只消失而留下的空虛。
The followers of Jesus and the early Christians thus were almost unwittingly led to establish Christianity as a positive religion, although in its early stages even they could not even have been aware of the commitments they were undertaking. They were a small sect, whose members joined voluntarily (and thus “imposed” the rules of the sect on themselves), and they were able thus to be a society of friends in the Aristotelian sense.But as they grew in size and influence, the “positivity” of their views became all the more apparent. As they took over the state and the realm of positive law, their religion itself became all the more “positive” in character. They eventually eliminated freedom of thought, and their positive commands to their members to feel certain ways resulted in an unspiritual society of hypocrites and self-deceived people who had lost all sense of freedom and beauty.
? ? 耶穌追隨者和早期基督教教徒因而幾乎不知不覺地神差鬼使般把基督教建成實定性宗教，盡管在基督教早期階段甚至就連他們自己也完全不可能意識到他們所作出的奉獻。他們形成很小的派別，派別成員自覺自愿加入（成員因而“把“該派的規章“強加“于他們自身），他們因此能夠組成亞里士多德哲學意義上的友人社團?！暗请S著該派成員逐漸增多和日益有影響，他們看法中的“實定性”變得更加明顯。當他們主宰國家和實定法王國的時候，他們的宗教自身變得更具有“實定性”品格。基督教很多派別最終摒棄了思想自由，它們積極地要求它們的成員去感受某些方式，這樣的要求導致塵世偽君子社團的面世和那些自欺欺人的早已喪失全部自由感和美感的人們大行其道。
Unlike Gibbon, however, Hegel was not content to attribute the rise of Christianity simply to a series of contingent, heterogeneous social factors. Hegel’s interest in the Kantian ideas of freedom and therefore of the self-imposition of the moral law lead him to offer a hypothesis that went far beyond the bounds of Gibbon’s Enlightenment historiography. Hegel noted in relation to Christianity’s having supplanted the great pagan religions of antiquity that “great revolutions which strike the eye at a glance must have been preceded by a still and secret revolution in the spirit of the age, a revolution not visible to every eye, especially imperceptible to contemporaries, and as hard to discern as to describe in words. . . . The supplanting of a native and immemorial religion by a foreign one is a revolution which occurs in the spiritual realm itself, and it is thus of a kind whose causes must be found all the more directly in the spirit of the times.”” The “secret revolution” of which Hegel spoke made reference to his Tubingen concerns: the collapse of ancient freedom and the possibility of a revolution-reformation in modern life that would restore the spirit of Greek freedom and lead to moral and spiritual renewal. Christianity became a positive religion in spite o/Jesus’ teaching because the “spirit of the times” in Jesus’ day and immediately thereafter had lost the ideal of freedom; what actually separated the followers of Jesus from the followers of Socrates was Greek social and religious life, which had prevented the Greeks (in Hegel’s eyes) from having any positive religion. Accusations of heresy in Greek life were, after all, virtually nonexistent; the Greeks did not seem so intent in their religious practices on propounding doctrine against which one could measure one’s “true” religiosity.
? ? 然而，和吉本不一樣，黑格爾并不滿足于把基督教興起簡單地歸結于一系列偶然的異質的社會因素。黑格爾對康德自由思想感興趣且因此對康德道德律自我強加思想非常感興趣，這就致使他提出了一個遠遠超出吉本的啟蒙運動史學著作范圍的假設。黑格爾在關于基督教取代了大量古代異教這個問題上強調指出，“那些乍一看就使人留下深刻印象的大革命想必后于一種平靜和秘密的時代精神革命，想必后于一種并非每個人都能看到的革命，特別是不被當代人察覺到的革命，這樣的大革命像很難用詞語描述一樣幾乎是難以覺察的……本土的古老宗教被外國宗教取代，這是一場發生在精神王國自身的革命，這場革命的原因因而想必更加直接地見于時代精神?！蹦潜缓诟駹柼岬降摹懊孛芨锩鄙婕八趫D賓根時期關注的東西：古代自由的坍塌和革命性地重塑現代生活的可能性將會恢復希臘人自由精神和致使人們道德重生和精神重生。撇開耶穌教義，基督教變成實定的宗教，因為耶穌時代的“時代精神”和緊隨其后的“時代精神”喪失了自由的理想；實際上把耶穌追隨者和蘇格拉底追隨者分開的是希臘人的社會生活和宗教生活，希臘人的生活使（黑格爾眼中的）希臘人不復具有任何實定的宗教。畢竟希臘人生活中實質上并不存在對異端的指控；希臘人看來好像并不一心根據他們的宗教習俗提出教義以反對可以判斷人們“真”宗教的東西。
Despite Hegel’s own description of himself as wanting to “apply” Kant’s thought, in the “Positivity” essay he was also clearly trying to develop it in light of his own interests. In “What Is Enlightenment?”, Kant had called for an end to mankind’s “self-incurred tutelage.”^'* In the “Positivity” essay, Hegel took this a step further, explaining this self-imposed tutelage as having come about because of the loss of Greek and Roman freedom, and attributing the transformation of Christianity into a positive religion to that loss; Hegel “applied” Kant’s notion of freedom as self-legislation to history to explain how Christianity became a “positive religion.” Echoing Kant’s essay, Hegel noted that “every day anyone can see examples of how far men can renounce their own native powers and freedom, how they can submit to a perpetual tutelage with such willingness that their attachment to the fetters they place on reason is all the greater the heavier these fetters are. In addition to recommending a virtue religion, Jesus was also bound continually to bring himself, the teacher of this religion, into play; he had to demand faith in his person, a faith which his virtue religion required only for its opposition to the positive doctrines.
? ? 盡管黑格爾自己把他自已描述成想“運用”康德的思想，在《基督教的實定性》這篇論著中他還是明顯地努力根據他自己興趣來闡發康德的思想。早在《什么是啟蒙運動？》中，康德就已在倡導人類“自己招致守護”的目的。在《宗教的實定性》這篇論著中，黑格爾在這一點上走得更遠，把自己招致守護出現的原因解釋成在于希臘人和羅馬人自由的喪失，并把基督教變成實定宗教歸因于希臘人和羅馬人自由的喪失；黑格爾把康德關于作為自我立法的自由概念“應用于”歷史以解釋基督教怎么變成“實定的宗教”。在重復康德論著中觀點時，黑格爾強調指出“每天任何人都能看到一些事例，它們是人們怎樣更大程度上拋棄他們自己與生俱來的權力和自由、他們怎樣屈從于帶有下列的這種意愿的永久守護：他們作為他們給理性帶上的鐐銬的附屬品意味著這些鐐銬將變得更加巨大更加沉重。除了舉薦德性宗教之外，耶穌同樣也不斷地必然發揮他自己作為德性宗教導師的作用；他不得不要求人們信仰他這個人，這樣的信仰是他的德性宗教僅僅出于它與實定教義分庭抗禮所需要的?！?br>
The unspoken but clear implication of the essay is that the question of whether Christianity could therefore cease to be a positive religion and become again a “religion of freedom” was necessarily connected with the issue of whether the French Revolution would succeed in restoring freedom and spirituality to modern life. But, oddly enough, the question of whether Christianity actually could be this new “religion of freedom” was left unanswered in the essay, and the reason seems to be that Hegel simply had not made up his mind on the issue. He suspected that Christianity might simply be inadequate to the role of a “religion of freedom.” At one point he noted that its imagery does not lend itself to the kind of “poetic adaptation” that is capable of “refining our people,” because the images of “positive” Christianity have been so inculcated in people’s minds in such a “positive” manner that they “carry a sense of uneasiness running counter to that enjoyment of beauty which arises from the free play of our mental powers.”^* (The notion of beauty as arising from the “free play of our mental powers” is, of course, an indirect reference to Kant’s notion in his Critique of Judgment that beauty results from the sensuous embodiment of our spontaneity, that in enjoying beauty, we are really enjoying the spontaneous free play of our mental powers.) If because of its cultural and historical baggage, “positive” Christianity is incapable of being beautiful, then it is incapable of motivating people to be free, and, if that is true, “positive” Christianity simply cannot satisfy the demands of modern European life.
? ? 這篇論著未言明而顯然暗含的問題是基督教因此是否可能不復成為實定宗教和是否可能再度成為“自由宗教”這個問題必然是與法國大革命是否將會成功地還現代生活以自由和精神性這個問題密切相關的。可是，十分奇怪地，基督教實際上是否可能成為新的“自由宗教”這個問題在這篇論著中并未作出回答，原因看來好像是黑格爾根本沒有決定解決這個問題。他懷疑基督教可能根本不勝任扮演“自由宗教”這個角色。在這個關鍵問題上，他強調指出它的表象沒有使它自身成為一種“能夠渾化我們國民”的“詩化的適應”，因為“實定”基督教的表象已經被以這樣一種“實定”方式如此反復灌輸進人們的腦子里，以至于他們“產生與美的享受背道而馳的焦慮不安感，這樣的感覺源自對我們智力的自由應用?！保ㄗ鳛樵醋浴白杂傻貞梦覀冎橇Α钡拿肋@個概念當然間接地涉及康德《判斷力批判》中的概念，這個概念大意是美源自我們自發性的感性體現，在享受美時，我們確實在享受我們自發而自由地應用我們的智力。）如果，由于“實定”宗教的文化和歷史包袱，“實定”基督教不能夠成為優美的宗教，那么它就不能夠促使人們去爭取自由，如果說上述假設成立的話，“實定”基督教就根本無法滿足現代歐洲人的生活要求。
At that point in his development, though, Hegel could not bring himself to conclude authoritatively that Christianity could not satisfy such demands. However, the lack of a definitive answer to that crucial question was, as Hegel surely came to see, fatal for the “Positivity” essay, and without an answer to that question, the “application” of Kant had not really succeeded, for the basic practical question remained unanswered.
? ? 盡管這樣，在他闡發這個關鍵問題時，黑格爾不可能讓他自己以權威姿態斷定基督教不可能滿足這樣的要求。然而，這個至關重要的問題缺乏確定的答案，像黑格爾想必逐漸看出的，這樣的缺乏是《基督教的實定性》這篇論著的致命傷，而假如這個問題沒有答案，對康德哲學的“應用”就不會早就真正地取得了成功，因為這個基本的實際問題仍然沒有得到回答。
Even worse for Hegel’s point of view, the answer that was coming from France, as it were, was not encouraging: In 1793, the revolutionaries had officially “abolished” Christianity and replaced it with Robespierre’s “cult of reason,” something that was as silly as it was uninspiring. Indeed, Christianity of any sort did not seem to be playing a critical role in the development of revolutionary events. The “Positivity” essay thus ended without really coming to grips with the very problems that had inspired it.
? ? 甚至對于黑格爾的觀點更為糟糕的是，可以說這個可能來自于法國的答案并不是令人鼓舞的：早在1793年，法國一系列革命就已正式“廢除了”基督教，取代基督教的是羅伯斯比爾的“理性神拜”，它像無啟發性東西一樣的荒謬可笑。更確切地說，任何種類的基督教看來好像都沒有在革命事件發展過程中發揮關鍵的作用?！痘浇痰膶嵍ㄐ浴愤@篇論著因而最終沒有真正地認真解決激起“理性崇拜”的特有問題。
Hegel was almost without doubt discouraged by his attempts at “popular philosophy.” He had written much, but none of it he deemed suitable to see the light of day. His position seemed, furthermore, to be more syncretic than synthetic: He was pasting together bits and pieces of Kantian practical philosophy, his theological training at Tubingen, and his interest in what he took to be the problems and promises of the Revolution, and the result was a whole that not only looked cobbled together but also failed to provide crucial answers for the basic problems it was written to address. Hegel’s attempt to “complete” the Kantian philosophy by applying it to the problems of a “people’s religion” thus seemed to be coming to a dead end.
? ? 黑格爾幾乎無疑對他在“通俗哲學”方面作出的嘗試感到心灰意冷。他確實寫了不少東西，但是其中沒有一件東西被他認為適合于拿出去見世面。此外就是，他的立場看來好像傾向于調和而非綜合：他在把康德實跋哲學中零零散散的東西、他在圖賓根時的神學訓練、他對被他認為的成為法國大革命問題和承諾的興趣這三個方面內容精合在一起，這三方面內容結果形成的整體不僅看似被草草拼湊起來而且未能為講演中被記下的有關整體的基本問題提供關鍵答案。黑格爾試圖憑借把康德哲學應用于“人民宗教”問題進而“使”康德哲學“臻于完美”，這樣的嘗試因此看來好像將要走進死胡同。
It was, in part, the failure of his efforts to “apply” Kant to practical life that eventually would lead him to question even more fundamentally just what the completion of Kantian philosophy would imply. At first, however, the failure of his efforts simply left him depressed and at odds with himself; but he had reason to be hopeful: He was escaping Berne for the more cosmopolitan community of Frankfurt, apparently to work for a more congenial family and for a reunion with his close friend Holderlin.
從特定程度上說，是他努力把康德“應用”于實際生活的失敗，最終致使他對使康德哲學臻于完美恰恰應該暗示的何種更為基本的東西產生懷疑。然而，起初由于他的努力以失敗告終而簡直令他十分沮喪和不知所措；但是他有理由抱有希望：他將逃離伯爾尼去世界化大都市法蘭克福，顯然是為更為和諧的家庭而工作，為跟他摯友荷爾德林的重聚而工作。
Stopover in Stuttgart: Flirtation and Politics
在斯圖加特的短暫逗留：調情與政治學
At the end of the year of 1796, Hegel set off from Berne to Frankfurt.? He had to get permission from the Konsistorium (the church authorities) in Wiirttemberg to take his position as Hofmeister with the Gogel family, since he still technically owed them service as a pastor. However, because there were many other young men who actually wanted the few church positions that were available, and who were obviously better suited for them than Hegel (who was in any event hardly the darling of the theological faculty at Tubingen), his permission to go to Frankfurt seemed a sure bet. Playing the odds, Hegel began his service with the Gogel family at the beginning of January, although his official permission from the Konsistorium to do so was not granted until January 10, 1797.
? ? 在1796年底，黑格爾從伯爾尼啟程前往法蘭克福。他必須得到符騰堡Komsistorixmr（教會當局）的許可才能擔任戈格爾家家庭教師，因為他法律上仍然沒有完成教會當局牧師服務。然而，因為有很多其他年輕人實際上想獲得教會提供的少量職位，而且他們明顯比黑格爾更適合這類職位（黑格爾無論如何幾乎不是圖賓根神學院的寵兒），所以他將被獲準去法蘭克?？磥砗孟駴]有什么懸念。幸運的是，黑格爾一月初就開始在戈格爾家服務，盡管教會當局直到1797年1月10日才正式批準他在戈格爾家當家庭教師。
On the way home, Hegel stopped off to visit his family in Stuttgart for a few weeks. Even with the brighter prospects of Frankfurt ahead of him, his sister remembered him as sad and withdrawn. After all, although he was moving to a better city, and would be in the company of Holderlin once more, he was simply trading one Hofmeister position for another. He was not, for example, going on to edit a journal or even to write for one, nor was he going to a university to assume a position as a salaried intellectual. However, as things turned out, two things during his stay in Stuttgart helped him to recover himself and get his feet planted again: he became involved with the growing revolutionary movements in his home state of Wiirttemberg, and he became involved in a flirtation with a young woman by the name of Nanette Endel, who was living at the time with his sister and father.
? ? 在去戈格爾家路上，黑格爾為看望當時在斯圖加特家人的中途逗留了幾個星期。甚至當法蘭克福更為光明的前景展現在他面前的時候，他的妹妹不會忘記他仍然表現出郁郁寡歡。畢竟，盡管他將移居一個更好的城市，盡管他大概會復又同荷爾德林交往、他卻只不過是利用家庭教師這個職位作為跳板。舉例來說，他不打算去當編輯甚或成為雜志撰稿人，他也不打算去大學做擔任拿薪水的知識分子職位。然而，像有些事情證明的，在他小住斯圖加特期間有兩件事助他煥發青春和再度站穩腳跟：他卷入他家鄉符騰堡州正在興起的革命運動、他同樣也卷入與芳名納內特·恩德爾這位年輕貌美女郎的調情，這位女郎當時跟他妹妹和父親住在一起。
Nanette Endel was apparently a friend of Hegel’s sister, Christiane.? She later became a milliner, and she was probably engaged in training to become a milliner while she was living and working at the Hegel household to earn her keep and to pay for her training. Nanette Endel was five years younger than Hegel and a devout Catholic. Although Hegel arrived at Stuttgart feeling quite low, it seems clear that he and Nanette became good friends rather quickly. The two teased each other quite a lot and carried on an extended flirtation (much to the consternation of Hegel’s sister, whom Hegel jokingly characterized in a letter to Nanette Endel as the “privy councilor” who had accused Nanette of being a bit “roguish” in her relations with him).” Hegel, whose own distaste for Catholicism was to last for the greater portion of his life, no doubt at first reacted strongly to Nanette Endel’s devout adherence to it. However, Nanette Endel was good-spirited enough to joust with Hegel on these matters. She teased him about his dour nature and his Protestant high-mindedness, gently poking fun at his self-important, self-appointed task of becoming an “educator of the people” and establishing a “people’s religion.” She teased him by calling him Saint Alexis, a Christian saint from the year 400, who fled on the day of his wedding and renounced all his worldly possessions in order to live the life of a monk. He teased her by calling her Sister Jacqueline, a reference to Jacqueline Arnauld, the abbess of the Jansenist cloister of Port Royal.? It seems that she at least tried, however good-naturedly and maybe even half-heartedly, to get Hegel to consider becoming a Catholic or at least going to Mass or undertaking some Catholic practices; he in turn tried to get her to convert to Protestantism.
? ? 納內特·恩德爾看似是黑格爾妹妹克里斯蒂亞娜的好友。她后來成了一名禮帽設計師，她很可能在訓練自己做禮帽設計師，其時她住在黑格爾家并為黑格爾家做家務以掙錢維持生活和繳納培訓費。納內特·恩德爾比黑格爾年輕5歲，是個虔誠的天主教教徒。盡管黑格爾到達斯圖加特時情緒非常低落，但是他和納內特看似顯然閃電般地成了知己，她被黑格爾致納內特·恩德爾信中開玩笑地描述成是“私人顧問”，她早就責備納內特在與黑格爾關系方面有點“耍流氓”。黑格爾、他自己對天主教的厭惡可能持續了他大半生，無疑起初對納內特·恩德爾虔誠信奉天主教作出強烈的反應。不過納內特·恩德爾有著足夠精力在這些事上與黑格爾展開爭辯。她取笑他秉性執拗和他作為新教徒的高傲心氣，委婉地嘲弄他自我持重自我指定將來當“人民教育家”和創立“人民宗教”的任務。她借助把他稱作圣亞歷克西斯而戲弄他，圣亞歷克西斯是400年前一名基督教圣徒。他在婚禮那天逃走和放棄了所有世俗家產以便出家修行。他靠把她稱作修女杰奎琳來取笑她，修女杰奎琳與杰奎琳·阿瑙爾德這位羅亞爾港詹森派修道院院長有染?？磥砗孟袼辽僭噲D，不管她生性多么善良甚或多么楊花水性，想使黑格爾考慮做天主教徒或至少去做彌撒或從事某些天主教活動；他反而力圖使她皈依新教。
