10 Berlin: Reform and Repression at the Focal Point (1818-1821)
第10章 柏林時期：改革與鎮壓的中心(1818—1821)(1)
Hegel’s Prussia and the Berlin University
IN RELOCATING TO PRUSSIA, Hegel was moving to a Land that he had previously scorned and that lay both geographically and culturally far away from his native Wiirttemberg. But the Prussia to which Hegel was resettling himself was no longer the Prussia of his youth; in 1818 it had come to be the focal point of the post-Napoleonic reform movement. Hegel thus had every reason to believe that he was moving to the Land in which the shape of modern life about which he had long reflected was emerging.
黑格爾的普魯士時期與柏林大學
? ? 在重新回到普魯士時，黑格爾移居到一個被他從前嘲笑過的、地理上文化上迥異于故鄉符騰堡的邦國。但是黑格爾將要重新定居于的普魯士已經不復是他青年時期的普魯士了；1818 年普魯士開始成為后拿破侖一世時期改革運動的中心。因此，黑格爾有充分理由相信他將移居的是一個被他長期以來一直反思的、現代生活形態正在從中形成的邦國。
Prussia had come into this status, however, in a roundabout way.? Reform had been pushed onto it rather than being developed out of it.? Although in the periods preceding the nineteenth century, Prussia had been one of the European “great powers,” near the beginning of the century it had come perilously close to being relegated to minor status if not vanishing altogether. It had already been put on the defensive by French military successes in the 1790s, and then after its catastrophe at Jena, it had been occupied by the French. Napoleon, moreover, insisted that Prussia bear the costs of the occupation, which amounted to the staggering sum of 216 million francs.' At the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, Napoleon also reduced Prussia’s size by half, depriving it of all its territories west of the Elbe River.
? ? 不過，普魯士乃是以迂回的方式形成上述狀況的。改革是它迫不得已采取的，而非它自身主動所為。盡管在 19 世紀前就屬歐洲“大國”之列，普魯士快到 19 世紀初時已經危機四伏，幾乎淪為可有可無的小國——如果它不是完全消失的話。它在 18 世紀 90 年代面對法軍節節勝利而疲于防御，接著在耶拿大敗后，它被法軍占領。再者，拿破侖堅持要普魯士負擔占領軍的開銷，這筆巨額開支總計達 2.16 億法郎之多。在 1807 年訂立的《蒂爾西特條約》中，拿破侖把普魯士國土削減了一半，剝奪了它易北河西岸的全部屬地。
The catastrophes at Jena and Auerstadt had left Prussia’s vaunted military in tatters, and, after the court in Berlin had fled from the advancing French army, the French occupiers took over the administration of many of the provinces, thus further undermining the authority of the Prussian government. In the wake of crumbling political authority at the center, the provincial organizations of estates, encouraged by Napoleon, took over even more economic and political authority. But the widespread destruction of farmland and requisitioning of food, cattle, and horses during the war devastated the countryside; to make matters worse, Napoleon’s forcible inclusion of Prussia into his continental system cut them off from the English market, and without England as an export market, grain prices, absolutely crucial to the health of Prussia’s economy, collapsed. In the wake of such economic and political disintegration, disease and hunger mounted; in Berlin alone between 1807 and 1808, of the 5,846 children born, 4,300 died, and the number of suicides rose sharply.^ Prussia’s old government and army had been thoroughly discredited; and by 1810, the state debt had grown from 53 million Thalers in 1806 to over too million Thalers, which in turn by 1815 had increased to more than 200 million Thalers.^ It was clear that Prussia was hemorrhaging financially and unravelling politically.
? ? 耶拿與奧爾施泰特的慘敗使得普魯士軍隊四分五裂，在柏林王公貴族面對法軍大兵壓境逃之夭夭后，法國占領者接管了許多省的行政事務，從而進一步削弱了普魯士政府的權威。隨著中央政治權威的崩潰，各省議會組織受拿破侖的鼓勵，掌握了更多的經濟和政治權力。可是，由于莊園遭到普遍破壞，由于戰時對食物、牛和馬的征用，鄉村經濟被摧毀；雪上加霜的是，拿破侖強行將普魯士納入他的歐陸體系，這就切斷了普魯士人同英國市場的聯系，沒有了英國作為其出口市場，對普魯士經濟健康發展至關重要的谷物價格崩潰了。隨著這種經濟和政治的瓦解，疾病和饑餓接踵而至；在 1807 年至 1808 年間，僅在柏林一地，在所出生的 5846 個嬰兒中就有 4300 個夭折，自殺者數目急劇攀升。普魯士舊政府和軍隊已全然失信于民；到 1810 年，國債從 1806 年的 5300 萬泰勒增長到 1 億泰勒以上，到 1815 年又翻了一番，增加到 2 億泰勒以上。十分清楚，普魯士財政上遭受巨大損失，政治上分崩離析。
The debacle had created an opening for those who wished to introduce modern, even French-style social and political reforms into Prussia, and Hegel was one of those who sympathized deeply with this aspiration. The reformers saw that the Prussian crisis had discredited the old elites and the old way of doing things; when the crunch came, they simply had not passed the test, and it was now time for something new and different, something more along the lines that the French were pushing onto Europe. As long as Napoleon was around and was supreme, the Prussian king had little choice: He had to go along with the reforms or, so it seems, run the risk of vanishing, along with his state, altogether.
? ? 這種崩潰為那些希望將現代的、乃至法國式社會改革和政治改革引入普魯士的人創造了機會，黑格爾當屬那些對這一抱負寄予深切同情的人之列。一些改革家看到了普魯士的危機已經使舊的精英和舊的做事方式遭到質疑；當關鍵時刻到來時，這些改革家根本沒有經受住考驗，現在是普魯士另起爐灶的時候了，是更為按照法國人向歐洲推行的思路做事的時候了。只要拿破侖在世且是最高的統治者，普魯士國王就幾乎沒有自己的選擇，他不得不贊同改革，否則似乎同時不得不冒與他的國家一起滅亡的危險。
Stein’s Reform Government
A reform government was installed in 1807 under the leadership of Baron von Stein as chief minister. Stein, while wanting to reshape Prussian life around his vision of a mixture of English free-market economic theory, aristocratic liberalism, and preservation of some of the old corporate structure of the ancien regime in Germany, also brought with him a firm, almost cameralistic belief that the key to success lay in a well-educated administrative bureaucracy that could bring off these reforms in a disciplined, rational manner. Stein also believed that if Prussia was to survive as a modern state, it also had to offer its citizens something with which they could identify; Stein thought that this could be achieved by opening up the society to certain liberal ideas and by developing a form of nondemocratic but nonetheless representative government, in which “property owners” would be allowed “participation in the administration,” an idea for which he took England to be the model.'* (In England, so Stein argued, the costs of national administration were lower because local communities assumed more of those costs themselves, and they were willing to take on such costs and responsibilities because they “identified” with their state.
施泰因政府改革
? ? 1807 年，一個以巴龍·馮·施泰因為首相的改革政府成立。施泰因在圍繞他的看法——把英國自由市場經濟理論、貴族自由主義、保留著德國舊政體的某種舊集團的結構融為一體——重塑普魯士人生活的時候，也具有一種堅定的、幾乎是財政上的信念，即成功地重塑普魯士人生活的關鍵在于要有一個高素質的行政機構，這樣的行政機構能以一種嚴謹、合理的方式完成這些改革。施泰因也相信，如果普魯士要繼續以一個現代國家的形式存在，它同樣必須提供給公民某種可以得到他們認同的東西；施泰因認為這種認同的實現借助的是提供社會某種自由主義的理念，以及借助培育非民主政體的形式而非代議政體的形式，因此“有產者”應被允許“參與行政管理”，這就是施泰因以英國為原型而提出的理念。（在英國，如施泰因論證的，國家行政成本之所以比較低，是因為地方政府自己承擔更多的行政成本，而地方政府之所以愿意承擔這樣的行政成本和職責，是因為它們“認同”它們的國家。）
On October 9, 1807, Stein’s government issued an edict that put the French idea of “careers open to talent” into practice, declaring that henceforth all occupations were to be open to those who qualified (in other words, a free labor market), that there were to be no restrictions on the sale of noble estates, and that after 1810 there were to be no more feudal relations of subordination on landed estates.? A year later, Stein’s “municipal ordinance” of November 19, 1808, tried to put into effect a somewhat English idea of self-governance in terms of which the state would be built up from below by local communities in which propertied citizens would be authorized to manage their local affairs.
? ? 1807 年 10 月 9 日，施泰因政府簽署了一項將法國人的“任人唯賢”理念付諸實施的法令，并宣布自此之后，各行各業都應擇優用人（換句話說形成自由的勞動力市場），貴族田產出售將不再受到限制，1810 年后將不復存在對擁有土地領主的封建的人身依附關系。一年后，即 1808 年 11 月 19 日，施泰因頒布“市政法令”，試圖實施帶有點英國味道的“自治”理念。根據施氏的“市政法令”，國家應自下而上由地方社區建立，在地方社區，擁有財產的市民應被授權處理他們的地方事務。
Stein’s ideas thus confronted head-on what Hegel had regarded as the clash between modernizing “universalism” and particularist hometown structures, the ways in which hometowns vigorously defended their own local senses of identity, their entrenched ideas of the way things were supposed to be done, and the various structures of local authority and privilege that had accumulated over the years. To be sure, the cities of Prussia did not have the hometown structure typical of southern Germany (where Hegel had grown up), but they still carried with them a dizzying array of local privileges, exemptions, and concessions that made each locality different from the others. The “municipal ordinance” of 1808 more or less abolished those particularisms. From now on, the “municipal ordinance” declared, there was to be “only one right of citizenship” instead of the patchwork of various different local stipulations about membership and privileges, only one “city- citizenship” recognized as an “estate” in Prussian law replacing the patchwork of “city-citizenships” depending on the locality. Those who had the right of “citizenship” in the cities were henceforth to concern themselves with the affairs of their localities; the older rule of guilds and corporations in league with an appointed magistrate was to be wiped out. Although Stein’s “municipal ordinance” did not entirely abolish all the local privileges and laws of the cities (for political reasons it had to leave some intact), its general drift was clear: Town membership was henceforth to be continuous with state membership, not something confronting it or competing with it.^
? ? 因此，施泰因的想法無法避開黑格爾早就看作的現代化的“普救論”與特殊恩寵論的地方結構之間的沖突，無法避開某些方式——借助這些方式，地方勢力積極地捍衛他們自己的地方身份觀念、他們所謂作為做事方式的根深蒂固的想法，以及那些經過多年積淀的地方權力和特權的各種不同機構。毫無疑問，普魯士的這些城市不存在南部德國（黑格爾長大的地方）那種典型的地方機構，它們卻依然具有使每個地方區別于其他地方的大量令人眼花繚亂的地方特權、豁免和特許。1808 年的“市政法令”或多或少廢除了這些特殊恩寵論。從今之后，“市政法令”宣布，應該保留“唯一的公民身份的權利”，而非各種不同的關于成員資格和特權的地方約束的拼湊物，唯有“公民身份”依據普魯士法被認作代表“社會地位”，“社會地位”取代那依賴于地方性的“城市 - 市民身份”的拼湊物。那些在城市中擁有“公民身份”權利的人們自此之后可以關心他們地方性的事務；行會和那由被任命的地方長官主政的市政當局的舊規章必將被消滅干凈。盡管施泰因的“市政法令”沒有完全廢除所有城市的地方特權和法律（出于政治上的原因，“市政法令”不得不留有某些禁區），“市政法令”的總體傾向還是非常清楚的：城鎮市民身份從此以后應該與國家公民身份相連，沒有什么可與市民身份相對抗或比得上市民身份。
In pushing through these ordinances, Stein also had to confront the problem that older Prussian policy had tended to make local government completely dependent on state autocracy, and locals thus had become alienated from their own local governmental institutions. Stein’s reforms thus clearly came to grips with the idea of transforming these people from subjects into citizens in order to motivate them to produce new wealth and spiritual support. The free market and administrative reforms coupled with representation in the government through membership in estates would, he thought, provide the necessary dynamic to avoid this dilemma and would reconcile the particularist emphasis on historically grounded privileges with the modernizing demands for the citizens’ allegiance to the state.* The identification that individuals had with their own local communities and estates would thus be organically extended to the larger community that was supposed to be the state itself.
在推行這些法令過程中面臨的問題及施泰因的設想
? ? 在推行這些法令的過程中，施泰因也不得不面對這樣一個問題：舊的普魯士政策傾向于使地方政府變成完全依賴國家的獨裁統治，地方居民因此已經變得與他們自己的地方政府機構離心離德。施泰因的改革因此顯然必須想方設法將這些人從臣民變為公民，以激發他們去創造新的財富和精神產品。在他看來，通過各階層成員，與代議政體相聯系的自由市場和行政管理，將為避免這種困境提供必不可少的動力，將使特殊恩寵論者對歷史上形成的特權的強調與公民對國家忠誠的現代化要求相一致。各種各樣的個體對他們自己的地方社區和階層的認同，因此將被系統地擴展到那更大的、應該成為國家自身的社區。
Under Stein’s leadership, the old autocratic system of governance, in which the king made all the real decisions and took advice only from a cabinet appointed by him, had been effectively dismantled in the early stages of reform, with its place being taken in November, 1807, by a more reform-minded system of ministers who each headed a specific department. Stein had made himself only the “leading minister” of such a group, a first among equals, and this was exactly how we wanted it; in Stein’s eyes, the ministry should be a collegial body with no clear leader having more privileges than the rest. As Stein had organized things, Prussia was to be divided into local administrative districts, which in turn were to be combined into district governments that were themselves supposed to operate as collegial bodies (not, as the alternative centralizing French model would have had it, under the authority of a single Prefect) ^
? ? 在施泰因的領導下，舊的獨裁統治體系（在該統治體系下，國王作出所有真正的決定，并僅僅聽取由國王任命的內閣意見），早在改革之初就已被有效地破除了，并在1807年11月被代之以一個更具改革精神的部長統治體系，其中每個部長領導一個特定的部門。施泰因自視為這樣一個團體中唯一的“最重要的部長”，自視為平起平坐的同仁中的第一位部長，而這樣的部長同樣也恰恰是當時所急需的。在施泰因眼中，政府各部應該成為像大學那樣的機構，其中沒有哪個領導比其他領導擁有更多的特權。正如施泰因所安排的，普魯士將被劃分成一些地方行政區域，地方行政區域依次將被合并成區域政府，這些區域政府自身應該像大學機構一樣運轉（而不是被合并成像另類法國中央集權模式本欲具有的、在一個行政長官統治下運轉的區域政府）。
The Hardenberg Reforms
Stein never found out if his ideas for running things would work. Under French pressure, he was dismissed in 1808, and he had to flee to Russia after Napoleon put a price on his head. In Stein’s place, Friedrich Ferdinand Count von Dohna and Karl Altenstein were placed in charge of the government, but that arrangement proved to be short-lived. In June 1810, the king appointed Karl August Prince von Hardenberg as chancellor, a newly established position in the government. Having been the chief negotiator of Prussia’s 1795 Treaty of Basel with France, Hardenberg was used to striking deals, and he thus seemed like the right person to carry out the reform program.
哈登貝格改革
? ? 施泰因并沒有看到他的治理理念是否收到成效。在法國施壓下，他于1808年被解除職務，在拿破侖懸賞他的人頭后，被迫逃往沙皇俄國。作為施泰因的繼任者，弗里德里希·斐迪南特·康特·馮·多納和卡爾·阿爾滕施泰因受命掌管政府工作，但這樣的安排被證明是短命的。1810年6月，國王任命卡爾·奧古斯特·馮·哈登貝格親王為總理，這是政府中新設的一個職位。作為普魯士1795年與法國簽訂的《巴塞爾條約》首席談判官，哈登貝格過去向來以處事八面玲瓏著稱，他因此看起來像是實行改革計劃的合適人選。
Like Stein, Hardenberg had studied in Gottingen; like Stein, he was a member of the nobility; and like Stein, he was firmly on the side of the reformers. Unlike Stein, though, Hardenberg wished to be something more like an English prime minister, and his wish was fulfilled when he was named chancellor. Stein was idealistic, pragmatic, and blunt; Hardenberg was pragmatic and courtly. Stein was attached to particularist, almost hometown life; Hardenberg continued to speak of the “machine state,” not of the “organic unities” that had come to pervade political discourse. Although Hardenberg was no less committed to reform than Stein, his ideas on what reform consisted in and how to achieve the goals of reform departed in certain key ways from Stein’s.? Neither Stein nor Hardenberg was personally inclined toward democracy, and Hardenberg was far less inclined toward representative government than was Stein. Like Stein, Hardenberg was concerned with how he could bind individuals to the state in a way that would strengthen the state, but unlike Stein, Hardenberg did not have any personal attachment to the ideals of the hometown or to the old corporate bodies. He was thus far more inclined to push liberal economic reforms at the expense of particularist communities than was Stein, and he was far more inclined than was Stein to more French models of statist centralization.
? ? 像施泰因一樣，哈登貝格早年也求學于哥廷根；像施泰因一樣，哈登貝格也是貴族階層一員；像施泰因一樣，哈登貝格也堅定地站在改革者這一邊。但是，與施泰因不同，哈登貝格更希望成為像英國首相一樣的人物，在被任命為總理時他終于如愿以償。施泰因是位理想主義者，講究實干，性格直率；哈登貝格同樣講究實干，但溫文爾雅。施泰因屬于特殊恩寵論者，幾乎終身秉持故鄉的生活方式；哈登貝格則繼續談及“機器國家”，而不提及那逐漸彌漫在政治演講中的“有機統一體”。盡管哈登貝格和施泰因都承諾實行改革，但哈登貝格在改革倚重什么以及怎樣實現改革目標等問題上的看法，依然在某些關鍵方面與施泰因的看法背道而馳。施泰因和哈登貝格個人都不傾向于民主政體，哈登貝格比施泰因更不傾向于代議政體。像施泰因一樣，哈登貝格關心的是如何通過強國方式使個人依戀國家，但是與施泰因不同，哈登貝格個人與故鄉理想或舊的社團組織徹底決裂。因此，他比施泰因更加不惜以犧牲特殊恩寵論共同體為代價，傾向于推行自由主義經濟改革，而且他比施泰因更傾向于法國的中央集權模式。
For Hardenberg, the central issue was that of restoring the authority and power of the state, and if the old particularist estates stood in the way of that, then so much the worse for them - they would simply have to go. Putting any kind of written constitution into place was also less important for Hardenberg than were the economic and administrative reforms that he was convinced had to precede any constitutional settlement. Although Hardenberg gave eloquent statements of the purpose of reform, he had no intention of introducing genuine democratic reforms in the more expansive sense of devolving responsibility widely onto a popular electorate; the administration was to remain in full authority over the governance of the state.
? ? 對于哈登貝格，核心問題是恢復國家的權威和權力，如果舊的特殊恩寵論階層阻礙這樣的做法，那么對于他們來說是弊大于利——他們理應只有去恢復國家的權威和權力。同樣在哈登貝格看來，將任何種類成文憲法付諸實施，都趕不上經濟和行政改革重要，他深信這樣的改革必須走在制憲的前面。盡管哈登貝格對改革的目的做了雄辯的陳述，他還是不打算推行本真的民主政體改革，還是不打算在更為廣泛的意義上使責任落在廣大普通選民身上；行政機關依舊威風八面，凌駕于國家統治權之上。
Hardenberg moved quickly and at first with great resolve to put his reforms into practice, issuing various sweeping edicts in rapid succession. On October 20, 1810, he issued a trade edict that firmly institutionalized the idea of careers open to talent; on October 27, he issued a finance edict, which was intended to equalize tax burdens; and on October 28, he issued an edict that required that anybody running a business be licensed not by his local guild but by the state.’"
? ? 哈登貝格做事雷厲風行，起初信心百倍地將他的改革付諸實施，接連發布了各種不同的全面改革的法令，其改革之勢銳不可擋。1810年10月20日，他頒布了一項貿易法令，堅決使任人唯賢的用人理念制度化；10月27日，他頒布了一項財政法令，意在平衡稅收負擔；10月28日，他發布了一項法令，規定凡經商者不復需要得到他們所屬的地方行會的許可但要得到國家的許可。
This last edict was clearly a strike against the very heart of the particularist nature of German life, a move to shift authority decisively away from local, historically embedded authorities to the state (thereby carrying further the momentum already established by Stein’s 1808 “municipal ordinance”). Many of the established powers had been firmly opposed to these reforms from the outset, and even the threat of conquest or further humiliation from Napoleonic France had only blunted their hostility to the reform process. Neither the nobility nor the military officers wished to see their traditional privileges removed.? Moreover, Stein’s “municipal ordinance” had had the paradoxical effect of encouraging or creating small pockets of particularism in Prussia in places where they had earlier been leveled out, as the newly enfranchised city-citizens quickly began asserting their rights against those of the state.” Some other elements of reform also backfired: The result of emancipating the peasants from feudal ties - a reform originally opposed by many elements of the nobility - was that large wealthy landowners simply swallowed peasant land and thereby in many cases rendered the peasants even worse off than they had been before, whereas the nobles themselves only became richer and thus more confident of their ability to forestall any further changes. When Hardenberg summoned an “Assembly of Notables” in 1811 as an effort to bypass the traditional estates, he found himself stymied by the fact that the collapse of central authority in 1807 and some of Stein’s reforms not only had reinvigorated the estates, but also had made them into the hub of antagonism to further reforms; they had become a force that was impossible to dismantle immediately. The “Assembly of Notables” quickly turned into a forum for attacking the reforms instead of a body that would unify the country in favor of the reform package as Hardenberg had intended.
? ? 這最后一條法令顯然是對德國生活中天生的特殊恩寵論的致命打擊，從而明確地把歷史上植根于地方的權力轉移到國家手中(由此對施泰因1808年頒布的“市政法令“已經確立的東西造成了進一步的沖擊)。許多既有勢力從一開始就堅決反對這些改革，甚至那來自拿破侖法國征服的威脅或更深層次的羞辱，也僅僅是稍稍減弱了他們對改革進程的敵意。貴族和軍官都不希望看到他們的傳統特權被廢除。再者，施泰因的“市政法令“產生了悖論式的影響，這體現在“市政法令“對在普魯士早些時候特殊恩寵論已經被消除了的地方適當鼓勵或提倡特殊恩寵論，同時新興的城市市民很快著手維護他們的權利以反對國家的權力。一些其他的改革因素也產生適得其反的結果：把農民從封建的束縛中解放出來——一種最初遭貴族中的許多人反對的改革——的后果是大批富有的土地所有者全然吞并了農民的土地，因此在很多情況下致使農民與自己以前相比更貧困了，而貴族們自身則僅僅是變得更富有，從而他們對于自身阻止進一步的改革的能力也更自信了。當哈登貝格1811年提議召開一次“知名人士會議“以繞過傳統議會的時候，他發現自己因以下的事實而陷入了困境：1807年中央集權的坍塌和施泰因的某些改革，不僅使傳統議會恢復了元氣而且使它們形成了對抗進一步改革的中心；它們已經成為一種不可能被立即消除的力量。“知名人士會議“很快演變成攻擊改革的論壇而非成為如哈登貝格希望的將一統國家且利于改革的團體。
The reformers (Stein, Hardenberg, and all their allies) faced a terrible dilemma: They had no real social constituency for their reforms outside of a small educated sector of the Prussian bureaucracy. Many people in the countryside were either indifferent or indignant, and the nobles were dead set against the reforms. Both Stein and Hardenberg were appealing to a Prussianized version of English and French society which did not exist but which they were trying to bring about; and in order to bring it about, they had to strike deals with the elements of society that were opposed to any version of such a vision. Hardenberg, like most others involved in the reform movement, was also haunted by the idea that reform had to be carried out without revolution; indeed, the fearful example of the French Revolution and the desire to avoid at all costs provoking something similar in Prussia formed the backdrop to almost all the moves undertaken by the reform movement. The result was that Hardenberg had to zig and zag in his policies; by 1812 the reform movement was clearly beginning to run out of steam, and by 1815 the defeat of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna had sapped even more momentum from of the reform process. After Napoleon’s defeat, Prussia, which had once looked as if it might vanish altogether as a major state, suddenly found itself larger than ever with the lands that it gained as a result of the post-Napoleonic shakeout; it now controlled large areas of the Rhineland and was seen as one of “Germany’s” defenders along the border with France. Berlin now assumed a status more like that of Vienna as one of the central points in the Germanic world. No longer fearing humiliation by Napoleon, the antireform group was emboldened.
? ? 改革家們(施泰因、哈登貝格和他們的所有盟友)面臨著一個可怕的兩難局面，他們沒有真正的社會選區支持他們的改革，一小部分受過良好教育的普魯士政府官員除外。鄉村中很多人對改革要么漠不關心要么憤憤不平，而貴族則死命反對改革。施泰因和哈登貝格兩人提出一個普魯士化的英國和法國社會版本，這版本當時還未成形但他們正在努力制定；為了制定出這個版本，他們必須和與這種版本相對立的社會勢力作斗爭。哈登貝格，跟卷入到改革運動中的絕大多數其他人一樣，心中縈繞著的想法是改革必須通過革命之外的方式進行；實際上，法國大革命的可怕榜樣和對不惜任何代價避免在普魯士引發類似的東西的渴望，形成了由改革運動所實行的幾乎所有運動的背景。結果是哈登貝格不得不曲線救國式地推行他的政策；到1812年，改革運動顯然已是強弩之末，到1815年，拿破侖戰敗和維也納會議更使改革進程的元氣大傷。在拿破侖失敗后，普魯士，一度看上去似乎可能完全不復成為一個主要國家，突然發現自己作為后拿破侖一世時期格局變動的結果，因得到的土地而使自己的領土比以往任何時候都更加遼闊；它現在控制著萊茵河沿岸的大片區域，并被看作是沿法國邊界一帶的“德意志“的保衛者之一。柏林現在獲得了一種更類似維也納的地位，成為德意志世界的中心之一。由于不復擔憂受拿破侖羞辱，反對改革的團體大受鼓勵。
In those changed circumstances, the constitution that the king had been promising since 1810 and which he had publicly promised on May 22, 1815 - as the allies were preparing for their final battle with Napoleon - was put on indefinite hold. Even the reformers believed that they could not put any constitution into place without large-scale reforms first being carried out in society; and with the interest in reform becoming progressively more faint, the promise of the constitution began to seem more and more distant. But the reformers continued to firmly believe that for Prussia to be a sustainable modern state, they had to break down the barriers between government and society, prince and people, and create a state with which people could identify; and for that they needed a constitution to provide what they thought was the only way in which citizens could be integrated with the state. Otherwise, the well-established German practice of attaching loyalty to one’s locality or hometown and not to any such abstraction as the “state” or the “monarch” would remain in place; without this binding to a larger sense of the state, hometowners and other particularists would continue to play one prince off against another as they felt they needed to and as they felt they could get away with. The problem of representation in the government was thus accentuated as the actual experience of representative institutions among the reformers dampened their enthusiasm for them; whenever representative institutions were called into session, they typically turned into forums for various groups to call for the reestablishment of their old privileges.
? ? 在這些已經發生了變化的境況下，國王自 1810 年就一直允諾頒布的憲法和他 1815 年 5 月 12 日公開承諾頒布的憲法——其時盟軍正準備與拿破侖決一死戰——被置于不確定的狀況中。甚至就連改革者也相信，在沒有首先在社會上進行大規模改革的情況下，他們不可能實施任何憲法；隨著人們對改革的興趣變得愈來愈淡化，關于憲法的許諾也開始變得越來越籠統。但是改革者依然堅信，為了使普魯士成為一個強大的現代國家，他們必須拆除政府與社會、君主與平民之間的藩籬，創造一個人民能夠認同的國家；為此他們需要一部憲法來提供他們所想要的東西，這乃是借以能使國民跟國家戮力同心的唯一方式。不然的話，根深蒂固的忠誠于地方或家鄉而非忠誠于任何諸如“國家”或“君主”這樣的抽象物的德國國民實踐就會仍然保持下去；在不受一種更大的國家觀念約束的情況下，地方勢力與其他的特殊恩寵論者在感到需要和感到自己能僥幸取得成功時就會繼續為君主之位相互爭斗。政府中的代表問題因此得到強調，因為改革者關于代議制機構的實際體驗使他們對代議制機構的熱情衰減；每當就代議制機構召開會議的時候，代議制機構一般就會變成不同的團體號召恢復它們舊特權的論壇。
Although the slowdown of reform was clear enough in 1817 and 1818, when Hegel was musing about whether he should go to Berlin, it was not clear to everyone whether it was dead or was just taking longer than the overly euphoric aspirations during the heyday of the so-called “wars of liberation” had led some to hope. Hegel clearly took the latter view. For him, opposition was to be expected, but the social forces that were propelling reform were not going to vanish just because the representatives of an outmoded form of life were upset at the loss of their place as the lead actors on history’s stage. The various religious and economic stresses and strains that had already put England and France on the path to modern life were now in full play in Germany and especially in Prussia itself under the leadership first of Stein and then of Hardenberg. The modern reform for which Hegel had so long hoped was, by his lights, now going to be transpiring under his nose, and he was set to play his part in it.
? ? 1817 和 1818 年改革的放緩已是足夠明顯的，這時黑格爾正在思索他是不是應該去柏林，但是，在大家看來還不清楚改革是已經死亡還是恰恰要花費比所謂“解放戰爭”鼎盛時期過度的欣然渴望更長的時間，這就致使某些人對改革還抱有一線希望。黑格爾顯然抱著后一種看法。對他來說，反對改革是預料之中的事，而推動改革的社會力量不會消失，這恰恰是因為代表過時生活形式的東西終將因被推翻而喪失它們在歷史舞臺的主角地位。曾經橫臥英國和法國通往現代生活道路上的各種不同的宗教的、經濟的壓力和緊張，眼下在德國尤其在施泰因與哈登貝格先后領導下的普魯士本身全面上演。按照黑格爾自己的看法，他長期以來期待的現代改革現在即將在他眼皮底下發生，并且他將在這場改革中發揮他的影響。
The Berlin University
The founding and development of the university at Berlin played no small role in Hegel’s conception of what his place was to be in Berlin.? The virtual collapse of the Prussian state in 1806 had led a number of influential people in Berlin to advocate founding a new university in the city to attract the kind of intellectual leadership that they thought was necessary for reforming and rebuilding the Prussian state and regaining for Prussia some of the prestige that it had so abruptly lost. The idea of founding a university in Berlin had originated in the request by the faculty of Halle (which Napoleon had closed in 1807) that it be reesta- blished in Berlin. In the context of T. A. H. Schmalz’s (the rector of Halle’s) request for reestablishment of the university in Berlin, the Prussian king, Friedrich Wilhelm III, was widely reported to have said, “The state must replace by spiritual power what it has lost physically.” It may be the only even remotely philosophical utterance he ever made, but it made an impact, especially on modernizing intellectuals such as Hegel. The idea gained currency, and various versions of it began to be cited by people in Prussia. In 1807, the king authorized the head of his cabinet, Karl Friedrich Beyme, to investigate the possibility of erecting a university in Berlin.*^ It was certainly not to be taken for granted that such a university was needed or should be founded. But having been thus charged, Beyme asked several leading figures, among them Fichte, to draw up suggestions about what form such a university should take were it to be established.'^
柏林大學
? ? 柏林大學的創立和發展對黑格爾認為他的舞臺應在柏林的想法起到了不小的作用。1806 年，普魯士國家事實上的崩潰促使柏林很多頭面人物倡導在這個城市創建一所新的大學，吸引在他們看來那種對改革和重建普魯士國家和恢復普魯士已丟失殆盡的某種威望來說非常必要的有才能的領軍人物。在柏林創辦一所大學的想法源于（被拿破侖 1807 年關閉的）哈勒大學教職員工的請求——應該在柏林重建一所大學。在 T.H.A.施馬爾茨（哈勒大學校長）關于在柏林重建這所大學的請求的背景下，當時的普魯士國王弗里德里希·威廉三世說了以下這句廣為流傳的話：“國家必須代之以它事實上已經丟失的精神力量”。這可能是他曾說過的甚至唯一的略帶點哲學味道的話，而它卻產生了很大的影響，特別是對現代知識分子比如黑格爾。這個觀點不脛而走，關于它的各種不同版本開始被普魯士人引用。1807 年，國王授權內閣首腦卡爾·弗里德里希·拜梅調研在柏林建立一所大學的可能性。需要和應該創建這樣一所大學的事情當然沒有被看作是理所當然的。但是一直主掌此事的拜梅因此要求幾位一流學者（其中有費希特）起草了關于假如要建立這樣一所大學應采取何種形式的若干建議。
None of the proposals submitted to Beyme (particularly Fichte’s) proved to be feasible, but the debate took a new turn when in the spring of 1808 Friedrich Schleiermacher published a short piece. Occasional Thoughts on Universities in a German Sense. Schleiermacher, who had not been asked by Beyme to comment on the matter, independently published his own thoughts, in which he argued for a vision of the university more or less on the Jena model. In Schleiermacher s formulation, since knowledge is a totality that no single scholar can encompass, the state must therefore create the university as a modern institution in which scholars can come together and create this unity in concert with each other. The central faculty in such a university must be the philosophical faculty - and it must be remembered that Schleiermacher was a theologian making this argument - since only the philosophical faculty is fully autonomous (harking back to Kant’s thesis in The Conflict of the Faculties) and thus capable of both representing and achieving the unity of knowledge on which a modern institution of learning must rest.
? ? 遞交到拜梅手里的提議(尤其是費希特的建議)沒有一條證明是可行的,但是當1808年春弗里德里希。施萊爾馬赫出版了一本小冊子《德國思想界關于大學的機會主義的理論》的時候關于大學應采取何種形式的爭論出現了新的轉機。施萊爾馬赫,此前沒有被拜梅邀請對這件事發表看法的施萊爾馬赫,發表了他自己的獨樹一幟的想法,在這本小冊子里,他力主帶有點耶拿模式的大學版本。在施萊爾馬赫的閹述中,既然知識是一個所有單個學者都無法囊括的整體,國家就必須創建作為一個現代機構的大學,這個機構中學者們能夠匯聚一堂,彼此同心協力創造這個統一體。這樣一所大學里的龍頭系科必須是哲學系一一并且必須牢記施萊爾馬赫作為一位神學家提出了這個主張一一因為只有哲學系才是完全自主的(這個觀點可以回溯到康德《系科之爭》中的論題),因而哲學系不僅能夠代表而且能夠完成一個現代學術機構所必須仰賴的知識的統一。
The key practice in such a university, Schleiermacher argued, is the lecture; indeed, lectures are the “sacred aspects” of the “scientific common life of the university.”''' In the lectures, the professor both publicly enacts the way in which knowledge unfettered by orthodoxy is achieved and assists the students (both as exemplar and as pedagogue) in doing this for themselves, in making themselves into appropriately modern people. (In Schleiermacher’s formulation, the Fichtean-Jena conception of the “professor as modern hero” as distinct from the older professorial figure of ridicule clearly emerged again.) It also follows, as Schleiermacher also made explicit, that academic freedom must be the touchstone of such a modern university.
? ? 這樣一所大學里的關鍵的實踐,施荷爾馬赫辯稱,是授課;確切地說,授課是“科學的大學日常生活“的“神圣的方面““在課堂上,教授不僅要展現借以獲得不受正統制約的知識的方式,還要幫助(既作為榜樣又作為教師的)學生自己做到這一點,還要幫助他們自已成為與時俱進的現代人。(在施萊爾馬赫的閘述中,顯然再次出現了關于“教授作為“區別于受嘲笑的舊式教授形象的“現代英雄“的費希特一耶拿觀念。)由此也可得出,像施萊爾馬赫也表明的,學術自由必須是這樣一所現代大學的試金石。
Schleiermacher’s essay was widely read in the right circles and informed a large part of the background discussion of what a university in Berlin should look like. Schleiermacher’s essay took on particular significance after the great shake-ups in the Prussian ministry after 1807 (after Napoleon forced Stein’s resignation and Beyme was discharged as minister). The new minister. Count von Dohna, named Wilhelm von Humboldt in February 1809 as chief of the recently founded section of the Prussian government on “religion and public education” and specifically charged him with drawing up plans for the university. Although Von Humboldt himself had studied law and philology in Gottingen (and had also studied law at the university at Frankfurt on the Oder), he had lived in Jena from 1794 to 1797 and had been infused with the Jena view of the world. In May 12, 1809, von Humboldt submitted his proposal to the king. In it he argued for the establishment of a Jenastyle university (although Jena was not mentioned) in which the instructional goals were to be focused on promoting the Bildung - the selfdetermining self-cultivation and inwardly motivated love of learning and education — of the students there and preparing them thereby to be fully modern citizens of a fully modern state. To accomplish this, the university had to embody within itself the union of “teaching and research” - the two great watchwords of the Humboldt university which were to endure for virtually all modern universities down to our owm day. The university thus had to be organized around the notion that PVissenschaft, the totality of the learned disciplines, was an end in itself, that academic freedom was therefore of utmost importance, and that the purpose of the university was to have students taught by professors who were to impart to them the state of the art in current research in which they themselves were engaged. Publication was not the most important part of the envisioned university, which in Humboldt’s vision was to be based on a dynamic, evolving view of knowledge; the professor was to communicate in his lectures the latest and best thoughts on the subject, and the students were to integrate them into their own lives and go on to extend the process. The process would lead to students emerging from the university with the formation necessary to continue to progress through such Bildung in the rest of their lives. Moreover, in Humboldt’s vision, just as in the Jena view, the university was most emphatically not to be a training ground for the professions; it was an incubator for self-determining men of taste and learning, who would emerge as the proper leaders and state officials of a modern, free form of life.
? ? 施萊爾馬赫的文章理所當然在學界廣為流傳,并使人大體上了解到關于柏林大學應該看起來是何種模樣的討論背景。在1870年后,施萊爾馬赫的這篇文章在普魯士政府大改組后(在拿破侖逼迫施泰因辭職和拜梅被解除首相職位后)產生了特殊的影響。新首相康特,馮。多納1809年2月任命威龐。馮。洪堡為普魯士政府新設的“宗教和公共教育部“部長,特別委任他負責制定大學的計劃。洪堡本人此前在哥廷根研習法律和哲學(并也在奧得河畔的法蘭克福大學研修過法學),但是他在1794年至1797年間住在耶拿并被灌輸的是耶拿的世界觀。1809年5月12日,馮。洪堡將他的提議呈遞給國王。在提議中,他主張建立一所耶拿模式的大學(盡管他沒提及耶拿1,教育的目標應集中在提升那里學生的BiLQdxung自決的修養以及發自內心的對學問和教育的熱愛一一使他們由此準備成為全面現代國家的全面現代公民。為實現這個目標,大學本身必須體現“教學和研究“的統一。一一時至今日洪堡式大學這兩個偉大口號實質上始終為所有現代大學所秉持。大學建設因此必須圍繞以下的思想做文章:科學,作為專業學科的總體,自身就是目的;學術自由因而是極為重要的;大學的目的應該由教授向學生講授教授自己從事的研究領域當前學術現狀。發表作品并不構成想像中的大學最重要的部分,想象中的大學在洪堡看來應該奠基于知識的動力學的進化觀;教授必須在課堂上講授有關學科的最前沿的最好的學術思想,學生則必須把這樣的學術思想納人他們自己的生活和學習并繼續擴展這個過程。這個過程必將致使學生自大學時代起就養成一種良好的習慣,這種習慣繼續促使他們428余生始終秉持這樣的修養。不止于此,按照洪堡看法,正像按照耶拿人看法,十分強調大學不應該成為職業訓練場所;它是培養具有審美力和學問的自決的人才基地,這樣的人因秉持現代的自由的生活形式而將成為真正的領導或國家官員。
Humboldt succeeded in convincing the authorities to go ahead, and on October 10, 1809, the faculty senate held its first meeting (headed by its first rector, T. A. H. Schmalz, the former head of Halle who was later to become a strong opponent of Hegel), followed by the first lectures held on October 29, 1809. The university was a success; at its opening, it had already attracted many of the leading lights of German intellectual life and had become the model of the reformed modern university. Reality, however, soon set in. Humboldt, disappointed with the various demands and quibbles from the luminaries of the faculty the university had attracted, soon resigned his position and left Berlin even before the university had formally opened. The professors found that the promised remuneration and financial support for which Humboldt had called was not forthcoming. Humboldt had proposed that professor’s salaries start around 1,500 Thalers per year; instead, they were pegged closer to 800 Thalers, when the cost of living for a bourgeois family to maintain itself in the socially appropriate ways was between 600 to 1,000 Thalers a year.'^ The students themselves turned out be more interested in careers than in Wissenschaft for its own sake, and the professors complained about it. Moreover, another shake-up in the Prussian administration had put K. F. von Schuckmann in charge of the university, and he put into effect a decree that the university would be completely dependent on the government for its operating costs rather than being given some lands or foundation from which it could derive independent revenues (as had been the case with the early modern universities).
? ? 洪堡成功地說服了當局推行他的辦學理念,1809年10月10日柏林大學理事會召開丁第一次會議(主持人是柏林大學首任校長TA.H.施馬爾茨,此人系哈勒大學前任校長,后來成為黑格爾的強勁對手),在接下來的1809年10月29日開始了第一批課程的講授。這所大學辦得有聲有色;在創辦之初,它就吸引了德國學界很多一流人物并成了改革現代大學的典范。然而麻煩的事情接踵而至。洪堡,因那些已經被柏林大學招來的大師們提出的各種不同的要求與遁詞而大失所望,旋即辭去了他的職務甚至在柏林大學正式開張前就已離開了柏林。教授們發覺校方允諾的薪酬和洪堡聲稱的科研啟動經費并未如約而至。洪堡早已建議教授的薪酬起于每年1500泰勒左右;相反,他們的薪酬被限制在近800泰勒,其時一個中產階級家庭維持自身一年正常社會生活開支在600至1000泰勒之間.“出于科學自身的原因,學生自己對就業感興趣而非對科學感興趣,而這批教授則對他們的待遇抱怨連連。而且普魯士政府作出了另一重大人事變動,任命K.F.馮,舒克曼主持大學工作,他上臺伊始就實施了一條政令:柏林大學辦學經費上將完全仰賴政府而非仰賴柏林大學借以可能獲得獨立收益的某些既定的地產或基金(像早期現代大學實行的那樣)。
In July 1811 the faculty elected Fichte as rector. Fichte, although beginning with high-minded ideals close to those upon which Humboldt had founded the university, almost immediately alienated all of his colleagues, and a kind of academic civil war among the faculty began.? Some of it had to do with the personalities involved. Fichte, for example, had the habit of issuing his rectoral edicts to his colleagues by saying, “It is not I as an individual who says and wills this, but the Idea, which speaks and acts through me.”’^ Fichte’s troubles with the faculty came to a head with one particular incident. In his inaugural address as rector, Fichte had warned that the most pressing threat to academic freedom, the lifeblood of the modern university, was that of the students being untrue to their vocation. A student’s vocation was to immerse himself in the study of “science”; instead, the students were falling back into the old pattern of a raucous fraternity life of drinking and dueling that, Fichte claimed, had brought down the university at Jena.'’ Fichte became particularly infuriated when a Jewish student was attacked by other students (who hoped thereby to provoke him into a duel); Fichte wished to punish those who had attacked the Jewish student, and when he was not supported by key members of the faculty in his efforts, became even further incensed. Schleiermacher, among others, thought that he was being too harsh; and Schleiermacher was no friend of Fichte’s, as he had insisted on holding his lectures at the same time as Fichte’s, thus depriving Fichte of potential lecture fees from the students who thereby could not attend his own lectures.'* Furious, Fichte resigned as rector.
? ? 1811 年 7 月，柏林大學教職工選舉費希特擔任校長。費希特，盡管起初心懷崇高的、頗似洪堡用以創建大學的理想，但幾乎很快就與所有同事疏遠，教職工中開始出現學術上的內耗。其中一些內容甚至涉及人格問題。例如，費希特習慣以這樣的說法向同事發布校長布告：“不是我作為個人這樣言說和希望這樣言說，而正是觀念通過我這樣言說且通過我這樣做事。” 費希特與教工的矛盾因一件具體小事發展到不可收拾的地步。早在校長就職演說中，費希特就已警告，學術自由是現代大學的命脈，而對它迫在眉睫的威脅是學生不忠實于自己的天職。學生的天職就是潛心學習“科學”；然而，不少學生重新過上舊時飲酒和決斗的粗俗江湖義氣生活，費希特聲稱，這種生活曾致使耶拿大學衰落。尤其讓費希特怒不可遏的是，一名猶太學生受到其他學生攻擊（后者甚至希望借此挑起與該猶太學生的決斗）。費希特想要懲罰那些攻擊猶太學生的學生，當他就此事爭取學校教職工核心人員的支持卻未得到回應時，他愈發憤怒。有人認為費希特過于嚴厲，施萊爾馬赫便是其中之一；施萊爾馬赫對費希特很不友好，因為他始終堅持與費希特在同一時間開課，這很可能搶走那些因時間沖突而無法來聽費希特講課的學生的聽課費。憤怒之下，費希特辭去了校長職務。
