第9章 海德堡時期:成為焦點人物(3)
He also maintained his friendship with Sulpiz Boisseree and came to know his brother, Melchior. Sulpiz Boisseree had known Hegel in Nuremberg, and Boisseree had played a role in bringing Hegel to Heidelberg. The brothers had (together with a friend, Johann Baptist Bertram) established an outstanding collection of paintings by old German and Dutch masters (both collected under the title “Old German”), which was unique for its time, and they had been exhibiting them in an older Palais in Heidelberg since i8io. (Goethe himself had made two trips to see the paintings.) With the awakening interest in German national matters, the collection garnered a bit of fame for itself The collection itself was to have quite an impact on Hegel, since it stirred his thought about early Christian art and put him on the path of thinking that eventually led to his lectures on aesthetics in Heidelberg and Berlin. He was likewise to spend many evenings and outings with the Boisseree brothers (particularly Sulpiz).
? ? 他還始終與蘇爾皮斯·波瓦塞蘭過從甚密,并最終結識他的弟弟梅爾希奧。蘇爾皮斯·波瓦塞蘭早在紐倫堡時期就已認識黑格爾,波瓦塞蘭在把黑格爾引進海德堡大學這件事上也發揮了重要作用。這兄弟倆(連同朋友約翰·巴普蒂斯特·貝爾特拉姆)藏有出自舊德國和丹麥大師手筆的杰出畫作(兩國大師作品都歸在“舊德國”名目下),這樣的收藏在當時無出其右,他們自1810年起一直在海德堡故宮展出這批珍貴的畫作。(歌德兩次親臨現場觀看畫作。)由于喚醒人們對德國國家事務的興趣,這批藏品為自己贏得了極大的聲名。這批藏品本身肯定對黑格爾產生了很大影響,因為它們激起了他對早期基督教藝術的思考,并且促使他走上思索那最終導致他在海德堡和柏林講授美學課程的東西的道路。他同樣肯定在很多夜晚同波瓦塞蘭兩兄弟(特別是蘇爾皮斯)外出散步。
The First Edition of the Encyclopedia
Although the Phenomenology had been Hegel’s self-described “voyage of discovery,” the Logic became more and more for him the main instrument for his rethinking and securing the rationality of modern life. Prior to Napoleon’s creation of a new Germany, Hegel had been ealling for a new order. Now, having seen his call answered - although not completely and certainly not in all its details - he became increas? ingly interested in defending and reforming that order in the face of what he took to be its enemies. That shifted his philosophical concerns even more fundamentally toward building his “system” based on the Logic, for although he had never relinquished his concern for how we came to be who we are, and with both how and whether that process of coming-to-be was rational, he became more and more dedicated to showing that who we have come to be is in fact something rational and sustainable in its own right, to defending and articulating the rationality of the post-Napoleonic world. In his own mind, Hegel began to think of himself less as a philosopher sketching out the birth of a new world, and more as the philosopher of reform for the new order that had now been born. The world around him had changed and, correspondingly.? so had his idea of his system. His earliest idea of himself as “applying” philosophical thought to the needs of the time had reappeared, only in different form.
《哲學科學全書綱要》第1版
? ? 《精神現象學》被黑格爾自己形容為“發現的航行”,《邏輯學》對他來說卻越來越成為他重新思考和保衛現代生活合理性的主要工具。早在拿破侖創造新德國之前,黑格爾就已經在要求德國需要確立一種新秩序?,F在,在已經見到他的要求得到回應(盡管既沒有得到全面的回應,也肯定沒有得到事無巨細的回應)后,他在面對他所看作成為這種新秩序的敵人的東西時,對保護和改革這種新秩序變得越來越感興趣。這就更加從本質上使他把對哲學的關注轉到去建構他奠基于《邏輯學》的“體系”,因為,他從未放棄對我們怎樣逐漸成為我們是誰的關注,他從未放棄對這樣的逐漸成為的過程是怎么的和是否是合乎理性的關注,但他越來越致力于證明我們最終成為誰這個問題實際上是某種當之無愧的、合乎理性和支撐得住的東西,越來越致力于為之辯護和系統闡釋的是后拿破侖一世時期世界的合理性。在黑格爾自己的心目中,他開始較少地把自己看作一個勾勒新世界誕生的哲學家,而更多地將自己看作那對現已誕生的新秩序進行改革的哲學家。他周遭的世界已經發生變化,相應地,他關于體系的思想也要發生變化。將哲學思想“應用”到時代需要中,他自己的這個最早的想法再次冒了出來,只是這一次這個想法采取了不同的形式。
That slightly altered conception bore fruit in Heidelberg, where He? gel managed to finish and publish his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in 1817. The Encyclopedia (subtitled “for use in his lectures”) was arranged according to the way Hegel had proceeded in the Gym? nasium in Nuremberg, that is, according to numbered paragraphs that would then serve as the basis for discussion and extrapolation in lec? tures. The Encyclopedia presented Hegel’s whole system in very brief outline; it had a short introduction, a condensed version of the Logic, followed by a section on the philosophy of nature, which was then followed by a section on the philosophy of spirit (Geist). The section on the philosophy of spirit contained a small portion in it called simply “Consciousness,” in which Hegel’s Nuremberg condensation of the opening sections of his Phenomenology appeared. It also introduced a new term, “objective spirit,” to describe the social and political institu? tionalizations of Geist, and a section called “absolute spirit,” which repeated the Phenomenology!'s distinctions among the religion of art (that is, Greek religion), revealed religion (that is, Christianity), and philoso? phy. (He had not yet separated “art” out into its own special section in the “system.”)
? ? 這個稍經改變的構想在海德堡結出了碩果,在這里,黑格爾絞盡腦汁于1817年完成并發表了他的《哲學科學全書綱要》這部著作。《哲學科學全書綱要》(被用作他講課中的“副標題”)被依照黑格爾在紐倫堡高級中學時采用的結構方式加以編排,也即被根據之后通常用作課堂討論和推演的基礎的編號段落加以編排?!墩軐W科學全書綱要》以極簡短的綱要形式描述了黑格爾的整個體系;它包含一個簡短的導論,一個濃縮版《邏輯學》,隨后的自然哲學編,緊隨其后的是精神(Geist)哲學編。精神哲學編包含了被簡單地叫作“意識”的一小節,這一小節中再現了黑格爾紐倫堡時期濃縮版《精神現象學》的開篇部分。精神哲學編還引入了一個被用來描述精神的社會上和政治上的制度化的“客觀精神”這個新術語,以及一個被叫作“絕對精神”的部分,這個部分重復了《精神現象學》對藝術、宗教(也即希臘人宗教)、天啟宗教(也即基督教)和哲學作出的區別。(他尚未將“藝術”剝離出來作為“體系”中特定的一編。)
In his public lectures on political philosophy in Heidelberg, Hegel filled out the bare bones of the section on “objective spirit” in the Encyclopedia into a full theory of modern political life, but he did not put those thoughts into book form until three years later in Berlin, when he published his Philosophy of Right in 1820.
? ? 在海德堡時期關于政治哲學的公開講演中,黑格爾把他在《哲學科學全書綱要》中只有梗概的“客觀精神”這個部分擴充成內容豐富的現代政治生活理論,但他直到三年后的1820年在柏林發表他的《法哲學原理》時,仍然沒有把這些想法編纂成書。
Hegel used the Preface to the 1817 Encyclopedia to express his opti? mism about the role that his philosophy might play in the new postNapoleonic order and how that order represented a decisive, even fate? ful rupture with the past. With undisguised enthusiasm, Hegel wrote, “The first of the phenomena touched upon here can in some measure be regarded as the youthful giddiness of the new epoch that has dawned in the realm of science just as it has in that of politics. If this giddiness greeted the sunrise of the rejuvenated spirit with reveling, and began enjoying the Idea at once without any hard labor, luxuriating for a while in the hopes and prospects that the sunrise offered, it also reconciles [us] more readily to its excesses because there is a kernel [of truth] at the bottom of it, and the morning mist that covers its surface is bound to clear spontaneously.”^'
? ? 黑格爾使用1817年出版的《哲學科學全書綱要》中的前言,表達他對自己的哲學可能在后拿破侖一世時期新秩序中扮演的角色的樂觀態度,表達這樣的秩序怎樣代表著與過去斷然的甚至是命定的決裂。帶著毫不掩飾的熱情,黑格爾寫道:“在這里首次觸及的這些現象可能在某種程度上被看作一種令年輕人眼花繚亂的東西,這種新紀元已經降臨科學領域,正像它已經出現在政治學領域一樣。如果說,這種令年輕人眼花繚亂的東西以狂歡來迎接這得到復興的精神的黎明,開始立即享受觀念的樂趣而不辛勤勞作,暫時地盡情享受那得到復興的精神的黎明帶來的希望和前景,那么,這種令年輕人眼花繚亂的東西也就會相應地使[我們]更樂意接受這種令年輕人眼花繚亂的東西的肆意嬉戲,因為在這種令年輕人眼花繚亂的東西的底部存在著[真理]的核心,而那籠罩在這種令年輕人眼花繚亂的東西表面的薄薄晨霧自然地必然會被清除干凈?!?br>
Hegel’s friend Sulpiz Boisseree helped to reintroduce Hegel to Goe? the via Hegel’s newly published Encyclopedia. In the Encyclopedia., Hegel defended Goethe’s theory of colors. Goethe had argued against Newton, who asserted that clear, white light was a collection of all colors of the spectrum. Instead, Goethe had argued in favor of what for him was a more experiential theory of color, namely, that there are in fact two primal colors (white and black), and that all other color is produced simply by a combination of these two as they are blended together when passing through various clouded media. The clouded media force the two elemental and opposed colors of black and white to combine in new ways that then produce the colors of the spectrum; without passing through such clouded media, black and white produce only gray. (Goe? the envisioned this as an application of his method of studying nature by attending to the Urphdnomen, the “primordial phenomenon” as it appears to us in experience; all the various appearances of something can be interpreted as variations on the “primordial phenomenon,” that which is presupposed in any encounter with particular instances of a phenomenon.) Few natural scientists took Goethe’s theory seriously as a competitor to Newton’s conception, whatever their feelings about Goethe’s notion of the emotional effects of color. But Hegel defended Goethe’s theory, and when Boisseree sent that section of the Encyclo? pedia to Goethe, Goethe was delighted to see a major thinker taking up his cause against so much opposition. This reestablished a link between Hegel and Goethe that was not afterwards to be broken. (It also did not hurt Hegel that his old nemesis, J. F. Fries, in a highly negative review of Hegel’s Eogic, also attacked Goethe’s theory of color; Goethe was thus irrevocably put on Hegel’s side and against Fries.)
? ? 黑格爾的友人蘇爾皮斯·波瓦塞蘭以黑格爾新出版的《哲學科學全書綱要》為由頭,幫忙向歌德引薦黑格爾。在《哲學科學全書綱要》中,黑格爾為歌德的顏色理論辯護。歌德為反對牛頓的顏色理論而進行辯論,牛頓斷定白光顯然是光譜上所有顏色的集合。相反,歌德則通過論證贊成對他來說作為一種更帶有經驗性質的顏色理論,也就是說,歌德論證道,其實存在著兩種初始顏色(白色和黑色),所有的其他顏色都只不過生于這兩種顏色的結合,因為黑色和白色在穿過各種不同的被云覆蓋的介質時會交織在一起。這被云覆蓋的介質迫使白色和黑色這兩種基本的、對立的顏色以新的方式結合起來,繼而產生光譜上的顏色;如果不穿過這樣的被云覆蓋的介質,那么白色和黑色就只會產生灰色。(歌德把這種現象設想為他通過留意那在經驗中出現的“原始現象”來對自然進行研究的方法的應用;所有關于某種東西的各種不同現象都可被解釋成是“原始現象”的衍生物,“原始現象”通常被預先假定為是與現象的具體例子相沖突的。)幾乎沒有多少自然科學家真把歌德顏色理論看作堪與牛頓構想相匹敵,無論他們對歌德關于人的情緒對顏色的影響的見解有著怎樣的看法。可是黑格爾卻為歌德的理論辯護;當波瓦塞蘭把《哲學科學全書綱要》中的這節寄給歌德的時候,歌德看到一位重要思想家據理力排眾議,非常高尚。黑格爾捍衛歌德理論這件事重新確立了黑格爾與歌德之間的聯系,這樣的聯系之后必將是牢不可破的。(黑格爾的宿敵J.F.弗里斯在對黑格爾《邏輯學》作了極端負面評論的同時還攻擊歌德的顏色理論,這同樣也沒有傷黑格爾一根毫毛;歌德因此也義無反顧地站在黑格爾這邊反擊弗里斯。)
Not everyone was enthusiastic about Hegel’s idealism as he was presenting it at Heidelberg. In particular, the Heidelberg natural scien? tists, who were all committed empiricists, had little time for what they saw as the extravagance and obscurity of Hegel’s version of German idealism, and there were discordant rumblings from them about Hegel’s philosophy, which they tended to view as something that the philoso? pher had simply spun out of his own head and that had little if any connection to the real world. Hegel’s published defense of Goethe’s theory of color only served as decisive proof for them that he did not know what he was talking about, and some actually resented the leading role that philosophy (or at least Hegel’s version of it) had come to play in the new structure of the university.But those rumblings were distant and faint, and Hegel could choose to ignore them if he wished.? On the whole, his stay at Heidelberg was proving to be the kind of success of which he had dreamed.
? ? 當黑格爾在紐倫堡時期提出他的唯心主義哲學理論時,有些人對他的這個哲學理論表現得非常冷淡。特別要提及的是,有些海德堡自然科學家,作為十分堅定的經驗主義者,幾乎無眼去審視被他們看作的極其夸張和晦澀難懂的黑格爾版本的德國唯心主義,他們在怎樣看待黑格爾哲學問題上吵得不可開交,黑格爾哲學被他們傾向于看作是這樣的東西:這樣的哲學是黑格爾這位哲學家純粹憑借他自己頭腦編造出的東西,是縱使與現實世界有聯系也是有極少聯系的哲學。黑格爾為歌德顏色理論作出的辯護僅僅被用作一種對他們來說黑格爾并不知道自己在談論的東西的決定性證據,這些人實際上怨恨哲學(或至少黑格爾版本的哲學)終于在新的大學機構中發揮的主導作用。然而,這些爭吵云里霧里模糊不清,黑格爾如果愿意的話可以選擇對它們置之不理??偟目磥恚诤5卤て陂g證明他獲得了一種他自己早就夢寐以求的成功。
Jean Paul
In 1817, Hegel befriended another literary celebrity in Germany, the poet and writer Jean Paul (Johann Paul Friedrich Richter), who came for a long visit to Heidelberg during that period to see his good friend Heinrich Voss. The visit on the part of such a literary celebrity caused a small sensation in the community. The visit was sure to interest Hegel himself Not merely was Jean Paul one of the best known and most widely read of the generation of early Romantic writers, he had also been one of the early enthusiasts of the Phenomenology of Spirit, pri? vately extolling it to Jacobi. Unlike the Jena Romantics, who had taken Fichte’s thought in a certain existential direction and converted Fichte’s views about the revisability of all judgments into a doctrine of irony, Jean Paul had subscribed to Jacobi’s “realist” criticisms of Fichte while at the same time developing his own special notion of the author’s ironic distance and displaying a sense of ironic playfulness in his writings. For him, both “realism” and Fichtean/Schellingian “idealism” needed to be combined into a more stable view of the relation of the self to the world. (Realism, as he was fond of saying, is only the Sancho Panza of idealism.) His writings combined intricate, unsummarizable plot lines with frequent intrusions by the author (who identifies himself as Jean Paul but gives fictive characterizations even of himself), shifting points of view, extensive contrapositioning of scraps of information, elaborate plays on words, confused identities (Jean Paul, after all, coined the term Doppelgdnger), and often brilliant comic asides. Moreover, Jean Paul had throughout his writings penned some wonderfully comical and sardonic spoofs of the foibles of the Jena style of idealism and the way in which one “system” rapidly replaced another during that period. A friend and admirer of Jacobi, who also got along quite well with Fichte personally, Jean Paul had satirized Fichte’s notion of the “F’ positing the “Not-F’; in his Titan, one of the characters is driven mad by thinking of himself as the absolute “I.” His parodies of Schelling had even more bite: In Titan, one of the characters (Schoppe) worries that reading Schelling will make him like the drunkard who on urinating at night into a running fountain ends up staying the whole night at the fountain be? cause he is convinced he has not yet finished. Given his own way of combining opposing strands within himself and the way in which so many of his own characters end up doing something that they had not been taking themselves to have been doing, Jean Paul was in a good position to appreciate the way in which Hegel in the Phenomenology had tried to show how the fundamental tensions at work in the various historical shapes of “spirit” inevitably lead them to undermine them? selves and to turn out to have been doing quite the opposite of what they originally thought they were doing.
耶安·保羅
? ? 1817年,黑格爾與另一位德國文學名流詩人兼作家耶安·保羅(約翰·保羅·弗里德里希·里希特)訂交,后者在看望好友海因里?!じK蛊陂g在海德堡住了很長時間。這樣一位文學名人的到訪在海德堡學界引起了一場小轟動。這次來訪必定引起黑格爾自己的關注。耶安·保羅不僅僅當屬最知名和作品最被廣為傳誦的早期浪漫派作家那代人中之一位,他也是《精神現象學》的早期熱情解讀者之一,私底下在雅科比面前贊美《精神現象學》。不像耶拿浪漫主義者(因為他們以某種存在主義方式解讀費希特思想并把費希特關于所有的判斷可修改性的觀點變成諷刺學說),耶安·保羅則贊成雅科比對費希特“實在論”的批評,與此同時闡述他自己特有的關于作者諷刺的距離這個見解,在作品中展示諷刺的嬉戲感。對于他來說,“實在論”和費希特或謝林的“唯心主義”需要結合成一種對自我與世界的關系的更穩固的觀點。(實在論,像他常喜好說的,只不過是唯心主義的桑丘·潘薩——這位堂吉訶德的侍從。)他的作品把復雜的非概述的情節主線和以下內容結合起來:那(自認為是耶安·保羅而甚至賦予自己虛構特征的)作者的頻繁侵擾、變換的觀點、大量對置的信息碎片、精妙的文字游戲、混亂的身份(耶安·保羅畢竟杜撰了“Doppelg?nger”(“面貌極相似的人”)這個詞語)、常常卓越的喜劇旁白。不止于此,耶安·保羅在整個作品中充滿著某些對耶拿唯心主義風格弱點的精彩的喜劇式和嘲諷的玩笑,充滿著那種在這個階段一個“體系”借以迅速取代另一體系的方式。身為雅科比的友人和仰慕者,而且也與費希特私交很深,耶安·保羅大肆諷刺費希特的“自我”設定“非我”這條原理;在耶安·保羅《提坦》這部小說中,眾多人物中有一個因把他自己看作絕對的“自我”而被逼瘋。他對謝林的諷喻更為辛辣:在《提坦》這部小說中,眾多人物中有一個(朔佩)擔心,解讀謝林作品可能使他像個醉漢,在夜晚對著正在噴水的噴泉撒尿,整晚都待在正在噴水的噴泉處,因為他確信自己仍然沒有撒完尿??紤]到耶安·保羅自己借以默默地把對立的線索結合起來的方式,考慮到耶安·保羅自己筆下的諸多人物借以結束一直在做長期以來沒有被他們意識到他們自己始終在做的事情的方式,耶安·保羅有足夠能力欣賞這樣的一種方式,借此方式黑格爾早在《精神現象學》中就已嘗試證明的是,在“精神”的各種不同歷史形態中起作用的那些基礎張力是如何不可避免地導致他們削弱他們自己,是如何不可避免地導致他們證明他們自己實際上一直在做與他們最初認為他們自己在做的完全相反的事情。
Hegel had, however, at first not been so enamored of Jean Paul, having taken an indirect swipe at him in 1802 in his polemical piece “Faith and Knowledge,” in which he lambasted Jacobi’s use of what he called Jean Paul’s “sentimentalism” to criticize the Kantian philosophy.? (Hegel’s criticism of what he took as Jean Paul’s “subjective arbitrari? ness” and sentimentalism was to reappear in his Berlin lectures on aesthetics.) But in the period between 1802 and 1817, Hegel had prob? ably come to appreciate Jean Paul’s ability to unite both profound religious doubt (bordering on atheism) with equally deep religious sen? timent, along with his ability to combine ironic and critical detachment with a sharp, fervid, even sentimentalized attachment to family affairs. Moreover, both he and Jean Paul shared an attachment to the French Revolution, a disinclination for its Jacobin terrors, and an attachment to the ideals of freedom and cosmopolitanism that the Revolution had fostered (even if Jean Paul eventually backslid on that attachment).?
? ? 不過,黑格爾起初并沒有受到耶安·保羅的如此仰慕,他在1812年論戰性的《信仰與知識》一文中間接地抨擊了耶安·保羅,在該文中,他嚴厲斥責雅科比運用他稱作的耶安·保羅的“感傷主義”批評康德哲學。(黑格爾對他自己看作的耶安·保羅的“主觀任性”和感傷主義的批評將在他自己的柏林美學課上重演。然而,在1802至1817年這個階段,黑格爾很可能開始意識到耶安·保羅有能力把深奧的宗教質疑(無神論的邊界)與同樣深度的宗教情感結合起來,連同意識到耶安·保羅有能力把諷刺和批判的超脫與一種對家庭事務的強烈的、熱誠的、甚至感傷化的依戀結合起來。不止于此,他和耶安·保羅都對法國大革命懷有依戀之情,都對法國大革命中雅各賓派恐怖行動深惡痛絕,都對法國大革命哺育的自由和世界大同的理想懷有依戀之情,盡管耶安·保羅最終放棄了這種依戀之情。)
Many of Hegel’s contemporaries often saw Hegel only as a serious man completely absorbed in his work, but in fact Hegel (although not always easily) combined a detached, jocular temperament with a full earnestness and seriousness about his calling, and he no doubt saw a bit of that feature echoed in Jean Paul. (That Hegel wrote “Faith and Knowledge” during his period of collaboration with Schelling and that Jean Paul had particularly singled out Schelling for his satire had no doubt played some role in Hegel’s initial disinclination toward Jean Paul; Hegel’s break with Schelling and Jean Paul’s appreciation of the Phenomenology no doubt played a role in his reappraisal.)
? ? 很多黑格爾同時代的人常把黑格爾僅僅看作一個嚴肅認真的全身心投入工作的人,但其實黑格爾把一種超然的、幽暗的氣質與他要求的事業上一絲不茍、嚴肅認真結合起來(盡管這種結合并不總是輕而易舉的),他無疑也看到有相當多的反映在耶安·保羅身上的同樣的特征。(黑格爾在與謝林合辦雜志期間寫出了《信仰與知識》這篇著作,耶安·保羅特別挑選出謝林作為諷刺對象,這兩件事無疑在加劇黑格爾最初對耶安·保羅感到厭惡方面起到某種作用;黑格爾與謝林的決裂和耶安·保羅對《精神現象學》的贊賞無疑在黑格爾對耶安·保羅的重新評價方面起到一定的作用。)
On July II, 1817 (a Friday), Heinrich Voss held a “punch evening” for Jean Paul (a good friend of his) and some Heidelberg luminaries. (A “punch evening” was basically a drinking party for gentlemen, with an emphasis on drinking, smoking, and jovial conversation in the absence of any women - a custom at the time newly imported from England and considered very modern and very sophisticated.) Voss served up what he described as “sweet wine” in large tureens and made sure the glasses were always full. The evening was a great success - which is to say that all the men present got thoroughly plastered, told outrageous jokes and stories, and at the end could barely walk. At one point a local pastor jokingly tried to persuade Hegel to write a philosophy book for young girls that the pastor could use for instructional purposes. Hegel excused himself, saying that not only were his thoughts not really the kinds of things that young girls could grasp but that he was not profi? cient enough with language to write such a book. When the minister then proposed that Jean Paul could render Hegel’s thoughts into ac? ceptable and beautiful style, Jean Paul retorted by saying, “Ah, so that’s how things are to be. Our old Hegel is to deliver the spirit. I’m to put a hearty body around it and a decorative garment, and then you want to take it to market!”” At this remark, everyone roared with laughter, making even more jokes about a possible Hegel/Jean Paul collaboration on a philosophy for schoolgirls. (Maybe one had to be there to appreci? ate it.) Hegel added his own jokes, being that evening, as Voss noted, “so unrestrained, glad-hearted, so popular (something that behind the podium he isn’t always), that little was lacking for him to start writing that philosophy book immediately.”” (It seems that a bit of wine always loosened up an otherwise too-serious Hegel and brought out his more jocular side.)
? ? 1817年7月11日(星期五),海因里希·福斯為耶安·保羅(他的好友)和一些海德堡名人舉辦了一場“潘趣晚會”。(“潘趣晚會”基本上是一種為紳士舉辦的酒會,重在沒有女性在場的情況下飲酒、抽煙、快活交談——這個風俗那時剛從英國引入并被看作是非?,F代的和非常不落俗套的。)福斯用大杯子端上那被他描述為的“甜酒”,并確保每個杯子總是滿的。這場酒會非常成功——也就是說,所有的在場男士全都醉得酪酊大醉,講著下流的笑話和故事,最后幾乎走不了路。就在這時,一位當地牧師開玩笑地力圖說服黑格爾為年輕的女孩子們寫一本哲學書,這樣牧師就可用它來達到教育的目的。黑格爾為自己找借口,說不僅他的思想確實不是那種能被年輕女孩子們可以把握的東西,而且他并不足夠精通寫這樣一本書的語言。當牧師接著提出耶安·保羅可以把黑格爾的思想翻譯成常人可以接受和優美的風格時,耶安·保羅借以下的這番話答復道:“啊,因此事情必將是這樣,老練的黑格爾必將釋放精神,我使它擁有豐滿的身體和穿上華麗的衣裳,之后你們就希望把它帶到集市上了!”聽到這番話,大家都呵呵大笑,并對黑格爾和耶安·保羅有可能合作為中小學女生撰寫哲學書這件事開了更多的玩笑。(也許人們必須身臨其境才能悟出這番話的真義。)黑格爾自己也講了笑話,在這場酒會上,像福斯指出的,黑格爾“如此盡情盡興和喜不自禁,如此受到大家喜愛(這些是在講臺上他很少表現出來的東西),以至于他幾乎足以迅速開始撰寫這本哲學書?!保磥砗孟褚稽c葡萄酒總是使得過于嚴肅的黑格爾變得別樣的無拘無束,并使他表現出更為詼諧的一面。)
As the men were staggering out at the end of the evening, Hegel looked at Jean Paul and said (no doubt in slurred tones), “He has to become a doctor of philosophy.” All present agreed that this was an excellent idea, and on Monday morning, the faculty (presumably now sober) met to vote on whether to award Jean Paul an honorary doctorate; one mathematician objected, arguing that Jean Paul’s Christianity was somewhat doubtful and his morals even more so. In best playacting seriousness, Hegel defended the idea that Jean Paul was not only a Christian but had to be the best of all Christians and the most moral of men. Voss - a classicist - gave a long disquisition on the difference between bacchic intemperance and bacchanalian drunkenness vis-a-vis Jean Paul. In the end, all agreed on the bestowal of the honorary doctorate; the degree was inscribed on parchment, a due ceremony was held, and more parties began, followed by days and days of excursions and carriage rides to scenic spots.
? ? 當男士們在酒會結束時都喝得搖搖晃晃時,黑格爾看著耶安·保羅并(無疑以含糊的語調)說道:“他必須成為哲學博士?!彼性谧娜硕汲姓J這是極好的主意,在星期一早晨,哲學系全體教工(現在大概清醒的)開會表決是否授予耶安·保羅名譽博士學位;一位數學教師持反對態度,認為耶安·保羅基督教徒的身份有點值得懷疑,而他的道德品質更有點值得懷疑。以極具表演的嚴肅姿態,黑格爾為耶安·保羅作辯護,認為他不僅是個基督教徒,而且客觀上是基督教徒的榜樣和人們的道德楷模。福斯——一個古典主義者——與耶安·保羅面對面地做了一個長篇專題演講,涉及酒神的放縱與酒神節的醉酒的區別。最終,所有人都一致同意授予耶安·保羅名譽博士學位;這個學位被寫在學位證書上,舉行了正式的典禮,更多的聚會開始了,接下來是連續多天的旅行和乘坐馬車去景點。
Marie Hegel joined in the festivities too, although not quite in the way Hegel anticipated. An excursion to the pretty town of Weinheim was planned. Hegel could not make it on the original wagon, so Marie, along with Jean Paul, Heinrich Voss, and Heinrich Paulus’s beautiful and talented daughter, Sophie Caroline Eleutheria Paulus, were to go on ahead. (In the fashion of importing sophisticated tastes from abroad, Sophie Paulus was addressed as “Mamsell Paulus,” obviously a Germanization of the French form of address.) They took off at 8:00 A.M.? on Sunday, with the ensemble noting that Marie seemed to be in a particularly good mood that day. There were stopovers for breakfast, hot chocolate and coffee (the women of course had to make the hot chocolate and coffee), and after a delightful lunch with even better wine (and apparently no small amount of it), they all took a stroll, then boarded their carriage again, at which point the four of them decided to play “spin the bottle” and began trading kisses. Marie was allowed to give Jean Paul eight kisses and Voss four; “Mamsell” Paulus had no such restrictions placed on her.-’’ Marie was surely also unaware that Jean Paul had in the meantime developed a great passion for Sofie Paulus, which was requited on her side, and which assuredly had some? thing to do with the erotic overtones of the carriage ride, even if it was limited to four adults playing “spin the bottle.” Nothing was to come of it, although it did lead Jean Paul for a while to mull over divorcing his wife so he could establish a union with Ms. Paulus; in late Septem? ber 1817, however, the twenty-eight-year-old Sofie Paulus married Au? gust Schlegel, almost fifty-one years old at the time, only to have the marriage fall apart within weeks. (That marriage was, curiously enough, the second time that Hegel was present to witness a rapidly failed marriage on August Schlegel’s part.) Hegel later showed up with the children in tow, and Heinrich Voss vowed to keep the ensemble’s mildly erotic secrets from Marie’s husband and Jean Paul’s wife. Hegel himself drank far too much and ended up with a bad hangover. (Perhaps the reason for Hegel’s ardor for Jean Paul notably cooling during his Berlin period had to do with some disclosure by Marie; but perhaps not.)
? ? 瑪麗·黑格爾也加入了慶祝,盡管她沒有完全以黑格爾預期的方式。他們計劃去曼海姆這個美麗小鎮旅行。黑格爾沒有按原計劃弄到四輪馬車,因此瑪麗連同耶安·保羅、海因里?!じK购秃R蚶锵!け1R斯的美麗聰慧的女兒索菲·卡羅利內·埃洛伊特里亞,保盧斯只得提前出發。(模仿國外傳入的優雅品味,索菲·保盧斯被稱作“馬姆澤爾·保盧斯”,明顯是法國人稱呼形式的德國化。)他們在星期天上午8點啟程,所有的人都指出瑪麗看來好像那天心情特別好。中途停下來吃早餐,喝熱巧克力咖啡(女士們當然必須制作熱巧克力咖啡),在喝著上好葡萄酒(顯然喝了不少酒)、吃過可口午餐后,他們全都散了一會兒步,繼而復又登上他們乘坐的馬車,在車上時他們中的四位約定玩“旋轉瓶子”游戲并開始交換接吻。瑪麗獲許給耶安·保羅八個吻,給福斯四個吻;“馬姆澤爾”·保盧斯則不受這樣的限制?!艾旣惍斎贿€未意識到耶安·保羅那時已經極愛索菲·保盧斯,這樣的愛在她瑪麗身上得到滿足,這樣的愛無疑與乘坐馬車的色情暗示有關,縱使馬車上只限定四個成年人之間玩‘旋轉瓶子’游戲?!薄靶D瓶子”游戲結果什么也沒有發生,盡管“旋轉瓶子”游戲確實曾致使耶安·保羅有一陣子認真考慮過與妻子離婚,這樣他就可以和保盧斯女士結合;然而,在1817年9月底,28歲的索菲·保盧斯嫁給了那時幾乎已經51歲的奧古斯特·施萊格爾,而他們的婚姻僅在數周后就破裂了。(說來奇怪,這段婚姻是黑格爾作為證婚人的奧古斯特·施萊格爾第二次很快失敗的婚姻。)黑格爾后來帶著子女一起到場,海因里?!じK拱l誓對瑪麗的丈夫和耶安·保羅的妻子保守大家在馬車上玩的稍微帶有點色情的“旋轉瓶子”游戲這個秘密。黑格爾本人喝了太多酒最終嘔吐得很厲害。(黑格爾后來在柏林這個階段對耶安·保羅明顯失去熱情,個中緣由也許與瑪麗向黑格爾對這件事情作了某些透露有關;但也許瑪麗根本就沒有向黑格爾透露這件事。)
As the parties and excursions with Jean Paul continued, a pattern became established. Whatever was said, Jean Paul would take issue and wittily defend some thesis that he knew would outrage or distress those present. Hegel would counter with some abstract, rigorous argument, which rolled off Jean Paul like the proverbial water off a duck’s back."’*’ For example, Hegel at one point gave his version of the myth of the fall as having to do with the symbolic presentation of the idea that by eating from the tree of knowledge and not of life, men had become like God, that self-consciousness was the impetus for their being driven out of paradise; Jean Paul then wittily retorted that such a view shows that God was therefore only jealous of mankind; Hegel would reply in all seriousness, and so on.^^ Great personal differences still existed between the two men; despite his combining of seriousness with ironic distance, Jean Paul always inclined toward sentimentalist solutions, whereas He? gel took that same opposition within himself in a different direction, always inclined to a more sharply critical, even rationalist view of things.? Hegel saw religion as grounded in reason, whereas Jean Paul saw it more in the way that Jacobi envisioned it, as a leap, a matter of emo? tional and intellectual faith. One thus gets the impression that Jean Paul’s wit might have been beginning to wear a bit thin on Hegel by the end of the visit. But by all accounts, Jean Paul found himself amused if not charmed by Hegel’s continual insistence on pushing their conver? sations in a methodical, “scientific” direction.
? ? 隨著耶安·保羅的社交聚會和旅行的繼續進行,他建立起了一種社交模式。不管別人說什么,耶安、保羅都總是對其持有異議,并機智地為這些在他看來將會引起那些在場者憤怒或痛苦的話題進行辯護。黑格爾經常用某些抽象的、嚴密的論證進行反駁,此舉對耶安、保羅像“水落鴨背”這句諺語一樣毫無作用。舉例來說,黑格爾一度曾說亞當、夏娃智落的神話與對這樣的想法——借助吃知識之樹上的果實而非吃生命之樹上的果實,人們變成了像上帝一樣的存在者,同時自我意識促使人們被逐出天堂——作象征的描述有關;耶安、保羅接著機智地反駁道,這樣一種觀點表明上帝因此只不過是在嫉妒人類;黑格爾當然極嚴肅地作出反擊,如此等等。在黑格爾與耶安、保羅這兩個人之間仍然存在著巨大的個人差異;盡管把嚴肅與諷刺式冷笑結合起來,耶安、保羅仍總是傾向于傷感主義解決辦法,而黑格爾卻以不同的方式對待在他自己內心恰好對立的東西,總是傾向于對事物采取一種更加尖銳地批評的、甚至理性主義的看法。黑格爾把宗教當作植根于理性看待,而耶安、保羅則更多地以雅科比借以設想宗教的方式把宗教當作一種飛躍看待,當作關于情感和知識的信仰的問題看待。人們因此通常留下的印象是,耶安、保羅的風趣到這次旅行結束時可能已經開始有點使黑格爾失去興趣。但是,根據各種流傳的說法,耶安、保羅發覺他自己也會很開心,如果說他沒有被黑格爾持續地堅持以一種方法論的“科學”方式來推進他們倆的交談迷住的話。
Victor Cousin
Hegel also received a visit from a young Frenchman, Victor Cousin, who was later to play a crucial role in introducing Hegelian philosophy to France (and was also to play crucial roles in redesigning the French educational system and in French politics). Cousin was at the time a young instructor at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris who had arranged a research visit to Germany to acquaint himself with the much vaunted innovations in idealist philosophy going on there. He of course went looking for whom he thought was the most famous living idealist, Schelling, but did not meet him; on his own account, he quite by accident encountered instead Hegel, of whom he had heard little more than that he was one of the leading exponents of the Schellingian school of thought (indicating that even by 1817 the picture of Hegel as an exponent of Schellingian philosophy still had a life of its own). He acquired a copy of Hegel’s newly published Encyclopedia of the Philo? sophical Sciences^ which he found somewhat obscure and scholastic.? During Cousin’s short visit to Heidelberg, Hegel must have been in a somewhat downcast mood, since Hegel seemed at the time to Cousin to be a man who was unsure of himself and who had little commerce with others (something which clearly was not true of Hegel in his Heidelberg period). To his great surprise, Hegel took an interest in him, although, as Cousin put it, he understood little German and Hegel understood an equivalent amount of French. Their conversations nonetheless made a deep impression on Cousin, who was both struck and quite taken with the depth of Hegel’s knowledge and the scope of his system. Cousin read Hegel’s newly published Encyclopedia together with one of Hegel’s French-speaking students, Friedrich Wilhelm Carove, and together they would go in the evening to Hegel’s house for tea, where they would pepper Hegel with questions (although Hegel’s answers. Cousin admit? ted, often did not exactly clear matters up). Cousin did not become a Hegelian, but, as Cousin put it to a friend, Hegel was one of those fellows to which one “attached oneself, not to follow him but to study him and comprehend him.”?* The two men nonetheless became good friends, and later in Berlin Hegel was to play a crucial role in having Cousin freed from political imprisonment.
維克托·庫贊
? ? 黑格爾還接待了一位年輕的法國人維克托·庫贊的來訪,此君后來在把黑格爾哲學介紹到法國這件事上起到了至關重要的作用(同樣也在重新設計法國教育體系和在法國政治學方面發揮了至關重要的作用)。庫贊是那時巴黎高等師范學校的一名年輕講師,他已經準備到德國做訪問研究以便了解德國正在進行的受到大肆吹噓的唯心主義哲學的革新。他當然打算找尋在他看來那時健在的最有名的唯心主義者謝林其人,但是沒有遇到他;照他自己的解釋,他反而非常偶然地遇見了黑格爾,對于黑格爾,他幾乎只是僅僅聽說黑格爾是謝林思想學派的一流闡釋者之一(這就表明甚至到1817年黑格爾作為謝林哲學擁躉的寫照仍然有著它自己的生命力)。他得到一本黑格爾新出版的《哲學科學全書綱要》,這本書被他感到有點晦澀和煩瑣。在庫贊短暫訪問海德堡期間,黑格爾想必從某種角度說情緒上顯得低落,因為黑格爾那時被庫贊看作一個對自己不自信和別人很少來往的人(黑格爾在海德堡階段顯然并不是這樣)。使他大為吃驚的是,黑格爾卻對他很感興趣,盡管,像庫贊說的,他聽不太懂德文且黑格爾也同樣聽不太懂法文。他們倆之間的交談仍然給庫贊留下了深刻的印象,庫贊被黑格爾淵博的知識和博大精深的體系所打動和吸引。庫贊與黑格爾的一位講法語的學生弗里德里?!ねた_韋共同解讀黑格爾新出版的《哲學科學全書綱要》,一起約定晚上去黑格爾家里喝茶,將向黑格爾請教問題(盡管黑格爾的回答,庫贊承認,常常沒有準確地解答問題)。庫贊并沒有成為一個黑格爾哲學信徒,但是,像庫贊向友人說的,黑格爾屬于那些“無需被人依附”的人之一,人們不必追隨他而必須研究他和解讀他。盡管如此,這兩個人仍然成了好朋友,后來在柏林黑格爾將在使庫贊解脫政治監禁這件事上起到了至關重要的作用。
Hegel’s Relation to Students
Cousin expressed surprise that Hegel took such an interest in such a young, unknown fellow as himself, but had he known Hegel better, he would not have been so astonished. In Jena, in Nuremberg, and in Heidelberg, numerous comments were made about Hegel’s openness to students, the course of their studies, and his continual willingness to spend the necessary time with them - provided, of course, that they showed an interest in “science.” Although no cult around Hegel devel? oped at Heidelberg such as later developed at Berlin, numerous students nonetheless apparently found in Hegel someone they could trust and who was always willing to offer advice and help.?*^ An example of Hegel’s openness to students was the experience of the Estonian aristo? crat Boris von Uxkiill, who after serving in the Russian army during the wars against Napoleon, decided that he needed to become educated and showed up at the age of twenty-four in Heidelberg, where he encountered Hegel; von Uxkiill remarked on how patient Hegel was with his fledgling efforts at studying philosophy, indeed, how Hegel was even amused at the way in which von Uxkiill found Hegel’s books unintelligible; Hegel gave him some private sessions, suggested addi? tional reading, and even gave him some instruction in algebra and Latin.“ Von Uxkiill remembered that in their strolls, Hegel would remark that he thought that “our overly clever times . . . could only come to be satisfied through a method, because a method subdues our thoughts and leads them to the real things themselves.”^' The Jena, Wissenschaft conception of the university required the professor to be not a disciplinarian of students (as he had often been in the older model of the university) but a model for them, an adult who was a living example for the students of the “scientific” approach to things, who showed them by his own practice what it meant to pursue a modern life with its anchoring in one’s own practices. This fit Hegel like a glove, and many students responded to it.
黑格爾與弟子的關系
? ? 庫贊感到驚奇的是黑格爾對像他自己這樣一個年輕的無名之輩如此感興趣,而如果他對黑格爾了解更深的話那他就理應不會感到這樣驚訝。在耶拿,在紐倫堡,在海德堡,他對學生虛懷若谷,在授課過程中表現出的思想開明,他對花費必要的時間與學生們探討問題的樂此不?!斎患偃缢麄儗Α翱茖W”表現出濃厚興趣——所有這些都受到人們的廣泛稱道。盡管黑格爾在海德堡沒有像后來在柏林那樣培養出大批信徒,很多學生依舊顯然發覺黑格爾是一位可以被他們信賴和總是愿意為他們提供忠告和幫助的老師。舉例來說,愛沙尼亞貴族鮑里斯·馮·烏克斯庫爾親身體驗到黑格爾對學子的虛懷若谷,他自抗擊拿破侖戰爭期間就在俄國軍隊中服役,退役后認為自己需要深造,在24歲時來到海德堡,遇到了黑格爾;馮·烏克斯庫爾提到黑格爾對他費力地初學哲學是多么誨人不倦,實際上,黑格爾甚至就連對馮·烏克斯庫爾覺得黑格爾的書晦澀難懂這件事依然顯得很大度;黑格爾對他進行個別輔導,建議他課外閱讀些書籍,甚至還對他在代數和拉丁文方面進行指導。馮·烏克斯庫爾清楚地記得,在他們師徒倆散步時,黑格爾總是談論道,“過于聰明的時代……只有通過一種方法才可能最終得到滿足,因為這種方法將征服思想并將致使思想把握真實事物自身?!币么髮W的科學構想要求不要成為學生的懲戒者(這種模式在過去的大學中經常存在),而成為學生們的楷模,要求教授作為成年人要以身作則引領青年學子以“科學的”方式對待事物,要求教授要借自己的實踐向學生表明追求現代生活和現代生活取決于人們自己的實踐意味著什么。這樣的構想非常符合黑格爾的心意,許多學生也對這樣的構想作出積極的回應。
In looking back on his Heidelberg years, one former student re? marked that Hegel showed the students “that one must first learn quite a lot before one can make the world a better place.The enrollments in Hegel’s courses correspondingly began to rise dramatically; during Hegel’s last semester in Heidelberg, one student noted to his father that “Hegel’s lectures are so densely filled” and that Hegel was not “preach? ing politics but, on the contrary, science. In his inaugural lecture at Heidelberg (on October 28, 1816), Hegel had already spoken directly about what he hoped for in his students and perhaps wistfully compared the storms of his past life to what he saw as the tranquillity of the modern world that finally had heen born. Obviously addressing the students in his audience, Hegel remarked, “We older men who have grown up amid the storms of the time may call you happy who in your youth can devote yourselves undisturbed to truth and philosophy. I have consecrated my life to philosophy ... I hope I may succeed in deserving and gaining your confidence.”*^ During his stay in Heidel? berg, a number of students seemed to have warmly responded to Hegel’s offer. Hegel was obviously fully at home in his role and satisfied with the way things were settling down for him.
? ? 回顧黑格爾的海德堡歲月,一個以前的學生談論道,黑格爾向學生明言“一個人首先必須在使世界變得更加美好之前學習大量的知識.“選修黑格爾課的人數相應地開始急劇增加;在黑格爾海德堡最后一個學期,一個學生對父親說道,“黑格爾的課已被全部選滿“,黑格爾也不在課堂上“大講政治學而相反宣揚科學.““在他(1816年10月28日)海德堡就職演說上,黑格爾就已直截了當地述及他對學生抱有何種期望,也許風趣地把他自己過去的生活的風暴比作他看作的那終于誕生了的現代世界的靜謨。明顯在針對學生聽眾作演講時,黑格爾談論道,“我們作為飽經風霜的長輩可能稱你們是非常幸福的,因為你們在青年時期能夠心無旁驁地致力于真理和哲學。我已經把我的一生獻給了哲學…...我希望我能夠值得且得到你們的信任.“在他待在海德堡期間,許多學生看來好像對黑格爾的提議作出了熱烈響應。黑格爾明顯對他扮演的角色得心應手并對自己適應新生活方面感到心滿意躍。
Hegel’s Review of Jacobi
That Hegel was feeling more at home with both himself and his work also manifested itself in one of the first pieces Hegel wrote for the Heidelberger Jahrbiicher^ a respected learned journal of the time. Shortly after his arrival in Heidelberg, Hegel had been made the editor of the journal at Daub’s insistence, and in 1817 he published a very apprecia? tive review of the third volume of Jacobi’s collected works in the journal.? The review was striking both for the overview Hegel gave of his own thought and the conciliatory tone he adopted throughout the piece.? Missing from his review was any expression of the sharp, polemical edge that had characterized him in his thirties in Jena, when as a member of the new idealist movement, he had felt obligated to make his mark and strike out at what he saw as the opposing views. Part of his contentiousness during that period reflected the passion with which he cared about the issues at stake; for him at the time, they seemed to be no less than whether a philosophy that joined forces with the dynam? ics of modern life and the Revolution would succeed, or whether what he saw as a series of philosophies (Jacobi’s included) that were set at halting the spread of modern ideas would prevail. By the time he reached Heidelberg, though, he was a man in his late forties with a family, a good marriage, a secure, well-paying position, and, most im? portantly, the world seemed to be going his way. He and what he cared about had, so it seemed at the time, won the day. He could afford to be generous.
黑格爾對雅科比的評論
? ? 黑格爾對他自己和工作都感到稱心如意,這同樣也顯露在黑格爾為《海德堡年鑒》這本那時頗受推神的學術刊物撰寫的第一批文章中的一篇中。在抵達海德堡后不次,黑格爾在道布的堅持下擔任了這本刊物的編輯,并于1817年在該刊物上發表了一篇對《雅科比全集》第3卷的充滿贊賞的評論。這篇評論之所以惹人注目不僅是因為黑格爾對他自己的想法作了概述而且是因為他通篇采用的調和的論調。他評論中的措辭已經不復具有他30多歲時在耶拿形成的具有辛辣的論辯式的犀利特點,在耶拿時,作為新唯心主義運動的成員,他已經感到自己應該有所建樹并對他所看作的對立的觀點進行無情抨擊。他在耶拿時期的部分爭論反映出他對重大問題的關心上的激情;對于那時的他,這些重大問題看來好像不亞于一種與現代生活動力和法國大革命相結合的哲學是不是將會取得成功,或他所看作的一系列因阻止現代思想傳播而遭到拌擊的哲學(包括雅科比哲學)是不是將會大行其道。盡管如此,到他抵達海德堡時,他已是一個年近50歲的有家庭、婚姻美滿、有一份穩定的高萍職位的男子,最重要地,世界看來好像在按他的方式發展。因此,看來好像在那時,他及其關心的東西順風順水。他可以稱得上慷慨大方寬宏大量。
Hegel’s review of Jacobi’s work also offered him a chance to make his own philosophical views known to the public in a manner less burdened with the jargon and dense formulations that he thought to be obligatory in his more scholarly, wissenschaftliche works. Full of praise for Jacobi’s contributions, sharp insight, and good-heartedness, Hegel’s review tried to show how Jacobi’s thought could best be understood as a rational but incomplete response to the way modern philosophical thought had de? veloped, and to do this, he argued, one had to set all of Jacobi’s works into the context of his much earlier confrontation with Kantianism and Spinozism in his 1785 book. On Spinoza’s Doctrines in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn. As Hegel saw it, the problems to which Jacobi was responding in 1785 were something like the following. By 1785, French philosophy had forsaken Descartes’ revolutionary turn in favor of the English Lockean approach. Unlike the Cartesian system, which had implicitly proposed that we “know thinking as the ground of being and cognize the contours of the latter only within and through the resources of the former,” the Lockean approach had proposed to derive all thoughts from the “immediate givens of the world of appearance.”'’^ But since the Lockean approach then needed to provide an account of how the “givens” of our experience could in any way be counted as authoritative for our judgments, the French were led to postulate “an indeterminate nature" as the metaphysical ground to explain why those “givens” of experience took the shape they did. On the other side of the Rhine, the German Enlightenment had done much the same thing with regard to received religious tradition. Finding that all received religious teaching about the “divine world” could not be found within “self-consciousness,” it had effectively dissolved that tradition, leaving behind only the ^‘'death’s head of an abstract empty essence that cannot be cognized" and finding within its own self-consciousness “only finite ends and utility as the relation of all things to such ends.”'"’ Others in the German Enlightenment had reacted against that and insisted on the priority of their religious feelings, setting out to correct what they saw as the philosophical errors of the more rationalistic Enlightenment thinkers. (Hegel might have had in mind his old mentor, J. F. Abel, who had done just that.)
? ? 黑格爾對雅科比作品的評論同樣也使黑格爾有機會以一種方式使他自己的哲學觀點變得為公眾所知,這種方式減輕了由于那被黑格爾認為在他自己學術昧道較濃的科學的著作中必須使用的術語和深奠難懂的系統閘述而給讀者造成的負擔。在充滿對雅科比的貢獻、敏銳的洞察力、菪薩心腸的贊美的同時,他的評論還嘗試證明雅科比思想怎久可能最好被理解為一種對現代哲學思想已經開出路徑的合理而欠完整的回應,有鑒于此,黑格爾建議,人們必須把雅科比所有作品都置于以下的語境中加以理解:他在1785年《關于斯賓諾莎學說給莫澤斯、門德爾松先生的書信集》這部著作中最早對康德主義和斯賓諾莎主義的比較。像黑格爾看到的,雅科比1785年對之作出回應的類似如下這樣的問題。到1785年,法國哲學已經拋棄借卡爾的革命式轉5向而著手贊同英國洛克的路往。和笛卡爾的哲學體系不同(因為借卡爾哲學體系隱約地提出我們“知道思維是存在的基礎并僅僅在思維領域或通過思維領域認識存在的輪廓“),洛克的路徑提出了所有的思想都源自“現象世界的直接的給予物.““然而,因為洛克的路徑接著需要具體釋述經驗的“給予物“怎么可能在標種程度上被算作判斷的權威的東西,所以法國人被致使假定形而上學基礎的“不確定的本性“以便解釋為什么經驗的這些“給予物“采取它們所采取的形式。在荷茵河的另一邊,德國啟蒙運動早已做了很多相同的關于得到接受的宗教傳統的事情。由于發現所有關于“神圣世界“得到接受的宗教教義都不可能見于“自我意識“中,德國啟蒙運動實際上早已撂毀了得到接受的宗教傳統,留下的只是“無法被認識的抽象空洞的本質僵死頭顱“,發覺在它自己自我意識中“只有有限目的和效用作為使所有東西都與這樣目的相關聯的東西?!啊暗聡鴨⒚蛇\動的另一些人一反上述想法而行之,堅持他們宗教感覺的優先性,著手糾正他們看作的帶有較濃理性主義色彩的德國啟蒙運動思想家哲學上的錯誤。(黑格爾有可能指的是他的資深導師JF.阿貝爾早已恰恰這樣做了。)
It was Jacobi’s good sense, Hegel argued, not to be satisfied with either the French or the German Enlightenment approaches. Instead, Jacobi’s acute insight led him correctly to see that “every consistent philosophy must lead to Spinozism”; he failed, however, to see that “true philosophy” must also go beyond Spinozism.'’^ As Jacobi had understood, Spinozism has no real place in it for our self-consciousness; Jacobi had grasped, if only implicitly, that the Spinozistic conception of substance cannot account for how it is that itself, this substance, can come to be aware of itself and give an account of itself, and how this insufficiency in Spinozism requires a move not back to pre-Spinozistic metaphysics but forward to idealist doctrines of self-consciousness. Ja? cobi, that is, did not understand that our self-consciousness essentially involved “negativity,” the way in which self-conscious reflection neces? sarily introduces a gap between our rationality and the deliverances of our senses; the capacity for self-consciousness, for reflection itself allows us to throw into question whether we can come to regard any of the deliverances of the senses as reasons for belief or action. The senses merely give us, as Hegel says, the “being” of things, that they are, not what our norms (our “oughts”) are to be. Although he took the first step, Jacobi thus ultimately failed to draw out the logical consequence of this line of thought: Since the senses themselves cannot sort out which deliverances count as reasons and which ones do not, reason, as Kant saw, must determine for itself and itself alone what does and does not count as rational. Thus, although Jacobi intuitively understood that the “absolute” must be something like “spirit” {Geist), that “God is spirit, the absolute is free and personal,” he ended up confounding this with a subjectivistic approach to knowledge and action.“
? ? 雅科比的高明之處,黑格爾爭辯道,在于沒有被法國啟蒙運動路徑或德國啟蒙運動路徑沖昏頭腦。恰恰相反,雅科比敏銳的洞察力致使他正確地看出“每個一以貫之的哲學都必將走向斯賓諾莎主義“;不過他卻未能看出“真哲學“同樣也必須超越斯賓諾莎主義。像雅科比早已理解的,斯賓諾莎主義自己沒有為我們的自我意識留出真正的地盤;雅科比已經領會(但愿已經徹底領會)的是,斯賓莎諾主義關于實體的構想無法說明實體自身怎么能夠逐漸意識到自身和怎么能夠逐漸對它自身作出釋述,無法說明斯賓莎諾主義這個欠缺怎么不是要求后退到前斯賓諾莎主義的形而上學而是要求前進到唯心主義的自我意識學說。也就是說,雅科比并不理解我們的自我意識本質上牽涉到“否定性“,牽涉到自我意識的反思必然借以使我們的合理性與感覺判定之間形成的裂口的方式;自我意識或反思自身能夠允許我們去質疑我們能不能逐漸把感覺的判定當作信念或行動的理由看待。桅些感覺僅僅賦孫我們,像黑格爾說的,它們所是的東西而非我們的規范(我們的“應當“〉必將成為的東西。雅科比盡管在這方面邁出了第一步卻迄今最終未能引出這條思路的邏輯結論:因為樹些感覺本身無法挑出鄖些判定可被算作合乎道理的而哪些判定不可被算作合乎道理的,理性,像康德看作的,必然會失定它自身且只能使它自身去確定何物可被算作合乎理性和何物不可被算作合乎理性的。因此,雅科比直觀地理解“絕對“必然是柏種像“精神(Geist)“一樣的東西,盲觀地理解“上帝是精神,絕對是自由的和有人格的,“他最終把他的上述理解與知識和行動的主觀路徑混為一談.“
The reason why Jacobi failed to make the idealist move was that his whole approach was, so Hegel explained, that of the “reflecting con? sciousness, which, disassociated from reason’s intuition distances itself from the mediating movement of the cognizing of this intuition.”*'^ (Hegel also made clear that by “reason’s intuition” he meant “intellec? tual intuition. For Hegel, “reflection” has to do with the way in which in making certain judgments about the structure of appearance, we commit ourselves to norms about what accounts for the structure of appearance; for example, the way in which judging that something to be the case commits us implicitly to general norms about something’s really being the case - such as judgments that things subjectively seem to be such-and-such commit us to general norms about the way things objectively are. But such “reflective” structures, as Hegel believed he had shown in his Logic, presuppose the structure of the “absolute Idea,” the unity of subjective and objective points of view, although they cannot make those structures of the “absolute Idea” explicit within their own structures.
? ? 所以黑格爾解釋道,為什么雅科比未能把唯心主義運動向前推進,原因在于他的整個路徑是“反思意識的路徑,意識因與理性直觀相分離而使它自己遠離認知理性直觀這個起著中介作用的活動?!保ê诟駹栠€借“理性直覺”這個他的意義上的“理智直覺”來深入闡明上述解釋。)對于黑格爾,“反思”與一種方式有關,借此方式,在作出關于現象的結構的判斷時,我們承諾遵守關于對現象結構作出解釋的東西的規范;舉例來說,借助這種方式,斷定某物好像是成問題的,就是促使我們含蓄地承諾遵守關于這個物確實成問題的通用規范——諸如這些主觀上似乎如此這般的判斷,促使我們承諾遵守關于事物客觀上的存在方式的通用規范。但是,這樣的“反思”結構,像黑格爾堅信他在《邏輯學》中證明的,是以“絕對觀念”的結構或主觀觀點與客觀觀點的統一為先決條件的,盡管“反思”結構無法使得“絕對觀念”的這些結構清晰地呈現在“反思”結構自己的結構中。
By arguing that Jacobi’s thought only embodied “reflection,” Hegel thus put him in the same camp as Kant (a classification that Hegel had already made in his 1802 essay “Faith and Knowledge”). But even though Kant’s thought, like Jacobi’s, was a philosophy of “reflection,” Kant had nonetheless explicitly recognized, unlike Jacobi, that reason had to be self-determining. Hegel put it strongly: “It is more important, however, not to overlook in this treatment of the Kantian critique of reason . . . that it had also cognized spirit’s freedom in its theoretical aspect as the principle. This principle, in an abstract form, of course, lies in the idea of an original-synthetic unity of apperception of self- consciousness, which seeks in cognition also to be essentially self(ietermining."'^^ Nonetheless, although Jacobi did not explicitly grasp this Kantian point, he was, Hegel argued, on the right track and in the same spirit; in this Jacobi was not to be confused with, as Hegel mischievously notes, some of his “friends” - he clearly meant in this context his old nemesis, J. F. Fries - who, not having understood at all what was important in Jacobi’s criticism of Kant, thought that they could thereby improve on Kant by transforming the critical philosophy into an “an? thropology . . . into a simple narration of facts that are lighted upon in consciousness,” an enterprise in which “the cognition of them then consists in nothing further than a dissection of that which is lighted upon.”'^
? ? 憑借論證雅科比的思想僅僅體現“反思”而已,黑格爾因此把雅科比列入跟康德相同的陣營(這樣的劃分黑格爾早在1802年《信仰與知識》一文中就已作出)。但是縱使康德的思想,同雅科比的思想一樣,也是一種“反思”的哲學,然而和雅科比不同,康德卻明確認識到理智必須自我決定。黑格爾著重指出:“不過,更為重要的,在討論康德的理性批判時不應忽視……康德的理性批判也已經在它自己的理論層面認識到精神的自由是一條原理。這條原理,這條具有抽象形式的原理,當然依賴于自我意識的統覺具有原初的綜合統一功能這個想法,這樣的原理還在認知過程中設法做到本質上的自我決定?!比欢?,雅科比顯然沒有吃透康德的這個觀點,黑格爾論證道,但是雅科比的大方向是正確的且精神實質與康德本人觀點大體相同;在這一點上,像黑格爾惡作劇式地說的,雅科比沒有被他的(黑格爾的)這些“朋友”(黑格爾在這個語境中顯然指的是自己的宿敵J.F.弘里斯)弄得暈頭轉向,這些“朋友”根本就不明白雅科比對康德的批評有何重要性,認為他們自己可以借助把批判哲學變為“人類學……變為對缺乏意識的事實的簡單敘述”由此使康德哲學日臻完美,按照這個雄心勃勃的計劃,“他們的認知于是僅僅依賴對所缺乏意識的剖析?!毖趴票?,憑借他那穩固的作為具體觀念的精神“直覺”,同樣理直氣壯地摒棄費希特的體系,此舉只不過使康德的體系“被提升到更高的抽象層面并更加堅定不移地貫徹”康德的體系。
Jacobi, with his firm “intuition” of spirit as concrete, also rightfully rejected Fichte’s system, which is only Kant’s system “raised to a higher abstraction and carried through more consistently.”’^ But although Jacobi thus had a concrete, intuitive feel for how both Kant and Fichte required something like a conception of spirit, Geist, to make good on the promises of their idealism, Jacobi’s intuitive feel for the concrete nevertheless led him mistakenly to suppose that the principles making up this notion of spirit, Geist, therefore had to come from the “heart.” In this way, Jacobi repeated an Aristotelian error, which is to misconceive what is “universal” in “impulses and mores Jacobi thus failed to learn Aristotle’s other lesson, namely, the recognition that “for the higher, cultivated cast of mind and its morality, a still more general cognition is required, namely that of what ought to be, not only its being present to itself as the being of a people, but rather knowing it as the being which appears as nature, world, and history.
? ? 然而,盡管雅科比因此具體地直觀上覺得康德和費希特兩人多么需要某種像“精神”(Geist)一樣的東西以便履行他們自己的唯心主義承諾,雅科比關于具體事物的直覺感覺仍然錯誤地致使他假定這些構成精神概念的原則因此必定是來源于“心靈”。以這樣的方式,雅科比重犯了亞里士多德的錯誤,這就是錯誤地設想在“沖動”和“道德”(Sitte)中存在“共相”。雅科比因此未能汲取亞里士多德的其他經驗教訓,即,未能認識到“為了塑造更加高尚的受到教化的心靈及其道德,人們更需要一般認知,也即人們更需要認識到應當做的人不僅僅自身的存在作為一個人的存在,而寧可說是把自己看作顯露為自然、世界和歷史的存在。”