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弗朗索瓦·菲永簡介，1954年3月生于法國西部城市勒芒，是執政的人民運動聯盟成員，具有公共法學和政治學博士學位。
1981年，他首次當選國民議會議員，是當時最年輕的國會議員。
1993年3月，弗朗索瓦·菲永首次進入法國政府，并在政府中擔任高等教育和研究部長。
2002年5月，菲永進入拉法蘭政府，擔任社會事務、勞工和互助部長。他一上任，就著手法國養老金制度改革。由于改革力度較大，他所推行的改革被稱為“菲永改革”。
2005年5月底，離開內閣后，菲永積極支持薩科齊備戰總統大選，成為薩科齊競選總統中的“首席高參”，對薩科齊的當選居功至偉。
《金融時報》說，在左翼陣營看來，薩科齊的右翼團隊中，菲永是“最不討厭”的一位，他也被視為薩科齊陣營的“鴿派”代表人物。
菲永以勇于改革和善于與社會各界對話著稱。他喜歡文學，愛好登山活動，并對賽車情有獨鐘。其所著的《法蘭西能夠承受真相》一書，頗為暢銷。
菲永在法國議會上稱：“我們需要中國，世界也要靠中國走出經濟衰退。”菲永還強調，西藏是中國領土的一部分。
-信息來自網絡。侵刪。
The FN’s first base was in the south, where Mr Le Pen built support among French settlers returning from independent Algeria in the 1970s. Its second was the rust-belt of the north and east, where it scooped up the disappointed vote that once went to socialists or communists. Maps by Hervé Le Bras, a demographer, show that the FN now has a third home in Mr Guilluy’s peripheral areas—beyond the outskirts of the cities, but not deeply rural. In a ring of communes between 40km and 50km from the centre of Paris, for example, the FN’s candidate in the 2015 regional elections, Wallerand de Saint-Just, won 32% of the vote. In places 80km out or more, he scored fully 41%
國民陣線的第一個根據地在南部，勒龐先生在20世紀70年代因阿爾及利亞獨立返回法國的定居者中獲得了支持。它的第二個根據地在北部和東部的‘’鐵銹地帶‘’，在那里曾經投給社會黨或共產黨的選票由于被辜負而被他們收入囊中。人口統計學家HervéLe Bras的地圖顯示，國民陣線現在找到了第三個安家落戶的所在，即Guilluy先生所謂的周邊地區-城市郊區以外，但又不是深入農村的地方。比如，在距離巴黎市中心40至50公里的公社圈里，國民陣線候選人Wallerand de Saint-Just在2015年的地區選舉中贏得了32％的選票。而在80公里或更遠的地方，他的得票率達到十足的41％。
Isolation boosts FN support. “The farther you live from a railway station”, says Mr Le Bras, “the more you are likely to vote FN.” France has high-quality public services,and its citizens have matching expectations for the fabric of their lives. When that fabric thins—when a local butcher closes, or a doctor leaves town—they feel neglect. A common factor behind the FN vote in such places, says Jér?me Fourquet, director of Ifop, is “a sense of abandonment, of being left behind by an elite that doesn’t care.”
與世隔絕的程度推動了國民陣線支持率的上升。Le Bras先生說 “你離火車站距離越遠，就更有可能投票給國民陣線。”法國擁有高質量的公共服務，其公民將期望和生活中的織物等量齊觀。當織物變薄時 -例如當一位當地的屠夫關張，或者一位醫生離開小鎮 - 他們會覺得被忽視。 Ifop的總監Jér?meFourquet說，國民陣線在這些地方收獲選票背后一個共同因素在起作用，那是一種“被放棄的感覺，被漠不關心的精英拋棄的感覺。“
Ms Le Pen exploits this sentiment with uncanny skill. Born into politics and raised in a mansion in a swish Parisian suburb, she somehow manages to speak for those she calls the country’s “forgotten” in a way they find credible. The reason this works is partly Ms Le Pen’s shrewd feel for simple language and anti-elite slogans. But it is also because France has been going through an unusually unsettled time that has left people looking beyond the established parties and given French populism distinctive features.
勒龐女士以不可思議的技巧借用了這種情緒。生于政治世家，長于時髦巴黎郊區的豪宅里的她，設法為她口中的國家“被遺忘者”代言，以他們認為可信的一種方式。這個做法有效的原因部分是由于勒龐女士對簡單的語言和反精英口號精于世故的感覺。但也是因為法國一直在經歷的一個異常的不穩定的時期，使得人們既定黨派之外尋求解決方案，這給予了法國民粹主義不同凡響的特征。
One is a sense that a great country, the cradle of human rights and the Enlightenment, has somehow lost its way. This is particularly obvious in economic terms. Since the end of the trente glorieuses, the three decades of strong growth that followed the second world war, it has been debt, rather than growth, that has financed the high-speed trains, the blooming municipal flower beds and the generous provisions for child care, ill health, job loss and old age that are the hallmark of France’s splendid public sector. French public spending now accounts for a greater share of GDP than it does in Sweden. But no French government has balanced its budget since 1974.
那種偉大國家的感覺，人權搖籃和啟蒙運動，已經有點不知所蹤。這在經濟方面尤其明顯。從特倫特榮譽結束以來，（指二戰之后三十年的強勁增長），是債務而不是增長，為高速列車，城市里盛開的花壇和慷慨的福利（如兒童保育，生病醫療，失業和老年福利）提供了資金，這是輝煌的法國公共部門的標志。法國公共開支占GDP的份額比瑞典的還要大。但自1974年以來，沒有一屆法國政府做到平衡預算。
Les Trente Glorieuses ("The Glorious Thirty") refers to the thirty years from 1945-1975 following the end of the Second World War in France. The name was first used by the French demographer Jean Fourastié.
以上來源于:Wikipedia
Over the past 15 years, there has been a particular décrochage, or decoupling, between?the French economy and that of Germany, its closest ally. In 2002 the two countries enjoyed comparable GDP per head. Germany, under Gerhard Schr?der, began to reform itself. France, under Jacques Chirac, didn’t. Today, Germans have 17% more purchasing power per person. Labour costs in France have risen faster than in Germany, deterring the creation of permanent jobs and undermining competitiveness. The country’s share of all goods exports between EU countries has dropped from 13.4% to 10.5%.
在過去的15年里，法國經濟和它最親密的盟友德國的經濟之間發生了一個特別的解耦或分離的過程。在2002年，兩國的人均GDP大體旗鼓相當。德國，在格哈特·施羅德治下（Gerhard Schr?der）開始改革自身。法國在雅克·希拉克(Jacques Chirac)治下卻沒有做同一件事。今天，德國的人均購買力高了17％。法國的勞動力成本比德國增長更快，這阻礙了長期工作的產生，并削弱了競爭力。在歐盟國家之間所有商品出口中法國的份額從13.4％下降到了10.5％。
Most devastating is unemployment. In 2002, it was a tad higher in Germany. Today it has dropped to 4% on that side of the Rhine, but in France it remains stuck at 10%, and at 25% for the under-25s. Over 80% of new jobs are on short-term contracts, with “short-term” often meaning just a month. A generation of young French people has grown up outside the country’s famously protected job market. The votes for Mr Trump or Brexit were weakest among the under 25s; but the young French support the FN more than any other party. (Conversely, older voters have much less truck with Ms Le Pen than their Anglophone peers did with Brexit and Mr Trump; polls say they fear for their savings and pensions if France leaves the euro.)
最具破壞性的是失業問題。在2002年，德國比法國略高了一點。而今，萊茵河那里的失業率下降到了4％，但法國仍然保持在10％，25歲以下則是25％。超過80％的新工作是短期合同，“短期”往往意味著一個月。法國的年輕一代成長于國家有名的受保護的就業市場之外。特朗普或英國脫歐獲得支持的選票在25歲以下是最少的; 但年輕的法國人更支持國民陣線而不是其他政黨。 （相反地，更年長些的選民支持勒龐女士的數量，比那些以英文為母語的同齡人對脫歐或特朗普的支持要少得多; 民意調查顯示，如果法國離開歐元區，他們擔心自己的儲蓄和養老金。
Shame isn’t a strong enough emotion
只是羞愧還不夠
Economic self-doubt has been compounded by a sense of what Laurent Bouvet, a political scientist, calls “cultural insecurity”. Three big terrorist attacks within the space of 18 months, in 2015 and 2016, battered France’s confidence. The coming presidential election will be conducted under a state of emergency which has been renewed four times since November 2015. The French have had to learn to live with soldiers patrolling the streets and railway stations, a daily visual reminder of their vulnerability.
經濟自我懷疑由于政治學家勞倫特·布維(Laurent Bouvet)宣稱的“文化不安全”感而變得更加復雜。 在2015年和2016年，18個月時間內發生的三次大型恐怖襲擊沉重打擊了法國的自信心。即將到來的總統大選將在緊急狀態下進行，自2015年11月以來已經延長了四次。法國人不得不學會忍受和街道上，火車站巡邏士兵共處的生活。這種日常的視覺沖擊是對他們脆弱性的一種提醒。
Legitimate worries about terrorism have supplied fertile ground for insidious identity politics. As the home to one of Europe’s biggest Muslim minorities, France is more alert than, say, Italy or Spain to hints of religious extremism. Moreover, the country has a pre-existing and unforgiving framework for managing religious expression—known as la?cité—which recent governments, fearing a threat to secularism, have tightened up. When this provokes a row—over Muslim head-coverings, say—it plays straight into Ms Le Pen’s hands; she has little trouble persuading voters that their values are under threat. France, she tells her flag-waving rallies, faces nothing less than “submersion”.
對恐怖主義的合理擔憂為陰險的身份政治提供了沃土。 作為歐洲最大的穆斯林少數民族之一的家園，法國比意大利或西班牙更加警惕宗教極端主義的跡象。 此外，該國有一個早已存在而且法不容情的宗教表達的管理框架 - 被稱為政教分離（la?cité） - 最近，由于擔心威脅到世俗主義，政府把它收得更緊了。 當這引起了爭議，比如關于穆斯林頭飾，它直接成為放入勒龐女士手中的武器; 她幾乎不費吹灰之力就說服了選民，他們的價值觀正在受到威脅。 她告訴揮舞旗幟這旗幟的集會人群，法國不啻于面臨“淹沒”的命運。
Ms Le Pen succeeds not because of the way her policies, which include a lower retirement age, more taxes on foreign workers and massive increases in spending on the armed forces, would tackle economic insecurity or the threat of terror (they wouldn’t). It is because of her talent for blending two strands of populism: anti-immigrant talk about values and churches, strong in the south, and anti-market discourse about jobs and the system, favoured in the north. On both counts, she can tap into French history.
勒龐女士成功的原因不是因為她的政策將解決經濟不安全或恐怖威脅（無濟于事），這些政策包括較低的退休年齡，對外國工人征更多稅和大幅增加武裝力量的開支。而是她融合兩股民粹主義的天賦：反移民者談論價值觀和教會，他們在南方很強大；反對市場者討論工作和制度，則在北方大受歡迎。在這兩個方面，她都可以利用法國歷史。
Ms Le Pen may have purged the FN of the overt anti-Semitism and neo-Nazi imagery of her father’s era. Yet her party remains originally rooted in a nostalgia for colonial Algeria and supporters of Marshal Pétain, who collaborated with the Nazis. Churches, flags and the homeland remain potent symbols in this world. Campaigning in Provence Ms Maréchal-Le Pen frequently recalls the country’s roots in Christendom. At her aunt’s political rallies, supporters can be heard chanting: “On est chez nous” (This is our home).
勒龐女士可能已經把她父親時代的公開反猶主義和新納粹圖像從國民陣線中清除出去。然而，她的政黨仍然或植根于對阿爾及利亞殖民的懷舊之情或來自于貝當元帥（曾與納粹合作）的支持者。在這個世界里，教會，旗幟和家園仍然是有力的象征。在普羅旺斯的競選活動中，勒龐女士經常回憶起這個國家的根在于基督教會。在她姑媽的政治集會上，支持者能聽到頌歌：“On est chez nous”（這是我們的家園）。
At the same time, anti-establishment politics fits her compatriots’ self-image as a nation of revolutionaries, pitch forks in hand. When Mr Le Pen was first elected to the National Assembly, in 1956, it was on a list led by Pierre Poujade, who evoked this tradition when he spoke up for “the little people”: “The downtrodden, the trashed, the ripped off, the humiliated.” It is no coincidence that Ms Le Pen’s campaign slogan is “In the name of the people”.
與此同時，反體制政治家身份很符合她作為一個國家的革命者的，手持杖叉的她同胞的自畫像。1956年，當勒龐先生第一次當選國民議會時，它在由皮埃爾·普賈德（Pierre Poujade）領導的名單上。，當他為“被壓倒，被丟棄，受欺騙，受侮辱“的“小人物”代言時，他喚起了這個傳統。勒龐女士選擇”以人民的名義“為競選口號不是巧合。
A final ingredient gives French populism a further twist: Euroscepticism. Invaded three times by Germany since 1870, and on its fifth republic, France has a long disrupted history, insecure even in peace. After the second world war it dealt with this by building Europe—a project by which it sought to bind in Germany and to amplify its own power. The French regarded the ceding of sovereignty as a means of reinforcing, not undermining, their nation state.
最后一種配料進一步扭曲了法國的民粹主義：歐洲懷疑論。自1870年以來到第五共和國，德國入侵法國三次，法國有長期中斷的歷史，甚至在和平時期也不安全。二戰后，它通過建設歐洲的項目來解決這個難題 - 一個試圖綁定德國和放大自己的力量的項目。法國可以把主權上的讓步視為鞏固其民族國家的手段而不是相反。
Europe remains an important part of French identity. But somewhere along the line the passion it once evoked cooled down, and the consensus supporting it faltered. Second thoughts spread long before the recent currency and refugee crises. In 1992, the French approved the launch of the union’s single currency by the slimmest of margins. In 2005 they rejected the draft EU constitution. The share of French people who see Europe favourably dropped from 69% in 2004 to 38% in 2016, according to Pew, a polling group; that makes the EU less popular in France than in Britain. This has given the FN a fresh electoral cause. Ms Le Pen speaks of Brexit as a model of emancipation from the?shackles of what she calls the “European Soviet Union”.
歐洲仍然是法國身份的重要組成部分。但是在這條路線上前行的某個地方，它曾經激發的熱情冷卻下來，支持它的共識也變得步履蹣跚。改弦更張的想法在最近的貨幣和難民危機發生之前很久就蔓延開來了。1992年，法國僅以最微弱多數批準推出歐盟單一貨幣。2005年，他們拒絕了歐盟憲法草案。根據名義調查公司皮尤的數據，法國人口中視歐洲為友好的比例從2004年的69％下降到了2016年的38％。這使得歐盟在法國甚至比在英國更不受歡迎。這給了國民陣線新的競選理由。勒龐女士談到英國脫歐時說，這是掙脫她所謂的“歐洲蘇維埃聯盟”枷鎖，得到解放的典范。
The feeling that France has lost its sense of purpose goes well beyond those tempted to vote for the FN. So does exasperation with the failures of both the left and the right to put the national interest first, and fix the country. At every national election for the past ten years, at all levels of government, the French have voted against the party in overall ower; fully 89% of the French told a recent poll they thought the country was heading in the wrong direction. It is this that has opened the way for a party refusenik such as Mr Macron—who,should he win, will have to get the people to break their unerring habit of resisting the change they have just voted for, a habit that accounts for much of their frustration.
認為法國已失去使命感的情緒遠遠超出了那些傾向于投票給國民陣線的心情。對于左，右兩派失敗的憤怒相比國家利益為先，治理國家也是如此。過去十年的每一屆國家大選中，在政府的各個層面，法國人都開足馬力投票反對各黨派; 最近一次民意測驗表明整整89％的法國人認為國家走錯了方向。正是這個因素為拒絕黨派的候選人，如馬克龍先生打開了局面。如果當選，他必須讓人民打破他們的但求無過，不愿變革的習慣，（變革正是他們投票希望獲得的東西），這個習慣是選民們挫敗感的重要原因。
In “Le Mal Fran?ais”, a book published in 1976, Alain Peyrefitte, a minister under Charles de Gaulle, lamented the fact that such a talented country had produced such a blocked system. Every now and then, it seems, France needs to go through convulsions of abrupt change in order to free itself from l’immobilisme (paralysis). History shows that such moments of upheaval can produce startling and creative forces for renewal. But they can also presage a slide into darkness. In Mr Macron’s cities, and Ms Le Pen’s peripheries, France is poised to go either way. The choice it makes could scarcely matter more.
在1976年出版的“Le MalFran?ais”一書中，阿蘭·佩耶菲特（Alain Peyrefitte），戴高樂的一位部長，哀嘆這樣一個有才華的國家產生了這樣一個阻塞的體制。 時不時地，似乎，法國需要通過突然改變引起的驚厥，把自己從癱瘓中解脫出來。 歷史表明，這種巨變時刻可以產生驚人的和有創造性的力量實現復興； 但他們也可以預示著一跤滑入黑暗之中。 在馬克龍的城市或勒龐女士的周邊地區之間，法國處于選擇道路的十字路口。 它做出的選擇不能更重要了。
