第9章 海德堡時期：成為焦點人物(4)

More perplexingly, in Hegel’s eyes, Jacobi - whose criticism of the Enlightenment was that it inevitably led to a devaluing of humanity and a rejection of the inherent dignity of man - had failed to see that humanity’s dignity lies precisely in the human capacity to assess our beliefs and impulses in terms of their rationality and to make that assessment effective - in other words, that the dignity of humanity consists in its autonomy. Jacobi’s distrust of “reason” therefore was misplaced, indeed counter to what Hegel argued was the real and legitimate core of his antagonism to the prevailing Enlightenment phi? losophies against which he had rebelled. In opposition to Jacobi’s asser? tion that only the “heart” could be the basis of, in Jacobi’s words, the “majesty” and “dignity” of humanity, Hegel argued that “this grandeur and majesty can only be achieved through this infinite power of abstrac? tion from the determinate and independence and freedom exist only through this power, as the inwardly concrete knows itself as that which is absolutely undetermined, the universal, the good in itself and makes itself into that which is absolutely undetermined but at the same time exactly determines itself/fom its own resources and is concrete action.”’? Jacobi’s appeal to the “heart” was implicitly an appeal to this kind of rationality; his appeal implicitly committed him to saying that there is something in our capacities for self-conscious reflection that implies that no mere “impulse” can count for us as a ground for action unless the “heart” endorses it. However, the “heart,” which sounds so much more concrete than “reason,” can offer no consistent guidance as to which impulses should be endorsed and which should not. To do that, one requires a grasp on some admirable way of life, a detailed conception of the “well-ordered state,” as the ancients had long ago recognized.” Even worse, the appeal merely to the “heart,” like Kant’s appeal merely to reason, threatens to be powerless in the face of “romantic” under? standings of ethics, and in light of key elements of human nature, such as the fact that often “people would rather be magnanimous than prin? cipled {rechtlich)f for example.”

? ? 更加令人困惑不解地，在黑格爾眼中，雅科比——他對啟蒙運動的批評不可避免地導致對人性的貶低和對人固有尊嚴的拋棄——未能看出人類的尊嚴恰恰在于人們能夠根據自己的理性評價信仰和沖動并使得這樣的評價變得更有實際效用——換句話說，雅科比未能看出人類的尊嚴在于人類的自律。雅科比對“理性”的懷疑因此是不適當的，實際上是與黑格爾下列的主張相反的：作為真實而合法的核心是他和那時流行的、早就遭到他反對的啟蒙運動哲學的對抗。與雅科比關于只有“心靈”才可能構成（用雅科比的話說）人類“權威”和“尊嚴”的基礎這個論斷相反，黑格爾則論證道，“偉大和權威只能通過從有限存在中抽象出的無限的力量而獲得，獨立和自由僅僅借這樣的力量而存在，就像內在的具體知道它自己是絕對地未確定的共相或自在之善，并使它自己成為絕對地未確定的但同時恰好根據它自己的資源確定它自己的和作為具體行動的東西一樣?！毖趴票葘Α靶撵`”的訴求言外之意是對這種“心靈”訴求的“合理性”的訴求；他的訴求言外之意是承諾說，在我們自覺反思的能力中存在著某種東西，這就暗示著除非“心靈”認可“沖動”，否則純“沖動”絕不可能被算作我們行動的基礎。然而，“心靈”，聽起來比“理性”更加具體得多的“心靈”，無法對這些沖動應該得到認可、哪些沖動不應該得到認可提供一以貫之的引領。為提供這樣的引領，人們需要去把握某種值得贊美的生活方式，需要去把握一種詳細的“井然有序的狀態”的構想，像古人很久以前就已認識到的一樣。甚至更糟糕的是，這樣純粹地對“心靈”的訴求，像康德純粹地對理性的訴求，有著在面對倫理學的“浪漫主義”理解時可能變得無能為力之虞，舉例來說，由于人性的關鍵要素，這樣純粹地對“心靈”的訴求，有著在面對諸如常?！叭藗儗幵笇捄甏罅慷辉笀猿衷瓌t性（rechtlich）”這樣的事實時可能變得無能為力之虞。

On Hegel’s view, both Jacobi and Kant had therefore demonstrated the insufficiencies of the “previous metaphysics” and thereby paved the way for an “altered view of the logical.Whereas Hegel had in 1802 portrayed Jacobi’s thought as essentially a misunderstanding of what was at work in modern philosophy, by 1817, after having befriended Jacobi, Hegel had taken to portraying him as an important thinker of the first order who had helped clear the ground for Hegelian idealism.? The difference in polemical tone was hard to miss. Jacobi was no longer seen as an opponent; he was now seen as a precursor. Hegel no longer spoke as an outsider trying to get his voice heard; he now spoke as an insider putting the list of thinkers in his own time into what he saw as their proper order.

? ? 照黑格爾看，雅克比和康德兩人都擺出了“以前的形而上學”的不足之>處，都由此為“改變對符合邏輯的東西的看法”鋪平了道路。黑格爾在1802年本質上把雅科比的思想描述成是對現代哲學中起作用的東西的誤解，但是，到1817年他和雅科比訂交后，黑格爾已著手把雅科比描述成是第一流的重量級思想家，因為雅科比有助于廓清黑格爾哲學唯心主義的基礎。論戰的語調上的差異很難不被察覺到。雅科比不復被看作對手；他現在被看作先驅。黑格爾不復作為一個試圖招攬聽眾的局外人講話；他現在作為一個把他自己時代一連串思想家置于他認為的、他們合適的順序中的權威人士講話。

Political Engagement

While at Heidelberg, Hegel was to become engaged in three related controversies. One was the issue of constitutions for the new German states; the other was the debate surrounding the possible codification of German law; the third was the role of the student fraternity movement (the Burschenschaft) in the development of German nationalism and the call for constitutional change. Hegel’s more public involvement was with the issue of constitutionalism, but the results of his involvement in all three were to have an effect on his life and thought for many years to come.

政治參與

? ? 當在海德堡的時候，黑格爾將參加三場相互關聯的論戰。一場是關于新德國的憲法問題的論戰；另一場是圍繞著是否可能編纂德國法律的爭論；第三場辯論涉及學生聯誼會（Burschenschaft）活動在德國民族主義的發展和要求憲法改革中的作用問題。黑格爾較為公開卷入的爭論涉及立憲政體問題，而他卷入這三場爭論所帶來的結果必將對他未來多年的生活和思想產生很大的影響。

Post-Napoleonic Germany and German Nationalism

After the defeat of Napoleon, many things were obviously up for grabs in Germany. Those elements in society that had lost out during the Napoleonic reorganization of Germany hoped to reacquire the privileges they had lost; those elements that had gained or prospered in the reorganization hoped to maintain what they had acquired; and those who had hoped for more radical change but had been disappointed by the French lack of enthusiasm for fomenting revolution in Germany now hoped that the time was ripe for such change. These elements contended with each other at the Congress of Vienna, each hoping to see its particular vision of Germany’s future fulfilled.

后拿破侖一世時期的德國和德國民族主義

? ? 在拿破侖戰敗后，德國許多東西明顯處于懸而未決中。那些在拿破侖一世重組德國時期出局的社會勢力希望重新獲得他們早先喪失的特權；那些在拿破侖一世重組德國時期撈到好處或飛黃騰達的社會勢力希望維持他們的既得利益；那些早就希望更徹底的變革但對法國缺乏激起德國革命的熱情感到失望的社會勢力現在相信德國進行這樣變革的時機已經成熟。這些社會勢力彼此在維也納會議上展開角逐，每一方都希望看到自身的特殊利益能在未來德國得到實現。

Those who wished to turn the clock back, to reacquire the rights and privileges they had lost, came face to face with the fact that to do that they had to confront the powers that had emerged in the reorganization of Germany; and those powers were simply not willing to be set aside.? Wiirttemberg, Baden, and Bavaria, for example, had vastly extended their holdings, and the rulers of those lands had no real wish to return ecclesiastical properties or cede privileges back to people who would only oppose their further institutionalizing and securing of power.? There were also those who pressed for a unification of all of Germany, but the band of people making such demands was small, ineffectual, and no match for the rulers of, for example, Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, and Wiirttemberg, who did not have the slightest intention of ceding power in order to merge with some other political body. Smaller states also feared that they might be gobbled up by the larger states and that any unification of Germany would come only at their expense.

? ? 那些希望時光倒轉、重新得到自己早已喪失的權利和特權的人們必須面對的事實是，他們不得不面對德國重組中出現的各方勢力；這些勢力絕對不愿意被拋到一邊。舉例來說，符騰堡、巴登和巴伐利亞已經大規模擴張了屬地，而這些公國的統治者絕不會真正希望把教會財產或被剝奪的特權還給那些只會反對他們把權力進一步制度化和捍衛權力的人們。同樣還存在著一些迫切要求全德統一的人們，但是，這幫提出這樣要求的人屬于少數派，成不了氣候，根本就不是例如普魯士、巴登、巴伐利亞和符騰堡州的統治者的對手，這些州的統治者為與其他政治體融為一體而絲毫沒有放弈權力的意向。小一點的州同樣也害怕自己可能被大的州吞并，或德國的統一將會僅僅以犧牲它們為代價。

The compromise that was reached with all these groups was the Bundesakte (the articles of confederation among the various German states), presented by Metternich to the delegates at the Congress of Vienna on May 23, 1815, and enacted into law in late June 1815. As its name indicates, it constituted only a confederation of states and actually had only one institution attached to it, the Bundesversammlung, the Diet, a bureaucratically restricted body that proved to be wholly ineffectual.? Article Thirteen of the Bundesakte also stipulated that every state in the confederation was to have a constitution for the land reflecting its own particularist concatenation of estates. (Each was to have what was called a landstdndische Verfassung.)

? ? 上述所有這些社會勢力達成的妥協產物是《德意志各州聯邦協議》（Bundesakte）。這份協議由梅特涅在1815年5月23日維也納會議上提交與會代表，并在1815年6月末被頒布為法律。像它的名字表明的，它僅僅形成了各州的聯邦，實際上它只有一個附屬機構（德意志聯邦大會或德意志聯邦各州議會），一個被證明是完全不起作用的受到官僚政治限制的組織?！兜乱庵靖髦萋摪顓f議》中第十三條還規定聯邦內的每個州都可以有反映它自己的社會等級聯系的憲法（每個州都可以有一部所謂的“代表憲法”）。

But the very idea of a federal Diet inspired the small minority who hoped for a unified Germany to press their case. Some eighteenthcentury ideas that had been floated in Germany about so-called German identity began to be revived, expanded, and in the wake of the new breed of Romantics, transformed. In particular, Fichte in his 1808 Addresses to the German Nation managed to give a much sharper for? mulation to a certain Romantic view of German identity in his argument that the Germans were unique in being an “original” people still living in their native land, speaking their original language, and maintaining their original customs. The French and British, on the other hand, had lost their original languages and did not live in the lands of their ancestors and hence could not claim to be “original peoples.” (This assertion about the Germans was false on almost all counts and rested on what has proved to be an even more dubious if not simply outright false assumption that the “Teutons” described by Tacitus were in fact the ancestors, both genealogically and culturally, of the “Germans” of Fichte’s own time; but at the time, the falsity of this view was not widely known, if it was known at all.)

? ? 然而，聯邦議會這個特有的概念使得一小部分人歡欣鼓舞，因為他們希望由一個統一的德國來處理他們的事務。一些早在18世紀就已在德國傳播的所謂“德意志身份”的觀點開始得到復興和廣泛傳播，并隨著浪漫主義的新形態而開始被做了某些改變。特別是，費希特在1808年做的《關于德意志民族的演講》中想方設法對浪漫主義關于德意志身份的特定看法作出了極為犀利的闡述，他認為德意志人是現存唯一的“原初的”民族，仍然生活在自己的祖國，說自己原初的語言，維持自己原初的風俗習慣。法國人和英國人，則與德國人相反，已經喪失了自己原初的語言，不復在自己祖先居住的土地上居住，因此不可聲稱是“原初的民族”。（上述對德國人的斷言幾乎完全是錯誤的，而且它依據的是被證明是較為可疑的、即使不是完全錯誤的假定，即從譜系上和文化上看，由古羅馬歷史學家塔西佗描述的條頓人其實是費希特自己時代的德意志人的祖先；但是，在那個時代，這個觀點的錯誤性并沒有被人廣泛知曉，縱使它完全應該被人廣泛知曉。）

Hegel was as usual completely unmoved by what he saw (correctly) as the phony Germanness of the whole movement; while in Nuremberg, Hegel had already characterized such celebrations of ancient “Germandom” as “German-dumb” {Deutschdumm), and he had not changed his mind in the meantime.“ The interest in glorifying supposedly ancient German customs and literature struck him as particularly silly. His disdain for things like the Ntbelungenlied had already been evident in Nuremberg; in 1810, Clemens Brentano, the poet, wrote to his friend Josef von Gorres (the Romantic arch-nationalist) that in Nuremberg he had recently encountered Hegel, who, he said, could only appreciate the Nihehmgenlied by “translating it into Greek.”*** In speaking of the Nihelungenlied in his lectures on aesthetics a few years later in Berlin, Hegel caustically dismissed it, arguing that “the Burgundians, Chriem- hild’s revenge, Siegfried’s deeds, the whole circumstances of life, the fate and downfall of an entire race, the Nordic character. King Etzel, etc., all this has no longer any living connection whatever with our domestic, civil, legal life, and with our institutions and constitutions.? The story of Christ, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Roman law, even the Trojan war have far more presence for us than the affairs of the Nibelungs which for our national consciousness are simply a past history, swept clean away with a broom. To propose to make things of that sort into something national for us or even into the Book of the German people has been the most trivial and shallow notion.”**^ (Hegel could not have even conceived that some years later the Nibelungenlied would be made the basis of an immensely successful series of operas; at this period, Richard Wagner was only a child whose father had been killed at the battle of Leipzig.)

? ? 黑格爾一如既往完全不為他正確地看作的整個運動虛假的德國性（Germanness）所打動；當早在紐倫堡的時候，黑格爾就已經把這樣的對古代“德意志人”（Germandom）的頌揚描述為“德國傻瓜”（Deutschaumz），他在此期間始終沒有改變他自己的看法。有些人認為應該頌揚古代德國人的風俗習慣和文學藝術，這樣的雅興給他留下特別愚蠢的印象。他對像《尼伯龍根之歌》一樣的東西的蔑視早在紐倫堡時期就已非常明顯；1810年，詩人克萊門斯·布倫塔諾在致友人約瑟夫·馮·格雷斯（浪漫派的極端民族主義者）的信中說道，在紐倫堡他近來碰到了黑格爾，黑格爾說只有把《尼伯龍根之歌》“翻譯成希臘語”才可堪欣賞。在幾年后柏林美學課上提到《尼伯龍根之歌》時，黑格爾以譏諷的口吻一帶而過，力主“法國勃艮第人，克里姆希爾德的復仇，齊格弗里德的行為，生命的整個境遇，整個種族的命運和衰落，北歐日耳曼民族的性格，埃策爾國王等，所有這些全都不復與我們國內公民合法的生活有任何關系，全都不復與我們的制度和憲法有任何關系。彌賽亞的故事、耶路撒冷、伯利恒、羅馬法，甚至特洛伊戰爭才是我們要面對的，而非尼伯龍根的事務。尼伯龍根的事務對我們民族意識而言純粹是一段過往的歷史，應該被清掃一空。建議使上述這類東西變成我們國家事務，甚或寫進德國人的書本，這是一文不值的極其淺薄的想法?！保ê诟駹柹踔敛豢赡茉O想一些年后《尼伯龍根之歌》將被變成一系列極其成功的歌劇的基礎；在這個階段，里夏德·瓦格納還只是個乳臭未干的孩童，他的父親早在萊比錫戰爭中就已陣亡。）

The Codification Controversy

An equally important controversy taking shape in Germany at this time had to do with the issue of the possible codification of German law, a debate also prompted by the changes forced on Germany by the Revo? lution and the Napoleonic adventures. It had become clear to many that traditional German law was in for a full overhaul.

法典編纂爭論

? ? 一場在德國那時形成的、同樣重要的爭論與德國法典是否可能進行編纂問題有關，這場爭論同樣也是由法國大革命和拿破侖一世冒險迫使德國發生的變化促成的。在很多人看來，傳統的德國法律顯然早已應該進行全面修改。

The fragmentation of Germany and the hometown structure of much of its life had meant that legal systems varied not just from principality to principality but from town to town, and resting on top of the tangled, messy, incoherent patchwork of German law was an overlay of Imperial law from the Holy Roman Empire. In German law, local custom min? gled piecemeal with Roman law and ecclesiastical canon law in all the various domains of the legal system. Added to all this mixture were the claims of “natural law,” which by the seventeenth and eighteenth cen? turies had come to mean any study of the normative supports of the legal system that did not rely on any “positive” statute or ruling by judges. As a result, throughout the eighteenth century, there had been a rising demand for university-trained lawyers to help run the various principalities of Germany, and there had consequently been a dramatic upsurge in enrollments in the law faculties at universities. Even Hegel himself had tried (unsuccessfully, since it was against his father’s wishes) to transfer out of theological into jurisprudential studies at Tubingen, and Goethe, the Olympian figure of the period, had studied jurisprudence, worked as an intern at the Imperial Chamber of Justice at Wetzlar, practiced law for two years in Frankfurt, and even written a best-seller - The Sorrows of Young Werther — whose protagonist was a lawyer.

? ? 德國的分裂狀態和德國大部分生活中的家鄉結構早已意味著法律體系不僅因公國而異，而且因家鄉而異。凌駕于德國法律這個糾結的、混亂的、無條理的湊合物之上的是神圣羅馬帝國的帝國法律。在德國法律中，地方習俗與羅馬法律和教會教規在法律體系的各個不同領域交互混雜。除了所有的這些混合外，還有“自然法”的這些主張也是混亂不堪，“自然法”到17世紀和18世紀已經逐漸意味著是對一種法律體系的標準化維護的研究，這種法律體系不依賴于“實定的”法規或法官的裁決。所以，貫穿整個18世紀，對由大學培養的幫助治理德國不同公國的律師的需求量不斷上升，大學的法律系入學人數因此呈現出直線上升趨勢。甚至就連黑格爾本人還在圖賓根學習時就試圖從神學院轉到法學院（這未能成功，因為違背了父親的意愿），而歌德這位那個時期的巨人同樣也學習了法學，并在魏瑪的帝國樞密法院做過實習生，在法蘭克福做了兩年律師，甚至還撰寫了一本暢銷書——《少年維特之煩惱》——書中主角就是一名律師。

During the upheaval of the revolutionary, Napoleonic, and postNapoleonic reform periods, the tangled complexity of German law came under particularly close scrutiny, and its possible reform became a topic of intense public interest. Much of the debate was focused on whether the great eighteenth-century codification of law begun in Prussia under Frederick the Great in 1746 and finally enacted in 1794 under Friedrich Wilhelm II should become the model for all German law. The “Prus? sian general code” had, after all, neatly codified great swaths of the formerly tangled and unruly Prussian legal practice into a series of neat paragraphs in nice, clear German (some of them only one sentence long). Some regarded the Prussian code as equal in cultural importance to Luther’s translation of the Bible.Especially after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and the consolidation of various German states, the new and old principalities were pressed to decide whether to modify their archaic legal practices in light of the Prussian code of 1794 or the new “civil code” enacted under Napoleon in France in 1804.? The debate was both intense and widely followed in all the German states, as it coincided and crossed paths with the debate over whether and in what form new constitutional structures for the reformed German states should be established.

? ? 在那個革命的動蕩不安的、拿破侖一世的、后拿破侖一世的改革時期，德國法律糾結的復雜性受到世人格外密切的關注，德國法律是否可能進行改革成了公眾極感興趣的話題。絕大部分爭論焦點在于那肇始于1746年腓特烈大帝統治下的普魯士且在1794年弗里德里希·威廉二世統治下最終頒布的18世紀大法典是不是應該成為全德國法律范本?！镀蒸斒客ㄓ梅ǖ洹樊吘挂呀浨擅畹貙⒅盎靵y不堪的普魯士法律慣例編纂成一系列用優美清晰德文撰寫的簡潔段落（它們中有些段落只有一句話那么長）。一些人把普魯士法典當作文化上重要性堪與路德的《圣經》譯本相媲美。特別值得一提的是，在1806年神圣羅馬帝國瓦解和德國各州合并后，新舊公國都被迫去決定是根據普魯士1794年法典還是根據1804年拿破侖在法國頒布的新的《民法典》來修改它們的古老法律慣例。這場爭論隨后在德國各州激烈而廣泛地進行著，因為這場爭論實質上且必須面對的是經過改革后的德國各州新的憲法結構是否應該且以何種形式得以確立。

The proponents of codification tended to be on the side of the new world opened up by the Revolution, and the opponents against. Those favoring the more traditional values of tradition and aristocratic privi? lege - and even the relative merits of Latin over vernacular German were set against those favoring the new ideals of reason and modernity.? In the great swirl of debate animating so much of German life during that period, the codification controversy gradually settled down into a match between two of the leading lights of German intellectual life in legal matters: Hegel’s good friend Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut, a professor of law at Heidelberg, and Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the great jurist at the Berlin university and later one of Hegel’s fiercest opponents.

? ? 支持法典編纂的人傾向于站在由法國大革命開啟的新世界這方，而反對者則與之相對。贊成更為傳統的價值觀念和貴族特權的人——甚至贊成拉丁語相對地優于本國德語的人——遭到支持理性和現代革新理想的人反對。在這場聲勢浩大的、極大地鼓舞了德國人這個階段生活的爭論過程中，法典編纂的爭論逐漸演變成德國思想界法律問題上兩個一流人物之間的斗爭：黑格爾的好友安東·弗里德里希·堯斯圖斯·蒂鮑特這位海德堡大學法學教授，和弗里德里?！た枴ゑT·薩維尼這位柏林大學大法學家（后來薩維尼成為黑格爾的勁敵之一）。

Thibaut had sparked the controversy with his highly respected pam- phlet of 1814, “On the Necessity of a Universal Civil Code for Ger? many.”**'’ In that piece, Thibaut replied to the arch-conservative royal councilor in the court of Hannover, August Rehberg, who had pub? lished a piece essentially arguing that for Germany to be “Germany,” it had to reject rationalistic, egalitarian “French” models of law and reinstate its own traditional system of particularistic, hometown laws.? Thibaut had countered by arguing that it would be just as “German” and indeed was far more necessary to enact a rational system of law common to all the German states. The old system of law, after all, could not possibly be characterized as “German”: Large parts of it were “Roman,” and many of its Roman aspects in fact derived from the very period of the Roman empire when it was in its most steep decline. A truly “German” system of law would therefore take into account the particularities of Germany and its legal traditions but would render them into a unified, rational form. Although the creation of such a rational system of law would neither imply nor bring about the unifica? tion of Germany into one state, it would serve to obviate the cultural, even if not the political, fragmentation besetting Germany. Moreover, because it was to be written in the vernacular, it would be accessible to all German citizens and lessen the dependence of citizens and even judges on the opinions of a few trained jurists fluent in Latin; and it would embody the new ideals of reason, since it would be crafted by the new generation of reform-minded law professors at work in the various newly founded universities. As such, the codification of law would embody what is best and most rational in the German spirit.

? ? 蒂鮑特通過他早在1814年就已發表的享有盛譽的小冊子《論德國制定一部普通民法的必要性》，引發了這場辯論。在這本小冊子中，蒂鮑特回擊了漢諾威法庭思想極端保守的皇家議員古斯特·雷貝格。此君早先發表的小冊子本質上主張，就德國應該成為“德國”而言，德國必須拋棄理性主義的平等主義的“法國人”的法律模式，必須恢復德國自己的傳統的特殊恩寵論的鄉鎮法律體系。蒂鮑特則主張以下內容，對其觀點進行反駁：德國恰恰應該成為“德國人的”，德國確實很有必要頒布全德國各州共同的理性的法律體系。舊的法律體系畢竟絕不可能被刻畫成具有“德國人的”特征：它的大部分內容是“羅馬人的”，而這些“羅馬人的”內容其實正是在羅馬帝國急劇衰敗時期形成的。因此，一種真正的“德國人”的法律體系應該考慮到德國的特性和法律傳統，但同時應將這些特性和傳統整合為一種統一的合理的形式。盡管這樣一種理性的法律體系的創建既不會意味著也不會導致德國成為一個統一的國家，但這種理性的法律體系仍然應該被用來避免文化上的（縱使不是政治上的）困擾德國的分裂。不僅如此，因為這種理性的法律體系注定用本國語言書寫，所以它應該被全德國國民理解，并減少國民甚至法官對一些訓練有素、精通拉丁文的法理學家意見的依賴。這種理性的法律體系將體現理性的新理想，因為這種法律體系將由供職于各個新建立大學中的新一代懷有改革思想的法學教授來編制。就此而言，法律的編纂應該體現德國精神中最好和最理性的那些東西。

Thibaut was the descendent of French Huguenots, firmly Protestant in his faith, progressive in his views, and middle-class in his outlook.? (He and Hegel shared a certain common generational outlook on life, Thibaut being only two years younger than Hegel.) Thibaut, however, found his match in Karl Friedrich von Savigny (born in 1779), who was Thibaut’s mirror opposite in many ways: Savigny was aristocratic, con? servative, wealthy. Catholic (and, moreover, had married into a famous and staunchly Catholic family, the Brentanos), and one of the key intellectuals of German Romanticism. Like Schelling, Savigny had be? come a famous scholar at an early age, having published in 1803 a landmark book. The Right of Property, a study of Roman law.**^ (Curi? ously, like Thibaut, Savigny was also descended from Huguenots.)

? ? 蒂鮑特是法國胡格諾派教徒的后裔，是一位具有堅定信仰的新教徒，思想進步，持有中產階級的觀點。（他和黑格爾都具有那一代人共同的人生觀，蒂鮑特只比黑格爾小兩歲。）然而，蒂鮑特與生于1779年的弗里德里?！た枴ゑT·薩維尼展開了斗爭。薩維尼在很多方面與蒂鮑特截然相反：薩維尼出身貴族，思想保守，家境富有，信奉天主教（而且還同一個聲名顯赫的篤信天主教的布倫斯諾家族聯姻），是德國浪漫主義的關鍵思想人物之一。像謝林一樣，薩維尼年輕時就已成為知名學者，早在1803年就已出版了一部關于羅馬法研究的里程碑式著作《財產法》。（說來奇怪，薩維尼和蒂鮑特一樣，也是胡格諾派教徒的后裔。）

Savigny had been working on the follow-up to his first book, which would deal with the law of the Middle Ages, but when Thibaut’s pamphlet appeared, Savigny gathered up some of his extant manuscripts and promptly answered Thibaut with his own pamphlet in 18145 the Vocation of Our Time for Legislation and Jurisprudence.”*'’ In it, he repeated and extended some of the claims made famous in his first book. Law, he claimed, grows organically within the life of a people, and it is forever in the process of development. To understand law, one therefore needs a sense of history, so that both the very uniqueness of a people - a Volk - and a sense of how things fit into their organic context can be grasped together. Law is founded, in Savigny’s terms, in the “shared consciousness of a people”; it is an expression of a specific way of life, of what he called the “spirit of a people,” their Volksgeist.? Indeed, what counts as “law” are simply the basic normative commit? ments shared by such a “people” that make that way of life what it is.? Law therefore can neither be justified in terms of its serving any inde? pendently identifiable social function outside of itself nor as a compo? nent of achieving some “rational” end external to itself (as Savigny thought people like Thibaut mistakenly believed). Law is an essential component of the identity of a people, and that identity cannot be broken down into paragraphs or neatly codified parts. Law therefore needs no more justification than does the identity of a people itself; a “people” simply is what it is, and the goal of legal studies should be to articulate the basic commitments of that sense of identity, not to pre? scribe external goals to such a people. Any attempt to codify the identity of a people would be an attempt to render what is properly only understood as an organic whole into a dead set of abstract principles.

? ? 薩維尼一直在撰寫第一本書的續編，續編將論述中世紀法律。但是當蒂鮑特的這本小冊子見諸坊間的時候，薩維尼把他手頭現有的這些手稿匯集起來，迅速在1814年以他自己的小冊子《論立法和法學的當代使命》回應蒂鮑特。在這本小冊子中，他重申并擴充了第一本書中使他名揚天下的某些主張。法律，依他之見，在民族生活中有機地生長，它永遠處在發展過程中。為理解法律，一個人因此需要歷史意識，所以無論是民族——Volk——的獨特性，還是事物如何適應它們自己的有機環境的意識，都能夠被共同加以把握。法律奠基于，用薩維尼的術語說，“民族的共同意識”；它是一種特殊的生活方式的表達，是一種被他叫作“民族精神”或Volkgeist的表達。更確切地說，被算作“法律”的純粹是由這樣一個“民族”共同具有的基本的規范承諾，這樣的承諾使得生活方式變成這個“民族”本身所具有的東西。因此，法律既不能根據它應該發揮超出它自身范圍的獨立地可認可的社會功用而被證明是合理的，也不能作為達到某種外在于它自身的“理性”目的的組成部分而被證明是合理的（像薩維尼認為，像蒂鮑特一樣的人們錯誤地相信的那樣）。法律是民族認同的基本成分，而認同不能被分解為段落或被簡潔地編纂的部分。法律因此只需要證明民族自身的認同是合理的；“民族”純粹是“民族”所是的東西，法律研究的目標應該在于系統闡述對民族認同感的基本承諾，而不應該在于給這樣的民族規定外在的目標。凡是想對民族認同進行編碼的嘗試，大概都是試圖把通常僅僅被適當地理解為有機整體的東西變為一套死板的抽象原理。

Savigny famously concluded that what “our time” lacked was pre? cisely that understanding of the organic connectedness of law and the Volksgeist^ which in turn made it entirely bereft of any real “vocation” for “legislation,” although the new university at Berlin perhaps gave it the basis for a new form of “jurisprudence” (more accurately, a “science of law,” Rechtsrvissenschaft, a term Savigny coined).*'^

? ? 薩維尼作出的有名斷言是：“我們的時代”缺少的恰恰是對法律和民族精神的有機聯系的理解，這反過來又使“我們的時代”完全喪失了“立法”的真正“使命”。盡管如此，新的柏林大學或許為一種新的“法學”（更準確地說，是一種“法學科學”，Rechtsrissenschaft，一個由薩維尼杜撰出的術語）奠定了基礎。

Savigny and Thibaut agreed that a unified system of law was appro? priate for the post-Napoleonic German states, they agreed that a unified system of law was necessary to overcome the fragmentation of German life, and they agreed that this neither required nor recommended unifi? cation into one German state. But they disagreed sharply on what that unity meant. For Thibaut, it meant a rational recasting of German law in light of the best post-Enlightenment thought coming out of the newly reformed universities; for Savigny, it meant getting clear on the true origins of the identity of the German “people” as a whole. Thibaut was in effect recommending a form of rationalism in the appropriation of the German tradition, while Savigny was recommending a more meta? physical, and certainly more Romantic, approach. Underlying Savigny’s arguments was his belief that attempting to codify German law in the way in which Napoleon had authorized the codification of French law would in effect undermine German identity and would de facto be an attempt to transform the Germans into the French. Savigny managed to stake out this claim without at the same time endorsing Rehberg’s entrenched reactionary position, which held that Germans simply needed to reassert their patchwork system of hometown laws.

? ? 薩維尼和蒂鮑特都表示贊同一個統一的法律體系非常適合后拿破侖一世時期的德國各州，他們同樣也都表示贊同一個統一的法律體系對于克服德國人生活中的分裂是必要的，他們同樣也都表示贊同這個統一的法律體系既不要求也不提倡把德國各州統一為一個德國人國家。然而，他們在統一的含義上存在嚴重分歧。對于蒂鮑特，統一意味著合理地重塑德國法律，這樣的重塑依據的是后啟蒙運動時期出自經過新改革的大學中最佳的思想；對薩維尼而言，統一意味著弄清作為整體的德國“民族”認同的真實起源。蒂鮑特實質上力薦一種適合德國傳統的理性主義形式，而薩維尼則力薦一種更加形而上學的、當然更帶有浪漫主義色彩的方式。構成薩維尼的觀點基礎的是他相信，嘗試以一種早就被拿破侖借以授權編纂法國法律的方式來編纂德國法律，其實將會削弱德國人的認同，實際上將會嘗試把德國人變成法國人。薩維尼堅持這一主張，同時并不認同雷貝格所確立的反動立場，在這種反動主張看來，德國人只是需要重塑他們東拼西湊的故鄉法律體系。

The Burschenschaften

The Romantic view (expressed so brilliantly by Savigny) helped to inspire among many people an ideal of “authentic” Germanness as a basis for national consciousness. This “Teutonic” element gained strength with the establishment of new student fraternities (the Bur? schenschaften) at Jena in June 1815 (in which Hegel’s old antagonist J. F. Fries played a part). Even Hegel’s brother-in-law, Gottlieb von Tucher, had become engaged in the movement while still at Erlangen.? Some members of the Burschenschaft at Jena even took to wearing what they thought were authentic Teutonic costumes, and the colors of the Liitzow volunteer regiment of the Napoleonic wars - black, red, and gold — became the colors of the flag of the Burschenschaft movement.** The Burschenschaften were intended by their founders to replace the older form of student fraternities, the Landsmannschaften (the “fraternity of fellow countrymen”); the latter were the characteristic beer-soaked, dueling, bawdy associations of German students that had been famous at places like Jena. The Landsmannschaften were “particularist” in their orientation, binding together students from a particular area or princi? pality in the celebration of their own traditions and customs; the Bur? schenschaften, on the other hand, conceived of themselves more universalistically as “German” rather than as, for example, “Saxon” or “Hessian.” The Landsmannschaften concentrated on rowdiness and beer drinking; the Burschenschaften had more explicitly political themes in mind. The older forms of Landsmannschaften were therefore seen by the conservative powers of the restoration as essentially harmless and as posing no threat to the established orders the Burschenschuften^ on the other hand, quite obviously posed an implicit threat to the order that had been established at the Congress of Vienna. Hegel had at first some sympathy with the high moral tone and the commitment to constitu? tionalist governments for the various German states on the part of some members of the movement, and he thus tended at first to support the movement.

學生聯誼會運動

? ? 被薩維尼推崇的浪漫主義看法有助于激起很多人把“本真的”德國性的理想作為民族意識的基礎。這個“條頓人的”元素獲得了力量，因為1815年6月在耶拿成立了新的學生聯誼會（Burschenschaft）（在這個聯誼會中，黑格爾的老對手J. F.弗里斯起著舉足輕重的作用）。甚至就連黑格爾的內弟戈特利布·馮·圖赫爾還在埃爾蘭根時就已經加入了這場運動。耶拿學生聯誼會中的某些成員甚至還著手佩戴他們認為的正宗的條頓人服飾，拿破侖戰爭中呂措志愿兵團的色彩——黑色、紅色和金色——成了學生聯誼會運動旗幟的顏色。學生聯誼會被創建者打算用來取代舊式的學生聯誼會，Landsmannschaft（“同鄉聯誼會”）；后者是德國學生的富有特征的酗酒斗毆下流協會，這樣的協會在像耶拿一樣的地方很有名。同鄉聯誼會在價值取向上是“特殊恩寵論者的”，把來自特定區域或公國的、頌揚他們自己的文化傳統和風俗習慣的學生聚于旗下；學生聯誼會則相反，他們更愿意將自己視為“德國人”，而非“薩克森人”或“黑森人”。同鄉聯誼會專注于耍流氓和喝啤酒；學生聯誼會則胸懷更明確的政治主題。舊式的同鄉聯誼會被復辟的保守勢力視為無害，認為它不會對已確立的秩序構成威脅；與之相反，學生聯誼會很顯然對維也納會議早已確立的秩序構成明顯的威脅。黑格爾起初對德國各州學生聯誼會運動中某些成員宣揚道德高調以及對立憲主義政府的承諾表示同情，他因此起初傾向于支持學生聯誼會運動。

On October 18-19, 1817, a Burschenschaft celebration was held at the Wartburg (the castle in Eisenach at which Luther had translated the Bible into German while under the protection of the prince there) in commemoration of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Reformation and the victory over Napoleon at Leipzig. The whole affair was some? what ill-conceived - how, for example, were Catholic German members of the Burschenschaft supposed to identify with a meeting celebrating the separation from the Catholic church? There were patriotic speeches, and as things got out of hand, a book burning of nonpatriotic works took place (a sad and vicious portent of even more vicious things to come much later in Germany’s history); among the books burned were the Code Napoleon and the works of German authors considered to be “un-German.” Much anti-Semitic rumbling was also heard at the fes? tival as speakers denounced the Jews as “un-German.” One of the professorial leaders of the movement who spoke at the Wartburg festival was J. F. Fries, who had already published in 1816 a pamphlet attacking “Jewishness.” (The pamphlet had been written while Fries was still in Heidelberg but was only published after he had gone to Jena.) In that pamphlet. Fries argued that since Jews wanted to keep themselves apart from the “German national community,” they form a “state” within the German “state” and can never be citizens of a German state. Jewish? ness itself, moreover, was only the culture of “conniving second-hand street peddlers and tradesmen,” a “frightful and demoralizing power,” which “should be extirpated root and branch, since of all societies and states, secret or public, it is plainly the most dangerous to the state.

? ? 1817年10月18日至19日，在瓦爾特堡——在這座愛森納赫城堡里，路德在親王庇護下把《圣經》翻譯成德文——舉行了一場學生聯誼會慶典，以此紀念宗教改革運動三百周年和德國人在荷比錫戰役中戰勝拿破侖。整個事務有些考慮欠妥——舉例來說，學生聯誼會中信奉天主教的德國成員怎么會被認為認同一場慶祝脫離天主教的集會呢？慶祝會上有人發表愛國講演，由于事態失去控制，有人焚燒非愛國的書籍（這是一個很久之后將在德國歷史上發生的更惡毒事情的悲哀的、惡意的前兆）；在這些被焚毀的書中有《拿破侖法典》和被認作是“非德國人”的德國作家作品。在慶典上，當演講者把猶太人當作“非德國人”詆毀的時候，慶典上同樣也可聽到反猶的叫嚷聲四起。這場運動中的教授級領袖之一就是在瓦爾特堡慶典上演講的J. F.弗里斯，此君早在1816年就已出版一本攻擊“猶太性”的小冊子。（這本小冊子弗里斯還在海德堡時就已寫成，而只是在他去到耶拿后才得以出版。）在這本小冊子中，弗里斯論證道，因為猶太人想把他們自己與“德國國家共同體”分隔開來，所以，他們在德國“國家”中形成了一個“國家”，絕不可能成為德國公民。不僅如此，猶太性本身只是一種“縱容街頭二道販子和商人”的文化而已，只是一種“可怕的、敗壞道德的力量”而已，猶太性“必須被徹底鏟除，因為，在所有的秘密或公開的社團和社會特殊階層中，猶太性都顯然構成對國家最大的威脅”。

Although this landed Fries in quite a bit of trouble and prompted a police interrogation of him, he remained unrepentant about the matter and even found support among some of his acquaintances. His friend Jacobi wrote a letter to him, assuring him that “Roth and Niethammer are fully in agreement with you. I have doubts and misgivings about this and that, but that is all mitigated for me by a different and greater hate of Jewish crap.”''” For his part, Fries claimed not to understand why people thought he hated the Jews; he only wanted, in his words, to “reform Jewishness (Judentum)''’ claiming that he had not spoken of hatred for the Jews themselves, nor of depriving Jews of their rights, but had spoken out only “against Jewishness as a degenerate social formation in the life of the German people.”''' But people like Hegel and his friends were not taken in by Fries’s distinction between only hating Jewishness but not hating Jews, and this was finally the last straw for Hegel with Fries. It was bad enough that Fries both continued to attack anything that Hegel would have identified as a “scientific” mssenschaftlich - approach to matters of religion and morality and con? tinued to be a competitor for influence in German philosophical circles; as far as Hegel was concerned. Fries had now come to stand for the worst elements of the new German movement, and he thought that Fries’s views on nationalism and the Jews were connected to his emo? tionalist, psychologistic versions of post-Kantian philosophy. This as? sessment of Fries was shared by some of Hegel’s friends; Boisseree had already written to Goethe about Fries on October 9, 1817, that “since things have gone badly for him in philosophy, he has thrown himself into astronomy for ladies, after that into a makeshift physics, and now finally into teutonism and hatred of the Jews, all of this just to earn his keep.”''^

? ? 盡管上述論證使弗里斯惹上很大麻煩并招致警察的查問，但他仍然對這件事毫不后悔，甚至還博得了一些熟人的支持。友人雅科比在給他的信中安慰他說：“羅特和尼特哈默爾完全同意你的看法。我對很多事情都有些疑惑和擔憂，但對猶太人那種別樣的、強烈的憎恨使我完全得到了緩和。”就弗里斯自己而言，他聲稱他不理解為什么人們認為他憎恨猶太人。他只是想（用他的話說）“改造猶太性（Judentum）”，聲稱他沒有提到仇視猶太人本身，也沒有提到剝奪猶太人的權利，而只是說“反對把猶太性視為德國人民生活中一種退化的社會形態”。極其糟糕的是，弗里斯不僅繼續攻擊那些大概被黑格爾視為解決宗教和道德問題的“科學的（wissenschaftlich）”方法，而且繼續竭力擴大自己在德國哲學界的影響。就黑格爾而言，弗里斯現在逐漸成為新德國運動中最壞因素的代表，他認為弗里斯關于民族主義和猶太人的觀點與弗里斯關于后康德哲學的情感主義和心理主義看法有關。對弗里斯的這個評價得到了黑格爾一些朋友的認同；波瓦塞雷早在1817年10月9日就在給歌德的信中談到弗里斯：“因為他在哲學上的發展極其糟糕，他投身于女性天文學研究，之后又臨時投身于物理學研究，現在最后投身于日耳曼精神和對猶太人的仇恨研究，所有這些只是為了混飯吃。”

Hegel himself was also aware of Niethammer’s implicit affinity for that kind of phony Germanism, although he seemed to be more willing to forgive him on this matter. When the French philosopher Victor Cousin inquired of Hegel about a possible visit on his part to see Schelling, Jacobi, and Niethammer in Munich, Hegel (writing in French) praised his old acquaintance Niethammer and extolled Jacobi’s virtues (whom he had befriended only after moving to Nuremberg), but warned Cousin about both Niethammer’s and Jacobi’s tendency “to? ward this Teutonic, anti-French patriotism.””^ Revealingly, Hegel told Cousin not to worry about these things with Schelling, since “you will no doubt receive a warm welcome from him, and find a manner of political thought free from anti-French prejudices.”'''' He also warned him not to bring up Jacobi’s or Schelling’s name in the other’s presence, since the two did not seem to get along. Hegel rightly saw that Schel- ling, at least at that point in his life, was not being seduced by the phony Germanisms being circulated. (In fact, the issue of the rationality of the new order emerging in Germany was to put great strains on Hegel’s and Niethammer’s relationship.)

? ? 黑格爾本人同樣也意識到尼特哈默爾跟這種假冒的德意志精神隱蔽的親近關系，盡管他看起來似乎更愿意在這件事上對尼特哈默爾不計前嫌。當法國哲學家維克托·庫贊來信征求黑格爾意見，他本人可否去拜望在慕尼黑的謝林、雅科比和尼特哈默爾的時候，黑格爾（在用法語寫的回信中）表揚他自己的老相識尼特哈默爾并稱贊雅科比身上的優點（雅科比只是在黑格爾移居紐倫堡后才被黑格爾結交），但黑格爾告誡庫贊道，尼特哈默爾和雅科比兩人都具有“條頓人的反法蘭西愛國主義”的傾向。在透露實情之后，黑格爾告訴庫贊不用擔心謝林這些事情，因為“你無疑將會受到他熱烈歡迎，并將會發現一種擺脫了反法偏見的政治思想方式”。黑格爾還告誡庫贊不要在其他場合提及雅科比和謝林的名字，因為這兩個人似乎相處得并不好。黑格爾正確地看出謝林，至少在他生活的這個階段，沒有受到四處泛濫的虛假的德意志精神的誘惑。（實際上，德國出現的新秩序是否具有合理性，這個問題必將弄得黑格爾與尼特哈默爾之間關系非常緊張。）

Several of Hegel’s students attended the Wartburg festival, and the son of his friend Friedrich Frommann and the two sons of the Wesselhoft family (the family that had taken in Ludwig Fischer and raised him until Hegel took him into his family in Heidelberg) were also present, as was Gottlieb von Tucher. (Hegel’s mother-in-law was firmly and resolutely opposed to Gottlieb’s attending the festival, finding his attraction to all that “teutonism” to be silly and distasteful, but Hegel talked her into allowing him to attend.)

? ? 黑格爾有好幾個學生參加了瓦爾特堡慶典，他的朋友弗里德里?！ず肓_曼的公子和韋塞爾赫夫特家的兩個公子也都到場（韋塞爾赫夫特家收留了路德維希·菲舍爾，并在黑格爾把菲舍爾帶回海德堡家中之前一直撫養他），戈特利布·馮·圖赫爾也到場。黑格爾的岳母堅決反對戈特利布參加這個節日，認為他完全被“日耳曼精神”所吸引是愚蠢且令人厭惡的，但黑格爾說服了岳母，允許戈特利布出席這個慶典。

One of Hegel’s favorite students at Heidelberg, Friedrich Wilhelm Carove, attended the festival as one of the leaders of the Burschenschaft movement, and he spoke out strongly against the anti-Semitic tenden? cies of some of those present. Carove, who heard Hegel’s lectures in 1817 on “Natural Law and Political Science,” even published a series of drafts of ordinances for the Burschenschaft movement in which he argued that only by remaking itself along the lines of the kinds of “universal principles as realized in determinate ways” (that Hegel had been expounding in his lectures) could the Burschenschaft hope to realize their goal of cultural renewal in Germany. Fries’s idea that national consciousness like religious consciousness was a matter of feeling was ridiculed by Carove, who dismissed it as “superficial monkey love,” a confusion of what was universal with the particularities and vagaries of personal temperament. In particular, in his draft of the regulations to govern the various fraternities, Carove stressed that the basis for mem? bership should only be rational agency, not religious confession, not national origin, and not social class; to drive that point home, Carove made it quite explicit that by that he meant that Jews and foreigners should be fully included as members in the Burschenschaften. (This was to lead to Carove’s defeat in the movement a year later and to his virtual expulsion from the movement.)‘^^

? ? 黑格爾在海德堡時期最得意的門生之一，弗里德里希·威廉·卡羅韋，也以學生聯誼會運動領袖之一的身份出席了這次瓦爾特堡節，他強烈反對某些到場人反猶主義的趨勢?？_韋，1817年聆聽過黑格爾的“自然法與政治學”課程的卡羅韋，甚至還為學生聯誼會運動發表了一系列法令草案，在草案中他辯稱，只有憑借沿著“以確定的方式實現的”（黑格爾在講課中一直在詳細闡述的）“普遍原則”這種思路重塑自身，學生聯誼會才可能有望實現自己的德國文化復興的目標。弗里斯的想法——那像宗教意識一樣的民族意識是關于感覺的問題——受到卡羅韋的嘲笑，卡羅韋斥責這樣的想法是“膚淺的淘氣鬼的愛”，是將普遍性的東西跟個人性情的特殊性和變幻莫測混為一談。特別是，在管束不同學生聯誼會的規章草案中，卡羅韋強調成員關系的基礎只應該是合理的中介，不應該是宗教的懺悔，不應該是出身的民族，不應該是社會等級；為使人領會這個觀點，卡羅韋十分清楚地闡明，借上述強調的內容，他意思是說猶太人和外國人都應該完全被包含作為學生聯誼會的成員。（這必將致使卡羅韋一年后在這場運動中的敗北，和必將致使他實質上被逐出這場運動。）

But in 1817, it no doubt seemed to Hegel not only that Fries had disgraced himself by his comments on Jewishness, but also that the Burschenschaft movement itself would likely be led by Hegelians. Not only would he triumph over Fries (already a sweet enough victory personally for him), his dreams of having his philosophy accepted as the truly modern account of the principles in play in modern life were perhaps close to being realized - and all this only one year after having secured his first real professorship! To the extent that the dynamic of modern life seemed to be moving toward making explicit those princi? ples to which he thought modern life had implicitly committed itself, he could expect that the Burschenschaft movement, whatever its momen? tary travails and misguided youthful exuberance (such as the affectations of old Teutonic dress), would eventually have to transform itself in the direction that his philosophy had outlined.

? ? 可是在1817年，無疑在黑格爾看來，不僅弗里斯因他自己關于猶太性的評論而使自己喪失顏面，而且學生聯誼會運動本身可能將會由黑格爾哲學信徒領導。不僅他將勝過弗里斯（這對他個人已經是個令人心花怒放的勝利），而且他關于讓自己哲學被人認可是對在現代生活中發揮作用的原理的真正地現代的釋述這一夢想也許接近于得到實現，——所有這些都僅僅是在他已經獲得他的第一個真正的教授職位一年后發生的！現代生活的動力看來好像在推動他去闡述這些原理，這些原理被他看作是現代生活早就隱約作出的承諾，在這種程度上，他可能期望學生聯誼會運動，無論學生聯誼會運動中有什么暫時的苦痛和遭到誤導的幼稚的過分表現（例如對于舊時條頓人服裝的喜愛），最終都必將沿著早已被他的哲學勾勒出的方向改變學生聯誼會運動自身。